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Abstract
The end of the Cold War was followed by a tense and conflictual environment in the 
Balkans. The present study provides a contribution to the understanding of the Balkan 
security from a regional and institutional perspective illustrated by the case of Albania. 
The approach is based on a wider understanding of the concept of security. Through a 
theoretical exercise related to security issues it makes clear the necessity of involving 
other spheres beyond the military and political ones, such as economic and social ones in 
dealing with the security concept. Considering indispensable the role of institutions in 
dealing with the complex and interdependent security issues, an accurate place is given to 
the role and involvement of Euro-Atlantic institutions in the Balkans, without ignoring 
the regional initiatives and institutions as important assets with a role to play. Albania is 
perceived as an integral part of the Balkans both as derivative and participant, with a role 
to play but meanwhile affected by regional legacies and developments.
in
Özet
Soğuk Savaş’ııı sonra ermesi Balkanlar’da gergin ve çatışmak bir ortamın yaratılmasına 
sebep olmuştur. Bu çalışma, Arnavutluk’u örnek alarak bölgesel ve kuramsal 
perspektiften Balkanlar’ın güvenliğini anlamak için yapılan mütevazi bir katkıdır. Bu 
yaklaşım güvenlik kavaramının geniş bir ele alışına dayanmaktadır Güvenlik kavramıyla 
ilgili teorik uygulama vasıtasıyla, bu çalışma askeri ve siyasi yönlerin ötesinde güvenlik 
kavramının izah etmesinde ele alınması gereken ekonomik ve sosyal yönleri de 
kapsamaktadır. Karmaşık ve birbirine bağlı olan güvenlik meseleleriyle uğraşan ilgili 
kuruluların rolünü gerekli kılarak, önemli değeri olan bölgesel inisiyatif ve kuruluların 
etkinliğini gözaıdı etmeden Balkanlar’ daki Euro-Atlaııtık müesseselerinin rolü ve 
alakasına özel bir yer verilmiştir. Arnavutluk, söz konusu bölgenin doğal bir parçası 
olarak algılanarak, bölgenin tarihi ve güncel gelişmeleninden etkilenmektedir.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis is an assessment of the security problems in the Balkans from a 
regional and institutional perspective with a specific focus on Albania. In the 
conceptualisation of the core issue the present work seeks to involve an interlinked 
perspective on the institutions active in the region, the region itself, specific countries 
such as Albania, all enveloped in a theoretical prospective.
According to Barry Buzan1 security is an issue that affects individual, national 
and global humanity. Of these levels, national security is the most important as it 
affects security in the other levels as well. Insecurity is a common denominator that 
characterises all nation states in the international arena. The insecurity is caused by 
different determinants which vary over time in terms of intensity, moving between 
confrontation and cooperation. Understanding national security necessitates the 
development of security as concept. In its broader sense security can be defined as the 
“relative freedom  from harmful threats”.2 Meanwhile, national security can be 
defined as the “preservation of a way of life acceptable to the ... people and 
compatible with the needs and legitimate aspirations of others. It includes freedom 
from military attack or coercion, freedom from internal subversion and freedom from 
the erosion of political, economic and social values which are essential to the quality 
of life.”3 This conceptualisation broadens the understanding of national security. The 
concept encapsulates not only military threats to security but other factors related to 
threats of an economic and social nature. The present study is organised around this 
conceptualisation of security.
At this level it is important to have a well-developed understanding of security 
as a concept limited by the level of analysis. For the purpose of this thesis the level of
1 See, Barry Buzan, 1991, People, States and Fear, An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post- 
Cold War Era, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 2nd edition
2 John E. Mroz, Beyond Security: Private perceptions among Arabs and Israelis, New York: International Peace 
Academy, 1980, p.105, cited in Barry Buzan 1991, People, States and Fear, An Agenda for International 
Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 2nd edition, p. 17 (emphasis in original)
3 National Defence College of Canada, Kingston, 1989, cited in Barry Buzan, 1991, People, States and Fear, An 
Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 2nd edition, p. 17
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analysis will focus on the national level involving the other levels, the individual and 
international ones, in terms of how they affect national security. This approach is 
pursued on the grounds that no phenomenon can be developed in isolation. 
Meanwhile this approach helps in better understanding the core issue by focusing on 
it.
Chapter 1 provides a theoretical understanding of security from different 
schools of international relations. In traditional terms security has been developed 
from two perspectives: war and peace. This consideration has shaped the main 
philosophical traditions in International Relations4. Meanwhile, according to Booth 
and Wheeler, the traditional theory of international relations remains focused on the 
state as the main rational actor in the international system of states and its policies 
aiming at the protection of national interest and the preservation of the status quo in 
the system. In light of both of these considerations, we can establish that three main 
concepts address the security issues: power, order and emancipation. Each of these 
concepts builds upon a philosophical tradition, namely the Hobbesian, Grotian and 
Kantian traditions5.
In the Hobbesian tradition war and power are the turning concepts. Security is 
a derivative of power accumulation and of balance of power preservation in an 
anarchical system of states. The Balkans reality has reflected in one way or another 
such consideration. War and power have shaped the map of the states and affected 
their behaviour.
In the Grotian tradition peace and order are the basis of the whole 
philosophical approach. Order implies in Bull’s terms a “pattern of activity” or 
otherwise international society which preserves the national interest in the system of 
states by settling norms and patterns of behaviour which become accepted and 
customising in time. This increases the predictability and trust in the state system and 
as such creates a pride in peace.6 The quest for order has guided the efforts of elites 
and decision makers. In this context we can mention for a start the Congress of 
Vienna System and finish with the Post Cold War Era7, dominated by the interlocked
4 Barry Buzan, op. Cit note 1, p. 2
5 See, Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, 1992, “Contending Philosophies about security in Europe”, Security 
and Strategy in the New Europe, London, Colin Mclnnes eds., pp. 6-7
6See, Hedley Bull, 1977, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, New York: Columbia 
University Press, pp.5-24
7 See, Hugh Miall, 1993, Shaping the New Europe, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs
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institutions’ activities. The Balkans have experienced these orders, but the results 
have been controversial since they have not always produced a peaceful region8. 
Nevertheless this is not pessimistic: there is a continuous quest for settling order in the 
present times based on democratic values that almost all Balkan countries have shown 
the readiness to share.
In its emphasis on emancipation the Kantian tradition has grounded its 
expectations for peace and thus security. Emancipation is a stage in the human 
development that realises human freedom and lifts all the constraints. These 
developments lead to agreement, mutual understanding, respect and morality among 
states in the international arena.9 Liberal democracies are considered to be the model 
that embodies and practices these values, grounding the Wilsonian belief that 
democracies do not fight each other, and meanwhile they have an emancipatory 
mission in the society of states until the stage of Kantian perpetual peace is achieved. 
The recent democratic transformations in most of the Balkans are feeding the 
expectations for a pacified Balkan region grounded on emancipation.
The emergence of global governance as “a process that embodies a 
transformation in the social organisation of social relations and transactions, 
generating transcontinental and interregional flows and networks of activity, 
interaction and power”10 brought a new impetus to the understanding of security 
issues. This stage in world affairs “raised the profile of economic, environmental and 
societal issues in the international system, as against the narrower, and often 
nationalist, agenda of power politics”11. This new understanding of the security issues 
posits a diminishing role of the state as guardian of national interests, meanwhile 
involving the role of institutional and regional players as partners in this regard.
If we approach “security as a consequence of peace, a long lasting peace will 
provide security for all”12. Integration is conceived as an asset that will provide for a 
long lasting peace. In Karl Deutsch’s terms, integration leads to community formation 
and when this integration goes beyond the national borders it creates an international
s Stevan K Pavlowitch., 1999, The Balkans, 1804-1945, London, Longman
9 Michael W.Doyle, 1995, “Liberalism and World Politics Revised”, Controversies in International Relations 
Theory, Charles W. Kegley Jr., New York, St. Martin’s Press
10 Held David et al, 1999, Global Transformations Politics, Economics and Culture, Cambridge: Stanford Univ. 
Press, p. 15
11 Barry Buzan, op. cit note 1, p. 12
12 ibid., p.2
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community. The community formation is perceived as learning and emancipatory 
process that makes people interact, help and understand each other. This is regarded 
as a contribution to the building of trust, respect, and confidence that in a given stage 
of the development of the integration process will lead to a merging of states called 
“amalgamation” which represents an authority beyond the nation state.13 The 
existence of governance in international relations as a process that goes beyond the 
nation state’s control, is considered by Mitrany14 to be an asset which will lead to 
lasting peace. The idea of organising the relations beyond the state influence is 
manifested in different ways. The federalism approach, implies the creation of 
supranational institutions in governing inter-state relations. Functionalism implies 
supranational agencies in addressing a “function” in the interest of human interests 
rather then in the interest of citizens of a nation state. Neo-functionalism implies the 
“spill over” effect which extends the role of supranational agencies from one given 
function to another.
The emergence of globalisation created the potential of building a long lasting 
peace. In Keohane and Nye’s terms, the multiplicity of the relations among states 
compels the state to not use coercion in one field of activity because this will disturb 
the mutually profitable relations in the other fields15. In Haas and Young’s16 terms, 
globalisation and interdependence in international relations are characterised by the 
emergence of regimes that are perceived as settled and commonly agreed rules and 
norms which regulate an issue area. The emergence of such regimes encourages a 
sense of community, trust and confidence with a pacifying effect on the state 
behaviour.
The emergence of globalisation has increased the importance of institutions 
and regimes in dealing with security issues, diminishing the role of the state in 
domestic and international affairs. At the same time state behaviour is more influenced 
by collective decision making17.
13 See, Karl W. Deutsch, 1957, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation 
in the light of Historical Experience, Pincerton N.J.: Pincct ton University Press
14 See, David Mitrany, 1966, A Working Peace System, Chicago: Quadrangle Books
15 See, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, 1989,Power and Interdependence, London: Harper Collins, 2ml eds.
16 See Oran R Young., “International regimes: Problems of Concept Formation”, World Politics, Vol. XXXII, 
No. 3, April 1980 and Ernst B. Haas, “Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes”, World 
Politics, Vol. XXXII, No. 3, April 1980
17 See, Hugh Miall, 1993, Shaping the New Europe, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, and Susan 
Strange, 1996, The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press
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These developments have great implications for the conceptualisation of 
national security issues, involving international and regional institutions. In our 
understanding of the Balkans’ security issues the theoretical review clarifies the 
importance of regional and institutional perspectives in approaching the core issue.
Most of the Balkan countries, Albania being a typical example, are small in 
size. In this regard they face insecurities of a small country perspective and thus imply 
peculiarities such as limited independence of actions and alliance building tendencies 
as an effort to increase the range of independent actions and thus security.
Chapter 2, provides a regional and country approach to security. The 
historical review of the Balkans, and Albania in particular, allocates an important role 
to the belief that human behaviour is myth-driven. History perpetrates and perpetuates 
mythhistories that in most of the cases drive state attitudes, perceptions and actions 
toward the others18.
Religion and major powers interests in the Balkans are considered to be a 
source of division that has fuelled nationalism in the region and a sense of alienation 
from the other neighbour states19. This trend is perpetuated over time, affecting the 
cooperation and inter-relations among the Balkan countries that still remain at low 
levels. The Balkan countries still fight each other based on religion affiliations and 
hatred nourished by historical myths, which was the justification for the war in Bosnia 
and Kosovo. Albania is part and product of this environment. At the same time in the 
Balkans context, Albania reveals distinct particularities. These particularities have to 
do with the division of the ethnic Albanian territories among different states, the 
backwardness inherited from being under foreign domination and the existence of 
authoritarian regimes over time. These facts are important in the sense that they 
provide insights for our understanding of security dilemmas and patterns of behaviour 
of states in the international arena. In this context the security dilemma is conceived as 
"a structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security 
needs tend, regardless of intentions, to lead rising
IK William H. McNeill., 1986, Mytlihislory and oilier Essays, Chicago: University of Chicago Press
19 See Barbara Jelavich, 1983, Balkan History, 2 Volumes, Cambridge: Cambrigde University Press, Vol I, or 
Costandine P. Danopoulos and Kostas G. Messas, l997,“Ethnonationalism, Security and Conflict in the 
Balkans", Crisis in the Balkans, Views from the participants, Costantine P. Danopoulos and Kostas G. Messas 
eds., Boulder, Co, Westview Press, or Janusz Bugajsky, 1994, Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe: A Guide to 
Nationality Policies, Armonk, N .Y ., O.M.P. Sharpe
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insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive, and the 
measures of others as potentially threatening"20. Furthermore, the patterns of 
behaviour are conceived as the reaction of states in coping with the threats to their 
security.
Believing that there is potential for cooperation in the Balkans, a broad 
account is provided from historical, analytical and contemporary perspectives on the 
Balkans cooperation, based on Nye’s21 pre-conditions for integration.
I will narrow the level of analysis from region to state, with a view to 
understanding how Albania copes with security its dilemmas and how its behaviour is 
shaped in this regard toward the neighbours.
Chapter 3 introduces an institutional perspective on security issues. 
Institutions in the Post Cold War era are considered as assets that play an important 
role in managing the inter-relations beyond state level. As such they are considered to 
be peace providers that guarantee the security for all. In Keohane’s terms, this belief 
is based on the institutions’ functions, principles and the role they have in the 
international arena, which with the appearance of global governance in world affairs, 
have assumed new importance.22 The role and intervention of institutions in world 
affairs is not seen without controversy. Some scholars see the present international 
institutions as having an European face or they are considered “Eurocentrist”, 
representing a source of tensions for those regions of the world which do not share 
the same values as Europe. In other words it is considered a clash of civilisations on a 
world scale.23 For the purpose of this thesis the level of analysis is focused at state 
level and from a regional and European perspective. The controversy of 
‘eurocentrism’ does not apply since in the context of the Balkans this controversy is
20 Barry Buzan, op. cit note 1, p 4
21 Joseph S.Nye, 1971, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organisation , Boston: Little 
Brown
22 Robert O.Keohane, "International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?", Foreign Policy, Spring 1998 
and Robert O.Keohane, 1993,“The Diplomacy of Structural Change: Multilateral Institutions and State 
Strategies”, America and Europe in an Eera of Change, Helga Haftendorn and Christian Tuschhoff eds., 
Boulder, Co.: Westview Press
23 Stanley Hoffman, 1986,“The problem of Intervention”, Intervention in World Politics, Medley Bull eds., 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, and Ian Forbes, 1993, “Beyond the State”, Political Theory and the Ethnics of 
Intervention, Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffman eds., London: Macmillan, and Samel P. Huntington, 1998, The 
Clash of Civilisations and the Remarking of the World Order, New York: Touchstone Books, and Barry Buzan, 
1991, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold Era, Harvester 
Wheatsheaf
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not important since the Balkans’ are considered part of Europe and the regional states 
share this belief.
In the understanding that an interlocked institutional approach is the most 
important for dealing with security issues, a great deal of attention is given to the role 
of the main European Institutions, such as NATO, the EU, the OSCE and the WEU, 
in building European security architecture with a focus on the Balkans and Albania in 
particular.
The particular reliance of Albania on institutions is related to the size, the 
peculiarities that have shaped the country’s security dilemmas, the region itself, and 
the conviction that this complexity can be dealt with beyond the state level. The 
institutions can use "the stick and carrot" as an incentive which can pull states in the 
direction of liberal democracies, market economies and rule of law-important tools 
and presumed conditions which build trust and understanding as the basis for 
cooperation and the obsolescence of war.
Chapter 4 is an account of social and economic threats to security. These 
threats are considered internal issues that remain within the social and the economic 
sphere. They become a source of threat to national security when they go beyond the 
sector lines, reaching politics and military spheres. At this stage political stability can 
be undermined by disturbances in the economic and social system. At the same time 
social and economic problems are now considered an important source for instability 
that in an interdependent international environment may easily cause a domino effect 
on a regional level with high repercussions on a broader scale.
The social crises are due to the extreme sensitivity of society to any 
fluctuation in political, economic or cultural conditions and the acceleration of the 
social changes beyond the ability of society to control their direction and intensity. 
Social issues constitute a threat when social values and relationships within 
communities have been altered for the worse and they enter a period of violent 
confrontation.24 The transition period from socialist to democratic regimes implies 
profound changes within society in most of the cases followed by crises that can 
threaten the political stability and involve military structures.
24 Vladimir Dimitrov, Robert Woog and Lesley Kuhn-White, “The Divergence Syndrome in Social Systems”, 
Complexity International, Vol. 3, April 1996
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It is important to consider civil society and démocratisation process in this 
analysis as the main factors which are involved in such a change. Both concepts are 
assessed using a multidimensional perspective that involves regional and country 
perspective, and the international context. Factors such as historical legacies, the 
influence of the preceding regimes and the developments in the international arena are 
considered during this analysis.
In understanding the democratic perspectives in the Balkans and in Albania, a 
theoretical perspective is developed focused on the distinction between formal and 
substantial democracy. In Diamond’s terms formal democracy implies free elections 
based on a set of democratic rules, free and equitable competition, constitutionalism 
and rule of law. Meanwhile we reach the stage of a substantial democracy when there 
exists the belief that democracy is the best possible alternative and democratic values 
and principles are customised.25 Meanwhile, in understanding civil society, Gramsci 
considers civil society role’s as important in sustaining capitalist development and 
leading transformations.
Under such conceptualisation, an account is provided of Albanian democratic 
transition, civil society’s development and tensions and controversies generated 
during the process of transition. At the same time the role of international institutions 
is not neglected in such developments. The main attention is given to the 
transformations in civil society, institution building, political transition, election and 
free media, considering them important in both civil society and democratic 
developments.
In the second part of the Chapter 4 economic problems are considered to be a 
source of instability and a threat to security issues. The economic problems can 
become a source of instability when the deterioration of the macroeconomic indicators 
has reached a level that has considerably deteriorated the standard of living of the 
main part of the population, and diminished opportunities and possibilities for a decent 
life, provoking as a consequence popular discontent that may constitute a threat to the 
political power. Due to the interdependence process this situation can go beyond the 
state level, constituting a source of instability for the region and some time going even 
further. Given the wide-ranging consequences of such situations and the complexity
25 Diamond Larry, 1996, “Is the Third Wave Over?”, The Global Resurgence of Democracy, Larry Diamond and 
Plattner Marc F. eds., Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2ml edition
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of the issue, it has become evident that a national approach into the solution of the 
problem may not be sufficient. In this context an important space is given in the 
present study to the role of the European Union in Balkan and Albanian 
developments. The role of the EU is considered important in developing sustainable 
security for the region. This consideration is based on the fact that the role of the EU 
in the region implies more than economic considerations and market economy 
development. It also involves the development of democratic values and obeisance 
toward the rule of law-important preconditions for developing a consolidated 
democracy that is the base for a sustainable peace. This context has been used for 
giving an account of Albanian economical transition and its peculiarities, thereby 
fulfilling the objectives of this study.
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CHAPTER 1 : A Short Theoretical Review of Security and
Integration Theories
1. Traditional Security Concept
Security is an important issue that has attracted the attention of academic and 
policy elite's since ancient times. There is no precise definition of security, but some 
insights from different schools of international relations theory can be summarised.
According to Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, the traditional idea about 
security is based on three assumptions: first, the concept of security is related to the 
state; second, the security policy of the state aims to preserve the status quo in the 
system of states; third, the main threat to state security is a military threat and 
accordingly the need for effective military defence is of primary importance to the 
state.
Looking at security from the state perspective we can say that, first of all the 
state is looking to provide for its own security, second it is looking to free itself from 
the fear of war in an anarchical world system, and finally it is concerned with the 
preservation of its ‘core values’ and the pursuit of ‘national interests’ and acquisition 
of safety against potential aggressors.26
There is a consensus among scholars of international relations concerning the 
importance of the three philosophical traditions that deal with security problems in the 
sphere of international relations, namely: the Hobbesian tradition, the Grotian 
tradition and the Kantian tradition. According to Andrew Linklater, these traditions 
turn around three competing principles: power, order and emancipation respectively.27
1.1 Hobbesian tradition
For the Hobbesian tradition or classical realism, power is the key word that 
explains the security dilemma in the international arena. States are driven to seek 
power because there is no central authority in the international system to settle
26 Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, op cit note 5, p.4
27 See, Andrew Linklater, 1990, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations, 
London: Macmillan
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disputes peacefully and enforce judgements. “States have no one but themselves to 
rely on for protection, or to obtain what they believe, they are entitled to by right” .28 
The threat to security is the anarchical nature of the international system, which is 
caused by the distribution and the character of military power among states.29At the 
same time, the military instruments gain importance because the ultima ratio of power 
in international relations is war.30 “The most serious wars are fought in order to make 
one’s country militarily stronger or, more often, to prevent another country from 
becoming militarily stronger, so that there is much justification for the epigram that 
the principal cause of war is war itself’.31 All states will seek to maximise power for 
the sake of their security; as a result, stability in an anarchical system of states will 
result only from the maintenance of a balance of power in the system.32 Evidently this 
approach is intrinsically pessimistic. Peace lasts only as long the established balance of 
power among states remain unchanged.
The insights of the Hobbesian tradition have characterised the Balkan states' 
behaviour over time. Animosities and systemic hatred based on ethnic and territorial 
claims have been a common denominator that have defined an isolated and self- 
seeking behaviour. These facts have prevented the Balkan countries from establishing 
a cooperative and interdependent relationship. Unable to maximise their power, 
Balkan countries established alliances with external powers interested in the region. 
The balance of power in the Balkans has been mainly a virtual projection of the 
balance of power dictated out of the region by the self-seeking interests of imperial 
powers over time. Consequently, the Balkan “states were encouraged and 
manipulated by the powers in the hope of gaining influence. Their size, shape, stage of 
growth and even existence were in the final analysis regulated by power 
consideration.”33. The Cold War period did not bring about any difference in this 
regard; the Balkan region ended up by falling under the two superpowers' influence 
and their game of power raising and balancing. Being consistent over time, these
28 Richard K.Betts, 1994, Conflict After the Cold War, Boston, Allyn and Bacon, p.63
2’See, John J.Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War”, The Atlantic, Vol. 266, No., 2 August 
1990
30 Edward Hallett Carr, 1994,The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939, Boston, Allyn and Bacon eds., p.77
31 ibid., Carr, p.78
32 Charles W. Kegley Jr., 1995, “The Neo-Liberal Challenge to Realist Theories of World Politics, An 
Introduction”, Controversies in International Relations Theory, Charles W. Kegley Jr. eds., New York, St. 
Martin’s Press, p.5
33 Stevan K.Pavlowitch, 1999, The Balkans, 1804-1945, London: Longman, p. 334
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considerations have shaped Balkan countries' security dilemmas and their foreign 
policy, both of which will be considered in the second chapter, with a particular focus 
on the Albanian case.
1.2. Grotian Tradition
For the Grotian tradition or rationalist approach, the key word is order. 
...“Order, therefore security, can be achieved not simply through the manipulation of 
power but through the growth of a society of states”34. Such a view posits 
international law and morality besides war and balance of power as important agents 
in creating order in international affairs.
According to Bull international order is a “pattern of activity” that settles and 
keeps under control the “primary goals” of states and the international system of 
states, implying as such, the preservation of the system of states, of the sovereignty 
and independence of individual states, and of the balance of power among states. 
International society is the only means to cope with anarchy within the international 
system. After defining the aims of this international society, as a second stage it is 
important to provide the “patterns of activity” that will bring about order within 
international society. These patterns imply consciousness, obeisance toward 
international law and international institutions. After providing aims and patterns of 
international society, we can define when and how the international society will 
emerge. The international society will be consolidated when a group of states become 
conscious of the commonality of interests and values, and conceive themselves to be 
bound by a common set of rules in their relations with another, and share in the 
workings of common institutions.35 The stronger the international society, the more 
disciplined and predictable are the international relations. Accordingly, the confidence 
of states in respect of security concerns is increased.
The units within a system or society, ( these units can be individuals, states or 
other social entities), are concerned with three important elementary goals: security 
against violence, assurance that agreements will be maintained, and stability of 
property. Meeting such goals may bring about order within a social system. States
34 Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, op. cit note 5, Pg.7
35 See, Hedley Bull, op. cit note 6
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seeking order create norms and rules which are internationally recognised. In this way 
the international law is settled, facilitating and satisfying states' needs through its 
communications and management functions. By clarifying rights, settling 
responsibilities and competencies, international law assists the state in its coordination 
and cooperation activities, fulfilling both state and collective interests within an 
anarchical system. In return, international law and the commitment of states to be 
bound by it will increase the degree of certainty and will diminish unpredictability in 
the system.36
Nevertheless, the Grotian tradition recognises that in international society, 
there exist problems due to “pervasive tensions between justice, power and order”,37 
which make the achievement of a sustainable order among states difficult.
The importance of order has driven the Europeans toward a continuous quest 
for stability. In time, state security concerns, in one way or an other, have been 
affected by the established orders. Still there is a quest for a perfect order that will 
provide a settled peaceful world. According to Miall we can start listing the political 
orders in Europe since 1815 as follows:
1815 to 1854 - Congress of Vienna System
1854 to 1871 - Bismarck’s wars
1871 to 1914 - From the Concert of Europe to alliances
1914 to 1918 - First World war
1918 to 1939 - League of Nations
1939 to 1945 - Second World War
1945 to 1989 - Cold War
1989- - Post-Cold War Era
Evidently, besides the continuing existence of anarchic order, there has been 
an important and strengthening trend toward regulating and modifying this anarchy 
through the creation of international institutions and international norms38 that still 
have yet to reach the stage of offering a long-lasting pacified world.
36 Harvey Starr, 1995, “International law and International Order”, Controversies in International Relations 
Theory, Charles W. Kegley Jr. eds., New York, St. Martin’s Press, pp. 299-315.
37 Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, op. cit note5, p.8
38 See, Hugh Miall, op. cit note 7, p. 8
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In the Balkans, the dialectics of the international order have had a prolonged 
and controversial impact, reflecting the self-seeking interests of the main European 
powers and the balance of power situation. At the beginning of the 20th century, with 
the dissolution of the empires and the principle of self-determination becoming a 
predominant principle in shaping the nation-building, the Balkan countries belatedly 
entered the European family with a plethora of problems. Within a short time Hitler’s 
Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union filled the power vacuum undermining all the 
principles and norms that international community tried to establish through the 
Congress of Vienna and the Treaty of Versailles. The war between the two ruined the 
whole Balkan edifice. The defeat of the Third Reich and the establishment of the 
communist regime in the Balkans after 1945 left the region once more under the 
shadow and dominance of an other imperial power and alien ideology.39
The dynamic processes that have been under way in Europe since 1989 have 
not clarified the patterns of the new order. Will Europe move toward further 
integration and consolidation of existing institutions or toward fragmentation? Efforts 
are under way to settle rules and norms, defining the role of institutions. Institutions 
are indeed emerging as key players to an unprecedented extent for addressing the 
Balkan countries' security problems. Their role is indispensable, given the large range 
of problems inherited from the past, the complexity of the international context and 
the inability of the Balkan countries to deal with them due to the lack of heritage and 
experience. The recent events in the Balkans and the intervention of NATO in 
resolving them speaks for itself.
1.3. Kantian Tradition
For the Kantian tradition the key word for security is emancipation. The 
accumulation of power is threatening and generates fear, the tightening of order 
encourages despotism and justifies injustice. Order and power, are ‘inherently 
unstable’. According to this logic, a sustainable security can be perceived only as a 
result of the emancipation of society. Emancipation is perceived as a stage when 
human beings feel free from the constraints that impede them from doing what they
39 See, Stevan K Pavlowitch, op. cit note 8
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are willing to do. Such a goal implies the lifting of constrains that may be of legal, 
economic, moral, political or physical nature.40
Emancipation is a long process that grows through building a state of justice 
and a feeling of community that guarantees respect and morality among states, and 
embodies an integrative dynamic. On the other hand, “as culture grows and men 
gradually move toward greater agreement over their principles, they lead to mutual 
understanding and peace”41
One could argue that historically, the emancipation of world society is 
observable. This society has developed from being primitive, inquisitorial, isolationist, 
towards being a more cosmopolitan, modern and efficient society. The consciousness 
of the public has changed also. The Balkan states are part of this historical 
development, their consciousness having grown over the course of history. 
Nowadays, initiatives testifying for cooperation and integration are part of the 
political agenda of the Balkan states. Different factors have influenced this process 
such as the establishment of: liberal democracies that imply free elections, free 
markets that offer equal opportunities, constitutionalism based on the rule of law. 
Accordingly, human behaviour is influenced by the needs of efficient cooperation and 
interrelations to prevail over the follies of the past. The moral of democratic societies 
is considered an important tool against the immorality of war. According to the 
Kantian tradition, democratic civil society is defined as the revolutionary force that 
emancipates and directs the society toward a new democratic social order that will be 
the basis for a peaceful world.
1.4. The New Security Concept
Through the 1980s and in particular in the 1990s, the concept of security 
received a new impetus. The three approaches have been updated in compliance with 
the new developments in the international arena. The concept of security is no longer 
concentrated only on the state, as “individuals and world community as a whole” are 
included as fully fledged participants and the new concept “is not status quo oriented, 
but future oriented and seeks progressive changes”. Military threat is not the only
4,1 Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, op. cit note 5, p 8
41 Michael W. Doyle, op. cit note 9, p.99
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threat to security. The new concept considers the fact that every thing that “prevents 
people and groups living full and free lives” constitutes a threat to security. What is 
more, economic, environmental and human rights problems are considered as threats 
to security,42 as they can constitute factors of instability which present one of the most 
pronounced security threats in the Post Cold War Era.
Evidently, the security concept has broadened to include political, ideological, 
legal and economic considerations, making it more complex and more difficult to 
achieve.
2. Concepts of Integration and Theories
From an early stage, concepts of integration and security were considered by 
most international relations scholars as interrelated and inter-influencing. Integration 
is considered an asset which, “will bring about a self conscious abstinence from the 
use of force”.43 As such it will provide the foundations for a long lasting peace. In the 
context of this thesis, the integration concept will be developed as part of the security 
approach. This assumption will limit the analysis of integration within the 
requirements of this study.
2.1. Concepts of Integration
Different scholars of international relations have perceived the integration 
process from different perspectives. Ernest Haas sees integration as a process that will 
spill over at some stages to a political integration.44 In Karl Deutsch’s opinion, 
integration can be considered a process that may lead to a sense of community in a 
defined territory that will make integration a matter of fact for the peoples living in 
it.45 Accordingly, “integration is the condition whereby a sense of community is 
attained, through institutions and practices which bring about expectations of peaceful 
change”46. .
According to Nye, integration works upon the existence of some given pre­
conditions that carry potential for integration. These pre-conditions include:
42 See, Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, op. cil note 5, p.4
4:1 Gulnur Aybet, 1997,“The dynamics of European Security Cooperation, 1945-91”, London: Macmillan, p.10
44 Ernst Haas, 1958, The Uniting of Europe , Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 16
45 Karl W Deutsch, op. cit note 13, pp. 5-6
46 Gulnur Aybet, op. cit note 43, p.10
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- symmetry or economic equality of units
- elite value complementarity
- existence of pluralism
- capacity of member states to adapt and to respond.47
These pre-needed conditions will be applied to the analysis of integration possibilities 
in the Balkans.
Building a community that will provide for security through integration is not 
perceived as a single path process. According to the dynamics of the integration 
process, different theories have been built upon. The most significant theories on 
integration, such as federalism, functionalism and neo-functionalism, and regime 
theory, will be elaborated below.
2.2 Integration theories
2.2.1. Federalism
Especially after the devastating periods of war in Europe, federalism gained a 
strong ideological prominence. It is presented by its advocates as an important mean 
to provide for peace among states within a federation. What does federalism 
intrinsically imply? “ ...Federalism implies the creation of supranational institutions 
including military and police forces and a common legal system as the best method for 
uniting people who already share some common features such as language or culture 
or geographic proximity, but who live in separate states.”48 The creation of the 
federation of states includes the elaboration of a common constitution and 
supranational institutions aiming at the last stage of integration, the creation of a 
political union that will be the first step leading to a closer integration in other fields. 
The supporters of federalism since the early times have foreseen this kind of 
integration as an important step towards a peaceful Europe; the supranational 
institutions will ideally put order into the anarchical system. Federalism is an attempt 
to provide a solution to the security dilemma, that will bring about lasting peace. 
Looking at the experience of Europe, federations or confederations as an other 
alternative option, have not succeeded. The most recent example is the Yugoslav
47 Joseph S. Nye, op. cit note 21, pp. 56-66.
4R Aybet Gulnur, op. cit note 43, p.12 (the italic word is added)
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confederation that collapsed, defying the efforts of international community to 
maintain it in one piece.
2.2.2. Functionalism and the ‘spillover’ effect
According to the most important scholars of this approach, the positive results 
achieved in one technical field will necessarily lead to cooperation in other fields. The 
deepening of this process will encompass unconsciously more and more of the 
political sector. This new configuration will contribute to security on the world scale. 
From Mitrany’s point of view, “economic unification would build up the foundation 
for political agreement even if it did not make it superfluous”.49
In functionalism, the role of international institutions is of great importance. 
They represent the body that in a transnational base manages the cooperation in a 
given technical function. The states transfers “slices of sovereignty” related to this 
given function, to these organisations. In this way the international organisations build 
a culture of a community that will lay down the path for further cooperation and the 
gradual shrinking of sovereignty, through an unintended process.50
According to Haas, the integration process depends on the interest 
calculations of major political elite groups within the states to be integrated. 
Integration is adopted as a policy objective by the state based on well designed 
national interests. The success of cooperation in a technical field will serve as a lesson 
that will be applied in other fields, and furthermore will ‘spillover’ to the field of 
political integration. What is important here is the result of this integration process: 
the conscious creation of a political community as a guarantee for security and 
stability. This logic of integration behind neo-functionalism is illustrated with the EU 
model.51
Functionalism has limited results on a global level. The spill over effect has not 
had the expected impact. The successful cooperation in one field has not extended to 
other fields even to a limited degree except for the case of the EU. As a result 
nationalism has not become obsolete52. On the contrary it has gained momentum after
49 David Mitrany, ‘T he functional Approach to World Organisation”, International Affairs, vol. XXIV July 
1948, p.359
511 Aybet Gulnur, op. cit note 43, p. 17
51 See, Ernst Haas, 1964, Beyond the Nation State, Stanford: Stanford University Press
52 See, Hans J Morgentau., 1978, “Introduction”, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power, New York: 
Alfred A. Knop, pp. 499-507
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the end of the Cold War. Even the EU, despite its success in economic integration, is 
still far from being a well integrated political community today. The Balkans are 
facing the reverse of the process, starting integration with security integration. 
Programmes, such as PfP and NACC are established by NATO to encourage and 
enhance the cooperation in the security issues and build confidence and security 
among the Balkan countries. This will create hopefully the environment for 
developing cooperation in other fields and will lay the path for integration first at 
regional level and later into the EU.
2.2.3. Globalization, Regimes and Complex Interdependence
The 20th century has been unique in the development of technology. The pace 
of advancement in technology has become faster and faster. The rapid process of 
industrialisation and technological advancement has increased man’s control over 
nature, improved communication and transportation possibilities and increased mass 
consumption. There is no reason to suppose that technological change in products and 
processes driven by profit will not continue in the future. The deepening of the world 
economic cooperation, favoured by the rapid changes in technology, has increased the 
possibilities and the opportunities for mutual gain. This fact is important because it 
predicts an irreversible increase in the relations between different regions and 
participants due to interest in profit and the elimination of logistical barriers. 
Especially after the 1970s, the world economy saw a high degree of trade and 
economic interactions among states and other actors which gave to international 
economic relations the shape of a “cobweb”53. This system of relations has created an 
economic interdependence that has highlighted the fact “that the territorial boundaries 
of states no longer coincide with the extent or the limits of political authority over 
economy and society”54. This state of affairs has led to a globalisation of economic 
relations on a world scale.
Globalisation has made war obsolete. This idea is supported by the fact that an 
independent state is supposed to have a variety of relations and employing force in 
one area is supposed to cause a rupture in mutually profitable relations in other areas. 
These facts show a clear reduction of the utility of force in interrelations among
53 John Burton, 1987, World Society, Lanham eds., Washington D.C., University Press o f America
54 Susan Strange, op. cit not 17, p. 3
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States. Accordingly, an internal arrangement among nations is in the interest of 
everyone.
This new situation in the world affairs was considered by Keohane and Nye and 
defined as “interdependence”. In order to explain the status of affairs of the 
international system a model was designed. The model is said to work when some 
given conditions are fulfilled. First, multiple channels of communication ought to be 
sent; second, multiple issues should not have a clear complex and consistent 
hierarchy, which in other words means that security is not consistently on the top of 
the international agenda; third, as a result the use of force ought to be obsolete when 
‘complex interdependence’ prevails.55
The globalisation of the world economy has caused a homogenisation of the 
world society with important consequences for international relations. In Miall’s terms 
these consequences can be summed as:
(i) The new situation gave a priority to the multilateral approach in dealing with 
problems of interdependence, involving institutions and regimes.
(ii) The role of the state in decision making and bargaining was highly influenced by 
collective decision making and in such circumstances the institutions and regimes took 
advantage of this situation.
(iii) A new kind of layer of governance emerged over the states, narrowing the role 
of the state over domestic society and increasing its influencing through international 
institutions.56
Accordingly, the existence of interdependence implies the gradual emergence 
of order “with its own rules and principles”, which will constitute in itself the 
emergence of a regime or “a final order brought by integration”. The existence of such 
regimes will bring “self restraint” in the actions of states and a “customary” obeisance 
toward the international law, encouraged by state self interests.57
A definition of the concept of regime will be important to better understand 
this cooperation. Oran Young characterises regimes as “social institutions governing 
the actions of those interested in specifiable activities” (or meaningful sets of 
activities).58 In Ernst Haas terms regimes are considered as “norms, rules and
55 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, 1989, Power and Interdependence, London: Harper Collins, 2'"1 eds., p.25
56 Hugh Miall, op. cit note 17, p. 20
57 Aybet Gulnur, 1997, op. cit note 43, pp.27-28
5* Oran R. Young, op. cit note 16, p.332
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procedures agreed to in order to regulate an issue area”.59 According to both 
definitions, the emphasis is on the creation of norms of conduct, rules, procedures and 
governing collaboration patterns relevant to security. A security regime can be formed 
if the states are in a condition of interdependence and judge that the costs and benefits 
of undertaking a war based on self-interests of the state are too costly. In order to 
have a sustainable regime, a sense of community, common values and trust must have 
evolved out of the condition of interdependence: in this way a regime can have a 
pacifying impact on the state behaviour.
3. The level of integration
According to the level of inter-state relations and their interests upon these 
relations, integration can exist on different levels. There are different levels of 
integration such as: pluralist security community, regional integration, alliances.
3.1. Pluralist security community
According to Deutsch, the first level of integration can be considered the 
pluralist security community. This community has three characteristics:
- compatibility of values among decision makers;
- predictability of behaviour of the decision makers
- mutual responsiveness toward the actions and communications of other units 
without recourse to war and other violent means.60
This is the lowest level of integration that implies the basic security needs, 
sovereignty and independence. This level of integration can be achieved in the long 
run in the Balkans since there is a trend in the international arena after the end of the 
Cold War toward building democratic regimes which provide the necessary credibility 
and trust in the actions and behaviour of others and the Balkans are part of this 
process. These values are important in creating a sustainable security community in 
the Balkans, since it is grounded in the Wilsonian belief that democracies do not fight 
each other.
59 Ernst B. Haas, “Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes”, World Politics, Vol. XXXII,
No. 3, April 1980, p.358
6,1 Karl W. Deutsch, op. cit note 13, p. 199
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3.2. Regional integration
Regional integration is a process that includes an intense cooperation among 
the countries of a defined geographic region in different fields such as economy, 
culture, education, law, defence. This cooperation creates a kind of interdependence 
that can provide a framework for security in the region by tying up the states into a 
network of relations of a different kind that in return will create a sense of community 
in which insecurities emanating from neighbouring countries will diminish.
Looking at the Balkan region, a limited amount of progress has occurred in 
respect of the postal problems, scientific exchanges and some aspects of tourism. In 
the other fields little has been done and the level of trade and economic exchanges 
remain at very low levels.
In addition, there is no historical background that leads to the sense of 
common community in the Balkan region. The region is split between the Muslim 
religion and different forms of Christianity. There is no language or cultural 
communality. Nevertheless, the new era of democratic changes has created a positive 
background for increasing the cooperation based on democratic values that are always 
in compliance with the national interests. In this framework an important role is 
played by international institutions. These organisations represent poles of attraction 
of prosperity and security for the region's countries. On the other hand, the 
membership of them involves a set of values and practices that imply democratic 
norms, free market and the rule of law. More then that, these organisations are 
involved in the Balkan region providing assistance and support for the transition 
process. Meanwhile they constitute a forum for discussion and information exchange 
as a mean for building security and confidence for regional cooperation.
3.3. Alliances
An alliance “ is a formal agreement between two or more nations to 
collaborate on national security issues”.61 According to Osgood: an alliance reflects “a 
latent war community, based on general cooperation that goes beyond formal
61 O.R.Holsti, P.T. Hopmann. and J.D Sullivan., 1973, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: 
Comparative Studies, New York: John Wiley&Sons, p.4
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provisions and that the signatories must continually cultivate in order to preserve 
mutual confidence in each other’s fidelity to specific obligations62.
Alliances are formed to attain policy goals related to security. The effective 
functioning of an alliance may bring about or enhance a sense of community.63 
Alliances are temporary instruments of policy that provide security only in some areas 
but they cannot resolve all security concerns.
Often the alliance of small states is established in order to prevent intervention 
of powers in the region or control and limit the pressure extended by the great power. 
Militarily this alliance can also act to restrain certain aggressive activities among its 
members.64 In the Balkan history this has been the case of the Little Entente or Balkan 
League thanks to which, the member countries managed to keep France and Italy 
distant from the region in the 1920s and 1930s.
The alliances of small states can provide a limited enhancement of security for 
the small states. However, it is wrong to assume that a combination of small powers is 
equivalent to a great power.
4. Small States Security Concept
In the Balkans most of the states of the region are considered small, from the 
point of view of the population, territory surface, economic importance, military 
capabilities and power projecting force. It is important for the aim of this thesis to 
perceive the size of a state from the perspective of the security function, avoiding any 
long debate over the definition of small in other contexts. Accordingly, “a small state 
may be described as one which tends to constitute no more than a dispensable and 
non-decisive increment to a primary state’s total array of political and military 
resources and which tends to believe in its inability to rely on its own means and this 
is then recognised by the other states involved in international politics.”65 This 
definition is important for understanding the perception and behaviour of small states 
in security issues and foreign policies related to it.
62 Robert Osgood, 1968, Alliances and American Foreign Policy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
p.19
63 Aurel Braun, 1983, Small-State Security in the Balkans, Totova, New Jersey, Barnes&Noble Books, p.23
64 ibid., pp.23-24
65 ibid., p.9
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4.1. Patterns of Behaviour
The small state is continuously under the pressure of security dilemmas due to 
its limited capabilities which are insufficient to provide for its own security, in 
confrontation with bigger powers. In such circumstances they look towards building 
alliances with major powers. “Small states do not have realistic options of 
independent actions so they try within an alliance to commit their larger partners to 
intimate consultations in future emergencies”.66
In their quest for alliances, the small states try to be attractive by presenting a 
deterrent fact (pollution might be the case) that may attract the big powers' interest or 
may be a cause of concern for their security as a result of the domino effect. On the 
other hand the small states can play with their strategic importance in order to gain 
the attention of big powers and use it as a bargaining asset. In their quest to find a 
solution for their security dilemma, the small states in most cases choose non- 
alignment or neutrality, followed by limited relations among themselves and extended 
relations with the big powers. They can also pursue integration within international 
organisations aiming to achieve at least formally an equal status with the other states 
and to claim protection from the international structures. Integration into pluralistic 
societies and international organisations is perceived as an asset that provides a 
convenient security for the small states. 67 This make the membership of these 
organisations attractive. However, it involves actions on behalf of the common 
interests that not always fully match the small states' interests. In such a case the small 
states find themselves compelled to obey. The KFOR operation in Kosovo and the 
controversies on the part of certain Balkan states to participate in it, is a good 
example. Compelled by the necessity of membership into NATO, all the Balkan 
countries that aspire to such membership gave their consensus to the operation, 
despite the internal controversies.68
66 Harlan Cleveland, 1970, NATO, The Transatlantic Bargain, New York: Haper and Row, p.24
67 See Robert L. Rothstein, 1968, Alliances and Small Powers, New York: Columbia University Press, cited in 
Aurel Braun, 1983, Small-State Security in the Balkans, Totova, New Jersey, Barnes&Noble Books, p.3 and 
David Vital, 1967,77ie Survival of the Small States, London: Clarendon Press, cited in Aurel Braun 1983, 
Small-State Security in the Balkans, Totova, New Jersey, Barnes&Noble Books, pp. 3-4,; and Arnold Wolfers, 
1962, Discord and Collaboration, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962, cited in Aurel Braun, 
1983, Small-State Security in the Balkans, Totova, New Jersey, Barnes&Noble Books, p 5
6RIn the beginning of operations in Kosova, Bulgaria was not in favour of giving to the NATO the right to use 
Bulgarian territory for NATO military actions. This attitude later was moderated.
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Small States can join an alliance for a variety of reasons to augment their 
power and importance, to increase protection in their favour, to have input to policy 
making, to involve the mediation of important actors on issues of interest, contain 
enmities.69
5. Security Debates After the End of the Cold War
Security issues are related to two interlinked concepts: security and 
sovereignty. This relationship has been going on since the Peace of Westphalia of 
1648. The birth of the modern state implied the concept of sovereignty in national and 
international security issues. Sovereignty in domestic terms is the institution that 
governs citizens of a given state. At the international level it consists of a series of 
rights through which the state can pursue its aims and meanwhile maintain its political 
independence and territorial integrity.
Following the logic provided by the schools of international relations, security 
issues have been addressed from two approaches.
The first approach, is the balance of power, which involves Clausewitz's theory of 
subordination of war to politics.
The second approach, is multilateralism, the assignment of some sovereign rights of 
states to international institutions with autonomous organs and interests that are 
different from the mere sum of those pertaining to individual member states.
The Cold War built a culture of its own based on security issues. This was 
reflected in the way of thinking, military instruments and diplomacy. Beside a 
continuous search for a balance of power among the two super powers, 
multilateralism expressed by the settlement of international institutions contributed a 
great deal the management of security problems. The international institutions of this 
period dealt with a plethora of problems related with the global geopolitical 
reorganisation of post World War II, the containment of the Soviet threat, the danger 
of the resurgence of Germany, the consolidation of a special relationship between 
France and Britain, the mitigation of various aspects of a conflictual East-West 
relationship, the problems of economic integration. The institution building process 
did not produce a united and free Europe. Meanwhile, multilateralization of security
69 See, Aurel Braun, op. cit note 63
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policies seems to be the most appropriate means of managing contemporary problems. 
The international institutions have been the appropriate instruments for dealing with 
the challenges of the post Cold War era. They managed the transformation from the 
confrontation of the Cold War to a new era in a peaceful manner.70 In the post Cold 
War era, security is affected by economic, political and social factors, beyond purely 
military considerations, and the individual states are likely not to be prepared to 
address the complex solutions single-handedly.71 More than ever the multi­
dimensional nature of contemporary problems requires a multilateral approach.
On the other hand, the end of the Cold War illustrated the trend of reinforcing 
the national outlook over security issues and foreign policy. This is due to many 
factors. The US, as the only remaining superpower has increased its involvement in 
international security affairs. Its role in obliging others to follow “a policy of political 
democracy, free market economy, and respect for the rule of law and human rights", 
is perceived by some actors as a compelling factor. The disappearance of the USSR's 
threat in Europe has decreased the importance of collective difference. Eastern 
Europe is no longer a potential enemy, but a security cooperation partner to be 
integrated into western security institutions. The biggest countries in many cases 
approach security issues based on their national interest. Accordingly, the 
effectiveness of international institutions in security issues has to be questioned.72
Evidently in the post Cold War era, the existing order does not present clear 
patterns on addressing security issues. There are arguments that both contradict and 
support the approaches of the balance of power and multilateralism. In this context a 
short review of challenges to fundamental security interests of the state at the end of 
the Cold War, will provide notable insights into the appropriate manner to approach 
them. In Cucchi’s terms, the physical and political safety and territorial integration of 
nation states in Europe is still existent. Threats are external and internal. The 
revitalisation of Russia, her efforts to enter as a security partner on security issues and 
the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction in South Europe constitute an 
important external threat to European security in the present time. The question of
7HSee, Marco Carnovale, 1995,“Vital and National Security Interests After the End of the Cold War”, European 
Security and International Institutions After the End of the Cold War, Marco Carnovale eds., New York: 
St.Martin’s Press, pp.2-18
71 See, Pierre Hassner, “Beyond Nationalism and Internationalism”, Survival, Vol.35, No.2, Summer 1993
72 Marco Carnovale, op. cit note 70, p.4
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minority rights, accompanied by confrontations and tensions has become a serious 
internal threat to the integrity of the state.
Economic and social problems constitute an important threat to security and 
have entered the primary interest of states. The maintenance of a minimum standard 
of living and economic development is considered a milestone not only for the internal 
stability but for the unity of the state also. In the framework of a globalised economy 
this implies the preservation of a free-market economy, a liberal international regime 
and free access to international markets.
The protection of a Western way of life which is translated into a pluralistic 
democracy, means not only freedom of movement for people and information but also 
support for the social order within a civil society. This represents an important 
challenge for the old democracies that on one hand constitute models of democracy 
but on the other hand are threatened by those who do not share such values.73
It is clear that “security can no longer be reduced to positioning the vectors of 
billiard-ball states and counting tanks. The new order is being remade by social and 
economic changes, no less then by shifts in the international configuration of power. 
Strategies to maintain international security must, in the new world comprehend all 
these facets of social life”74 and this will also be the guideline for my analytical 
approach of the security issues in the Balkans, with its special focus on Albania.
n  Giuseppe Cucchi, 1995,“International Security Institutions and National Sovereignty after the Cold War”, 
European Security and International Institutions After the End of the Cold War, Marco Carnovale eds., New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, pp.8-9
74 Jack L. Snyder, “Averting Anarchy in the New Europe”, International Security, VoL14, no 4, Spring 1990, p. 
93, (the italic word is added)
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CHAPTER 2 - The Regional and Country Approach to Security
Albanian concerns over security issues are symbiotically related with the 
volatile Balkan picture. In the Balkan context, Albania is not an isolated phenomenon; 
evidently it can not play solitaire. Accordingly, it will be of primary importance to first 
understand the historical background that shaped the Balkan map and the inherited 
historical legacies that have imprinted on a Balkan scale more or less the same 
psychological set up and which, have affected the security dilemma of the regional 
states.
Being part of Europe, Albania cannot settle its security agendas without taking 
into consideration the European and international context and the role of institutions 
in world affairs. A global-regional perspective that embodies the domestic concerns 
over political, economical and social challenges to security of a country will be also 
considered approaching security issues in the Balkans at the end of this century.
The whole approach to security will be developed in the next three chapters, 
starting with the regional country approach to security, then progressing to an 
institutional perspective on security issues and social and economic issues during a 
transition period.
1. Historical Background to the Balkans and Albanian Political History
The Balkans are presented as “the land bridge between Europe and Asia, a 
colourful region where East meets West, and an area where three of the world’s 
major religions, Christianity, Judaism and Islam in particular, have coexisted, albeit 
uneasily at times over the course of centuries.”75
The most important division in Balkan history can be considered the division 
in two parts of the Roman Empire that drew the line between the West and the East 
and marked the establishment in the Balkans of Catholicism in the North-West and 
Orthodoxy in the South-East. A sharp division was established between Orthodoxy
75 Jhon Treadway, 1997, “Of Shatter Belts and Powder Kegs: A Brief Survey of Yugoslav History”, Crisis in the 
Balkans, Views from the participants, Costantine P. Danopoulos and Kostas G. Messas eds., Boulder, Co., 
Westview Press
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and Catholicism in the Balkans. Barbara Jelavich defines this thus : for Orthodoxy, 
“Catholicism was the real enemy; it was both crusading and intolerant of other 
beliefs.”76 Orthodoxy with its decentralisation and national autocephalous church led 
to “ethnicization or nationalisation of Orthodoxy.”77 National churches played an 
important role in transforming ethnic groups into national communities. In some areas 
the church has played the primary role in building ethnic identity, preserving culture 
heritage, and introducing “a virtual surrogate quasi-governmental authority vis-a-vis 
the occupying powers”.78
Religious affiliations served both as an integrative and divisive factor in the 
Balkans, since they reinforced national unity and fomented inter-national conflicts. 
Religion was used as a source of legitimacy for nationalism and “ethnic- 
idiosyncrasies”. The autocephalous churches, by supporting the rights of ethnic 
minorities for political emancipation and self-determination, fostered separatist and 
irredentist tendencies, undermining the stability within the multi-ethnic Balkans.79
The Ottoman occupation marked the third religious division in the Balkans, 
reinforcing the previous attitudes and practices. The millet system established by the 
empire was based on religious division, which divided the empire into national groups. 
The Ottoman “tolerance” gave to the Balkan ethno-linguistic groups the possibility to 
survive and, through a slow but continuous elaboration of language and religion, to 
affirm a form of para nationalism that first emerged in the 18th century.80 The 
previous attitudes and practices were reinforced by the national movements for 
independence from the Ottoman Empire in the Nineteenth and Twentieth century. 
Religion has arguably never been important in the Balkan population’s esteem; 
regardless of the level of religious commitment, it was used as a tool to define cultural 
and ethnic identity among the inhabitants of the peninsula and fuel nationalism.
The state formation process in the Balkan peninsula was a result of both the 
enlivening of internal nationalism effected by nationalist movements current in Europe 
in the mid-nineteen century and the interference of the big powers of the time. “As a 
result, patterns of interaction have developed between regional tensions, conflicts on
76 Barbara Jelavich, op. cil note 19, p.53
77 Costancline P. Danopoulos and Kostas G. Messas, op. cit note 19, p.7.
n  Janusz Bugajsky, op. cit note 19, p.xiii
79 Pedro Ramel, 1989, ‘T he Interplay of Religious Policy and Nationalities Policy in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe,” Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics, Pedro Ramet eds., 
DurhanrDuke University Press, p.6
29
the peninsula, and great-power rivalries. The European powers' interaction and 
intervention in the Balkans relate more to the perceived positions of major players in 
the European security game than directly to the specific requirements of regional 
settlements”.81 The Balkan countries perceiving the drawing of borders in the peace 
treaties as arbitrary, sought protection, thus becoming clients of different foreign 
powers. The support of the big powers was important in two directions: first, to 
maintain the status quo; second, to secure promises that the treaties would be revised 
in favour of the client country.
In 1912, with the independence of Albania, the process of independence 
temporarily ended in the Balkan Peninsula. Most Balkan countries, composed of 
different ethnic groups of different origin, language, religion, education and customs, 
constitute the source of numerous conflicts. These internal conflicts prevented a 
balanced social development and national integration and strained the relations with 
the neighbours. These internal and external threats become a prominent source of 
economic problems.82 As a matter of fact, these states, although formally 
independent, remained economically and politically weak and competed against each 
other for state preservation, expansion and international support. This was also the 
reason for the division of the Balkan countries into opposing power blocs in both 
World Wars.
Division continued even after the Second World War, perpetuating past 
attitudes and practices in the Balkans. The division of Europe during the Cold War 
was reflected in the Balkans in two ways: isolation as was the cases in Albania and 
Yugoslavia, and alignment on pacts, respectively on the Warsaw Pact and NATO, for 
the rest of Balkan countries. This division did not change the “state system on the 
Balkan Peninsula” that dated from the controversial arrangements following the First 
World War. Most of the states “retained their statehood and most of their territories” 
until 1991, due to the commitment of European Powers to preserve their puppets.
K(l Georges Castellan, 1991, Histone des Balkans (XIV-XX siecle), Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, p. 12
81 See, Uwe Nerlich, 1994, “Balkan security in the European post-cold war environment: Challenges and policy 
choices for the west”, The Volatile Powder Keg ,Balkan Security after the Cold War, Stephen Larrabee eds., 
Washington: The American University Press
82 Roland Schonl'eld, 1990,"Economic Challenges to the Communist States of Southeastern Europe", Problems 
of Balkan Security,Southeastern Europe in the 1990, Shoup&Holfman eds., Washington, DC, The Wilson 
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The divisions within Europe, more than elsewhere, were reflected in the 
interpénétrations and alignments within Balkan peninsula prior to 1991. '
Balkan communist regimes tried to keep ethnicity under control, following the 
Soviet model of dealing with nationality problems, which emphasised the right of self- 
determination, inter-ethnic equalisation, territorial autonomy, federalism and the use 
of severe tactics. The demise of the communist regimes and the arrival of democracy 
in the Balkans blew up the cover that kept ‘simmering dissatisfaction’ and nationalist 
agitations under control.* 84
The new post Cold World era has changed many things in the Balkan 
peninsula. The system of states established since the First World War has started to 
change. For the first time Balkan countries with the exception of Serbia have common 
aspirations and would like to share the same values of democracy, market economy, 
and the rule of law. These attitudes and practices may provide for a peaceful region 
but on the other hand democratic procedures of public participation provide a window 
of opportunity for ethnic groups and thus exacerbate “the likelihood that conflict will 
emerge either as a result of, or in spite of, démocratisation”. The chance of conflict 
increases when “one or more groups in a given state are members of an ethnic group 
that governs a neighbouring state”.85 Communist rule had constrained the ethnic 
conflict but it had not managed to resolve or settle it. The erosion of communist 
ideology and policy from the Balkans has led to the resurgence of nationalism and has 
created the ground for a re-nationalisation of national policies.
This tendency also resulted from the need of the semi-democratic regimes of 
the Balkans to legitimise their power by obtaining popular support through appeals to 
nationalism. The re-nationalisation of foreign policies in a number of countries in the 
Balkan region may increase the tensions over the unresolved regional and ethnic 
conflicts. An intensification of the disputes can have a ‘domino effect’ throughout the 
region, exacerbating other conflicts.86
S3 James F.Brown, 1987,“The East European Setting”, Eroding Empire: Western relations with Eastern Europe, 
Gordon Lincoln eds., Washington, D.C, The Brookings Institution, p.8
84 Costandine F. Danopoulos and Kostas G. Messas, op. cit note 19, p. 11.
85 Renee de Nevers, 1995, "Démocratisation and Ethnic Conflict", Ethnic Conflict and International Security, 
Michael Brown, eds., Pinceton N.J., Pinceton University, p.71
86 For more detailed informations see, Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Post-Communist Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs, 
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Evidently, there is a prevailing re-nationalising and fragmenting environment in 
the Balkans that is a trend diametrically opposed to the integrating and cooperative 
environment in Western Europe. This trend in European affairs has diminished the 
possibility of war in the rest of Europe in case a Balkan conflict might break out, 
because none of the European powers is interested in exploiting the conflict for its 
own purposes. Nevertheless, a destabilised Balkans is a threat to the creation of a 
stable security order in Europe in the post Cold War era. Indeed, the patterns of this 
environment affect the security concerns of Balkan countries and their efforts to 
provide for security.87
Summing up, the historical picture does not provide any premise for a 
cooperative and integrated Balkans. The war in Yugoslavia is a living example of 
dormant unresolved ethnic conflicts that exploded in the federal Yugoslavian state. 
This crisis has deep repercussions over state security issues within the Balkans. 
Fuelled by Yugoslavian secession movements, irredentist movements may awaken 
unresolved regional conflicts and involve an inter-state confrontation.
This historical context is important in providing a general outlook over the 
security concerns of the Balkan states. Meanwhile, while remembering that the main 
focus of this thesis will be on Albania, it is necessary to see where Albania’s history 
fits within the region.
Albanians are “one of the oldest-established populations in Europe. No people 
could be less ‘alien’ to the history of the Balkans”. The Albanian language is indeed 
the only surviving representative (apart from Greek) of an ancient Balkan language: it 
belongs to the Indo-European family of languages, but exists in a sub-section of its 
own, with no immediate relatives.88 Nevertheless, since the Middle Ages, Albania has 
not constituted a geo-political entity.
From the 1470s until the early twentieth century, Albania remained under 
Ottoman administration. Under the Ottoman empire the land populated by ethnic 
Albanians was divided into several Ottoman administrative units. In the period from 
1881-1912, which constitute the last period before the establishment of the first 
Albanian state, the ethnic Albanians were split into the vilayet of Kosovo, Shkodra,
87 ibid., F. Stephen Larrabee, Winter 1990-1991
88 Noel Malcolm, 1998, Kosovo : a short history, London, Macmillan Press
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Monastir, Ioannina, including within them other ethnic groups such as Vlachs, Gipsies 
and Turks. This administrative approach of dividing ethnic groups into different and 
mixed administrative units was preferred by Ottomans as a way of reducing any risk 
of national state-formation within the Empire.89
This practice retarded the Albanian national movement. The movement 
attained its political shape only after the Congress of Berlin in 1878, which handed out 
territories inhabited by Albanians to Montenegro and Serbia. The national movement 
started as a military self-defence movement incorporated into the League of Prizren. 
At the beginning, the League did not seek the establishment of an Albanian state; its 
priority was to prevent foreign powers from infringing on Albanian inhabited land by 
creating an autonomous entity under the Ottoman Empire. In time, the movement 
attained other political and social objectives such as the recognition of Albanian 
language, followed by the opening of schools in Albanian language, self-rule and 
military organisation. The movement moved toward the demand for independence as 
it was made clear by the Ottoman Government that it was not protecting the rights of 
Albanians, and was ready to gave up parts of Albania under the pressure of the 
European powers. This movement, and others that followed, did not succeed in 
establishing an independent Albanian state until 1912. They suffered from deep 
internal division90.
In 1912, on the brink of Ottoman Empire's dissolution, the Albanians looked 
to gain their state independence. The 1912 London Conference on the Balkans 
created an Albanian state, but without the Albanian inhabited areas of Cameria in the 
south and Kosovo in the north. The new independent state was created under the 
auspices of the big powers as a “product of geopolitics and not ethnic 
considerations”91; as a result half of the ethnic Albanian population was left outside 
the new state internationally recognised borders.
The Albanian state won its real independence on the eve of the First World 
War. Concerned by Serbia's intentions to expand by seizing former Ottoman 
territories, Austria lent its support to the nascent Albanian state.
89 ibid.,
90 Barbara Jelavich, op. cit note 19, p 366
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Having been under foreign occupation for a long period, the new born 
Albanian state inherited a burden of economic, social and political problems. The 
country went through a state of anarchy as a result of the confrontation between 
conservative feudal forces and the left-wing forces, which ended with the 
establishment in 1924 of a central authoritarian regime led by Ahmet Zog, who later 
declared himself King Zog. The difficult economic situation in the country pushed 
Zog to strengthen ties with Italy. Beginning in the mid-1920s, the Italian Government 
signed economic and foreign relations treaties with Albania and provided large 
financial subsidies to the Zog regime. “By the end of the 1920s, Albania had become 
an Italian satellite”92; efforts to escape from the Italian orbit in the 1930’s failed, and 
as a result Zog fled Albania. In the spring of 1939, Albania was occupied by Italy. 
Additional agreements were signed surrendering the Albanian crown to Italy’s King 
Victor Emmanuel III. In 1943, the Nazis succeeded the Italians.
Prior to the liberation in November 1944, Albanian society was characterised 
by foreign domination, social and political fragmentation.9' At the end of the Second 
World War, Albania remained the same poor and small mountainous country, with 
limited economic and work power resources, unable to provide for its own security. 
These patterns continued even after the establishment of a communist regime in 
Albania, led by Enver Hoxha. The weak regime and the precarious conditions of the 
country forced Enver Hoxha to look for alliances and compromises.
Between 1945 and 1948, in order to consolidate his power, Hoxha tightened 
relations with Yugoslavia. In exchange of this support, Hoxha shelved the Kosovo 
question.94 Albania turned virtually into a province of Yugoslavia, having common 
customs and currency. This situation threatened Hoxha’s power. The Tito-Stalin 
dispute gave the opportunity to break down this subordinate relationship and 
strengthen relations with the Soviet Union as a counterbalance against the Yugoslav 
threat and other security concerns in the region on the one hand, and the need for 
economic and technical support on the other hand.
Interference in domestic politics and ideological contradictions increased 
Albanian-Soviet tensions. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Albania
92 Nicholas Pano, 1968, The People's Republic of Albania", Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
P-17
93 See, Costantine P. Danopoulos and Adein Chopani, op. cit note 90
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considered the Soviet Union its bigger enemy and the main threat to its own security. 
This led to the break up relations with the Soviet Union and withdrawal from the 
Warsaw Pact. After the Soviet domination, Albania established relations with China, 
which replaced the USSR’s place as mentor. Ideological controversies over Marxism 
-Leninism led to a series of conflicts between Albania and China. The final dispute 
arose from China’s overtures toward the United States and Yugoslavia. In 1978, 
diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed. Alter the demise of the 
Yugoslav, Soviet, and Chinese alliances, Albania’s isolation from both East and West 
exacerbated its stagnation and poverty. The developments in the international arena 
favoured Albania in security terms. The East-West disarmament and the Helsinki 
accord on the inviolability of international borders and confidence-building measures 
created a less hostile security environment for Albania. The break down of 
relationship with China did not create any major concern for Albania in security terms, 
so Hoxha’s regime did not look to establish new alliances. After the 1970s, Albanian 
foreign policy was based on isolation until the beginning of the 1990s.95
In 1992, a democratic government took power after the first free elections in 
the country since the Second World War. The country started the difficult period of 
transition toward the establishment of market economy and of integration into the 
international community and organisations.
2. Background and Prospects for Balkan Cooperation and Security
The Background to Balkan cooperation commences with the Little Entente or 
Balkan League, soon after the First World War. The Little Entente was founded in 
order to prevent the restoration of the Hapsburg dynasty in Hungary, Czechoslovakia 
and Yugoslavia. Later in the 1920s, it was joined by Romania and Bulgaria. 
Therefore, three Balkan states, Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria, were linked up by 
a certain degree of political cooperation. The treaty guaranteed the existing frontiers 
and offered support in case of external intervention. On the side of the big powers,
95 Elez Biberaj, 1994, “Albania and the Albanians in the Post-Communist Period”, The Volatile Powder Keg - 
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France was looking to preserve the provisions of the Peace of Versailles and balance 
the growing German and Italian ambitions in the region, and therefore encouraged 
the Pact.96
In 1929-30, for the first time, the idea of a Balkan Confederation was issued 
by the Greek Papanastasiu, coinciding in time with the agrarian crisis. The first 
Conference was hold in Athens, followed by three other Conferences in Istanbul, 
Bucharest and Thessaloniki. A range of commissions for economic, intellectual, health 
cooperation and coordination were created. The contradiction, implicit in the political 
issues led to the failure of the idea of a Balkan Confederation.97
In 1934, aiming to face the growing influence of Germany and Italy in the 
Balkans and as a counterbalance of fascist forces, a Pact of Balkan Entente was 
signed by Yugoslavia, Turkey, Greece and Romania. The Pact provided for the 
preservation of the existing borders and consultations in the case of conflict. The Pact 
was also open to other Balkan states and was put into a legal framework. A statute 
was compiled laying the ground for the creation of a permanent council of foreign 
ministers, a Balkan bank and a centre for the harmonisation of legislation. The Entente 
was created too late and it could not prevent the crumbling of the Versailles regime.98 
During the second World War, Balkan countries were divided within the two blocks 
in compliance with their nationalistic interests: Bulgaria and Romania entered the 
fascist forces' orbit after being promised a larger Bulgaria and Romania at the end of 
the War; and the rest -Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece- on the side of anti-fascist 
forces; Turkey kept its neutrality.
After the Second World War, the Balkan countries emerged with different 
characteristics. The division that took place in Europe was also reflected in the 
division of the Balkans. The idea of a Balkan Federation was gaining ground among 
the countries of the so called people's democracies. The Federation aimed for 
stronger political, military, and economic cooperation and close ties with Soviet 
Union. After the turn of Yugoslavia and its exclusion from Cominform the idea of a 
Balkan Federation died.
On February 28, 1953 the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed 
between Greece and Turkey. The treaty pledged to strengthen defence and security
96 Georges Castellan, op. cit note 80, p.455
97 ibid., p.456
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measures and, beside the security provisions, placed an importance on the 
strengthening of economic, technical and cultural ties. Later, the Treaty on Political 
Cooperation and Mutual International Aid between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey 
was signed on August 9, 1954 in Bled, opening the way for the new Balkan Pact. The 
treaty pledged support in case of aggression upon one of the signatories and stressed 
the peaceful solution of disputes and banned the use of force among the signatories. 
This was a unique agreement among signatories that were parts of different camps, so 
it can be perceived as a moment of coexistence between two systems". The Treaty on 
Political Cooperation and Mutual International Aid and the Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation and the founding of the Balkan Consultative Assembly laid down the 
foundation for cooperation between the three Balkan countries. Just when the 
structure was completed the whole issue was shelved. After the death of Stalin, 
Yugoslavia was looking to improve the relations with the USSR. Later Yugoslavia 
positioned itself in the non-aligned countries thus changing its interest in the Treaty. 
After the Cyprus crisis, even Greece and Turkey were no longer interested in the 
Treaty.
In 1957, the Romanian prime minister launched a plan for transforming the 
Balkans into a Nuclear-Free-Zone. This initiative was inspired by the negotiations of 
the super powers for withdrawal of American nuclear weapons from Greece and 
Turkey. After Romania, Bulgaria was also interested in the issue and later on the 
1980s Greece tried to push forward the idea. In the end, the idea did not produce any 
concrete result, due to the incompatibility of national interests. Nevertheless this effort 
can be considered as a step toward cooperation among the Balkan states.* 9100
The détente process in Europe and the Helsinki spirit of 1975 encouraged the 
first meeting of Balkan experts, except Albania, which took place in Athens in 1976. 
The meeting discussed the problems of economic and technical cooperation in the 
Balkans. The meeting did not produce any results but was important given the time it 
took place. The existence of the two blocs was still very much in evidence, but the 
Balkan countries showed that they could talk about cooperation and perhaps use 
regional cooperation as a deterrent against Soviet designs.101
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In the late 1980s, relations among Balkan countries started to improve. The 
first conference of Foreign Ministers of the Balkan countries took place in Belgrade in 
1988. The participation of the Albanian Foreign minister was considered a historical 
event. This meeting was the first at such a level and marked an important step 
towards Pan-Balkan cooperation, and was followed by other meetings at expert and 
ministerial level. Beside the little progress achieved, it showed the interest of Balkan 
countries in Pan-Balkan cooperation and can be considered as a means to cope with 
the new developments in the rest of Europe.
The ministerial meeting of Belgrade was the result of the new era that has 
reached the Balkan Countries. The second meeting was held in Tirana in 1990, but the 
climate had changed and all the Balkan countries except Albania were immersed in the 
transition process toward démocratisation and market economies. At the meeting it 
was proposed to institutionalise Balkan cooperation and in this framework it was 
agreed that the ministerial meetings would be held regularly. The meeting did not deal 
on the problems that divided Balkan countries. However, it was recognised that the 
new spirit prevailing in Europe should be transplanted to the Balkans. Therefore, 
measures were taken to prevent the resurgence of territorial, ethnic, minority, cultural 
and religious problems.
An important fact is that the minority rights protected by the UN charter and 
the Helsinki Act were recognised by Balkan countries who acknowledged that 
minority rights had to be separated from territorial issues and that existing borders had 
to be maintained. The Yugoslav crisis created a new situation in the Balkans, which 
altered these optimistic developments at the end of the Cold War.
Meanwhile a theoretical perspective will help on understanding the real 
possibilities of cooperation in the Balkans. First, it is important to remember Nye’s102 
pre-conditions for integration potential, as an important tool that will direct the 
analysis and provide the necessary insights. These pre-conditions include:
- symmetry or economic equality of units
- value compatibility between élites
- the existence of pluralism
- the capacity of member states to adapt and respond.
102 Joseph S. Nye, op. cit note 21, pp. 56-66.
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Balkan countries represent a variety of configurations in their economic level 
of development. Greece is a member of the EU, Turkey has had an association 
agreement with EU since 1960 and Yugoslavia with its mixed economy has split into 
different countries that represent different economic levels and approaches towards 
integration within EU. The rest of the countries, including Albania, have moved from 
the centralised economy to a market economy, and the level of development is far 
from being compatible with EU standards.
For the elites, there is a variety that cannot be seen in any other region. 
Besides Turkey and Greece which have settled on the side of the Western values, the 
rest of the Balkan countries have been in one way or an other on the side of 
communist values, totalitarian and autocratic regimes. The elites of these countries do 
not possess a democratic political culture, also they have different cultural 
backgrounds. The Balkan Region represents furthermore a colourful picture 
according to the variety of religious values(Catholic, Muslim and Orthodox) and 
language diversities.
Concerning pluralism, Balkan countries now are on the way to meeting 
pluralistic values, with the exception of the Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It 
is important to stress that all of them are far from being perfect examples of pluralistic 
values, given that they very recently came out of totalitarian and autocratic regimes.
Looking at the capacities to adapt and respond, there are some improvements. 
There are efforts to find a common language in problems of security and cooperation. 
Many initiatives and meetings at different levels- even at the level of heads of state- 
are taking place more frequent.
The general picture offered in the light of Nye’s pre-conditions does not 
provide for enthusiasm for a peaceful and cooperative environment in the Balkans. 
Nevertheless, the great variation among international regimes as social institutions and 
the broadness of the definitions at least allows for one of these variations to be applied 
to the Balkan region. The creation of regional regimes enhances cooperation and 
security.103
Nationalism, minority problems, different economic-political systems, 
incompatible economies, the smallness of the regional markets, the underdevelopment
103 Aurel Braun, op. cit note 63, p.253.
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of the economies and the paucity of energy resources all make regional integration 
difficult and have limited cooperation in the Balkans.104 Nevertheless cooperation 
could be developed in other forms as:
- emphasising and nurturing war-avoidance tendencies in the settlement of the 
disputes;
- enhancing their bilateral and multilateral economic and political links;
- ensuring that their participation in alliances and other international organisations 
does not affect the regional environment and cooperation.
3. Present Cooperation and Integration in the Balkans
Regional integration is perceived as an important means to promote stability, 
security and prosperity. Moreover, regional cooperation is considered an important 
development that will facilitate the cooperation and integration of Balkan countries 
into other European structures, including the European Union and NATO, and will 
build a clear commitment that will lead toward common undertakings.105
Accordingly, there are many ongoing initiatives for cooperation and 
integration since all the Balkan countries, except rump Yugoslavia, are developing 
democratic regimes. Accordingly some of the initiatives are: the Balkan Conference 
on Stability, Security and Cooperation in South East Europe, The Process for 
Stability and Good Neighbourliness in South East Europe (the Royaumont process) 
and the South-East European Cooperative Initiative (SECI)106.
3.1. The Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI)
The Southeast European Cooperative Initiative was set up in Geneva, in 
December 1996 to foster economic relations among Balkan states and help them 
integrate into the European Union structures; the initiative has economic aims. This 
initiative includes Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, The 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, Greece and Turkey. An
"M ibid., p.252.
11,5 All Balkan countries except Greece that is member of both EU and NATO and Turkey that is also NATO 
member, are aiming membership into European institutions.
106 EU Press Release, 1P/97/1104, December 11,1997
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invitation was extended to Serbia under the condition of implementing the 
recommendations of the “Gonzales Report” prepared for the OSCE.107
The initiative was launched by the United States. The aim was to develop a 
free market in the region and cooperation in the sectors of transportation, 
communications, energy and environment; to create free movements of goods and 
peoples across borders through the region; to attract foreign investment because “the 
only way in which these [Balkan] countries have a chance of really progressing is by 
ultimately making themselves far more attractive to private investments than they are 
now”108. This initiative came as a reaction to the American hesitation to send ground 
troops in Bosnia, believing that the problems in the Balkans can be settled not on a 
case by case basis but at the regional level.
The initiative is focused on facilitating cooperation in the Balkans by sorting 
out the bottlenecks and working on them. Projects will be financed by different 
international institutions, such as the UN, through the agency of Economic 
Cooperation for Europe which provides expertise on transportation bottleneck 
problems in the region109. The World Bank will co-finance the project on the 
standardisation in forms and procedures at border crossings110. The European Union 
will also extend its cooperation with the existing regional cooperation and its 
assistance will be provided through existing programs- notably PHARE, TACIS, 
MEDA and INTERREG and Sector-Specific EU programs, while at the same time 
developing the full potential of possible synergies among them.111 The initiative is also 
institutionalised with the creation of a Business Support Council, and a SECI regional 
Cooperation Centre. Furthermore working groups are created on facilitating transport 
across borders, on eliminating transportation bottlenecks, on coordinating the 
placement of natural gas pipelines in the region, on providing loans for the small and 
medium enterprises in the region, on conserving energy and on restoring the Danube 
river. The consolidation of the initiative is maintained through regular meetings at
""ibid.,
"* Richard Shifter -Special assistant to President Bill Clinton and counsellor on the National Security Council- 
1997 M2 Communications Ltd., TELECOMWORLDWIRE 26/3/97, the italic world is added.
"»ibid.,
110 BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts, 16.09.1998, "World-Bank co-financing SECI border 
crossing projects”
EU Press Release, IP/97/1104, December 11, 1997
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different levels-working groups meetings, Foreign Ministers meetings, and heads of 
state meetings.
This is a well meaning initiative aiming to create a cooperative and 
interdependent regime in the Balkan region, that will lead to the harmonisation of 
expectations and interests of the Balkan States, and which can enhance their economic 
development and ease the efforts for integration into European institutions.
3.2. Multinational Peace Force South-East Europe (MPFSEE)
As part of the efforts to create a peaceful and cooperative Balkans, a peace 
keeping force Multinational Peace Force South-East Europe (MPFSEE)- a brigade of 
4000- was established with headquarter in Plovdiv, Bulgaria. The Pact was signed in 
Athens on January 1999, by eight countries in Southeast Europe, NATO members 
such as the United States, Italy, Greece and Turkey and participants in the Partnership 
for Peace (PfP) Initiative, such as Albania, Bulgaria, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Romania and Slovenia."2
The aim of this multilateral peace force is the prevention of conflicts and peace 
support operations including peace-keeping, peace-making, peace-building and 
humanitarian operations in/or outside the Balkans under the mandate of the United 
Nations, the OSCE or other international bodies.
The Pact was a follow up of an initiative started by the Defence ministers of 
the Balkan Countries at a meeting in Sofia, October 1997, under the auspices of the 
United States. In this meeting, the South-East countries decided to increase the 
efforts to reduce regional tensions and prepare their armies for NATO membership.
This initiative encourages the cooperation in the security field, pulling Balkan 
countries toward a more relaxed and trustful climate that could make cooperation in 
other fields possible and will ease the way for further European integration.
3.3. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone (BSECZ)
The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSECZ) was founded on 25 June 
1992 as an intergovernmental and economic organisation, aiming to create a region of 12
112 Reuter, January 13, 1999, “MPFSEE headquarters in Plovdiv”
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peace and stability based on shared values such as pluralistic democracy, social 
justice, human rights, rule of law, fundamental freedoms, free market and economic 
prosperity.113 Albania is part of this initiative as well as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, 
Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. Besides Greece 
and Turkey, all the rest of the countries are going through a very difficult period of 
transformation from centralised to market economies. The initiative aims to provide 
the necessary framework that will facilitate this transformation and enhance the 
cooperation and integration among the member states as a tool for promoting mutual 
understanding and furthering stability and prosperity in the region. The organisation 
has created a large institutional foundation with a Secretariat in Istanbul, the BSCEZ 
council, the parliamentary assembly of the BSCEZ, The Black Sea Trade and 
Development Bank in Thessaloniki and the BSCEZ coordination centre for the 
exchange of statistical data and economic information in Ankara all of which are 
important instruments for an efficient functioning and attainment of the settled 
objectives and for developing proposals, programs and projects in various fields of 
cooperation. The Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs(MMFA) is the regular 
decision-making organ of the BSECZ. Working groups constitute another organ that 
works out the proposals and recommendations for the MMFA
In compliance with regime theories, BSCE is aiming to be a forum for the 
introduction or expansion of common activities in the region that will stimulate 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the fields of economics, technology, 
environment, health protection and promote trade relations. It is believed that all these 
will lay the groundwork for prosperity, stability and security in the region.
Accordingly, contacts among enterprises, companies and firms of participating 
states are encouraged, supported and facilitated. The forum is trying to improve 
conditions for investments, capital flow and various forms of industrial cooperation, 
notably by encouraging and providing the legal framework for agreements on the 
avoidance of double taxation, on promotion and protection of investments, on 
encouraging cooperation in free economic zones and facilitating the exchange of 
information on international tenders organised in the participating states.
113 Summit Declaration on Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Istanbul, 25 June 1992
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3.4. Other initiatives
3.4.1. The Summit of Crete and the “Marshall Plan” for the Balkans
The Summit of heads of state of the Balkan countries was held in Crete, on 
November 1997. The summit brought together leaders and officials from Albania, 
Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece, 
Romania, Turkey, and rump Yugoslavia after a very long period of divisions, tensions 
and hatred. For the first time, Balkan countries appealed to put their blood-stained 
history behind them and replace the past with a new era of peace and stability. In the 
declaration of the Summit, Balkan leaders agreed to create conditions for the 
prosperity of Balkan nations in a framework of peace, security, good-neighbourliness 
and stability. Accordingly, importance was given to the respect of territorial integrity, 
the protection of human rights, national minority and individual freedom in the region 
and the creation of an amicable free market economy environment for the 
development of business. The summit showed a strong European orientation of 
Balkan policies. Regional cooperation and integration in all areas were considered as a 
stepping stone toward the full integration within the EU and Atlantic structures that 
would mean the achievement of economic and political goals of the Balkan countries.
The necessity of a follow up in the future led to the agreement of participants 
for holding permanent meetings at the heads of state level.114 The follow up of such an 
initiative materialised at the meeting of Antalya in October 1998 after the meeting of 
foreign ministers in June 1998 in Istanbul.
The idea of a peaceful and stable Balkans is nowadays the first priority of 
Balkan politicians; accordingly the Greek Government has been advancing an action 
plan for a peaceful and stable Balkans by favouring a "Marshall Plan"115 for the 
Balkan region, after the solution of the Kosovo crisis.
The objectives of this Greek initiative, according to the Greek Prime Minister, 
are: the peaceful solution of the crisis as soon as possible; stabilisation and integration 
of the Balkans into the European security architecture, and coping with the 
humanitarian problems emerging from the crisis. This initiative so far has had the 
support of the EU and NATO.
ll4See: Reuter, November 4, 1997, and BBC Monitoring Service: Central Europe & Balkans, November 5, 
1997, and Independent, November 5, 1997, p.8.
115 Albanian Telegraphic Agency, TIRANE, April 17, 1999; for a discussion on the issue see: Paul Goble, “After 
the Bombing Stops”, RFE/RL, Vol 3, No. 81, Part II, 27 April 1999
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Greece maintains that it is necessary, immediately after the end of the military 
operations in Kosovo, to evolve a "Global Plan for Balkan Stabilisation and 
Development”; this contains the following key points:
-The economic development of the Balkan region through a package of measures and 
initiatives which will constitute a kind of "Marshall Plan" for the region. 
-Démocratisation of the region with measures for the construction and strengthening 
of the democratic institutions and of a "Stability Pact", which will guarantee the 
inviolability of borders.
-Progress, intensification and institutionalisation of interregional cooperation with the 
participation of all the countries of the regions, as a step toward the full integration of 
the region into the European architecture and the European institutional system. 
-Recognition of the requests made by all countries for membership in the European 
Union, if they meet the required political and economic premises.
This plan to be presented to the EU and, in combination with the "Stability 
Pact" proposed by Germany for the region, constitute a new regional initiative 
supported by the EU.
4. Current Albanian Foreign Policy
Being small not only in size but also in economic importance, Albania has 
always faced problems with its bigger neighbours constituting a threat towards 
Albanian integrity. Accordingly, its policy toward the Albanian ethnic population 
outside its border takes an important leading role in the direction of unifying the 
whole Albanian population under the roof of a proper state. This is due to the 
isolation that Albania reserved to itself for 50 years. Besides bequeathing the 
backwardness, the communists presided over a state building process in an effort to 
create a distinct entity that neglected the Albanian ethnic population outside the given 
borders.
The fall of the communist regime and the establishment of a democratic 
government opened a new era for Albania. One of the important foreign policy 
objectives of the new government was to re-position Albania in the Balkans in relation 
to its neighbours and integrating it into the international community. The eagerness 
for membership in the structures of the North Atlantic alliances (Albania was the first
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country from Central and Eastern Europe which applied for full NATO membership116 
and the European Union), marked its Western orientation. On the other hand, the 
other opportunities for cooperation were not neglected as a tool for stabilising its 
weak position in the agitated Balkan environment. Relations with Turkey and the 
Islamic countries were included in the principal agenda of Albanian foreign policy. In 
the framework of the Balkans, Albania emerged as an area of relative stability. 
Surrounded by many ethnic Albanians, about 3 million outside its borders, in Serbia, 
Montenegro, Macedonia and Greece, its stability could have great repercussions in 
the region.
As a result, two attitudes toward Kosovo have been manifested. One attitude 
was in concert with Western Europe and the US policy that the problem of Kosovo 
had to be resolved within the framework of Yugoslavia. The other one, stated by 
Berisha117, is that:
“If a change of international borders by force is accepted in Bosnia, there will 
be no peace in the region. We are also very much concerned about the issue of 
Kosovo, which is the key question to the Balkan crisis. The Contact Group 
(Russia, the UK, France, Germany and the US) is not dealing with this very 
important issue in the region; they are even ignoring it. I am convinced that 
the Balkan conflict will be a multi-act tragedy. A conflict in Kosovo will get 
the entire Albanian nation involved”.118
Concerning Macedonia, Albania was the second state after Bulgaria to 
recognise the Macedonian independent state without asking for trade-offs on the 
treatment of the Albanian community living there. In any case, Albanian leaders 
understood later the importance of taking into account the rights of the Albanian 
population in Macedonia (which does not represent a minority119), by later blocking 
the membership of Macedonia in the OSCE.
The relations with Greece have been characterised by ups and downs. 
Contentious issues like the Albanian emigrant problems in Greece and the efforts from
116 NATO Review, No 2, March 1996, Vol.44, p.24
117 Sali Berisha was the President of Albania, 1992-1997
M* Kevin Done, “Caution remains the keynote”, Financial Times, October 2, 1995, p.32
119 The Albanian population in FYROM represent 23% of the population according to the census internationally 
observed on 1994. Nevertheless Albanians claim to constitute up to 35% of the population justifying it with the 
fact that most of the Albanian population did not take part in the census due to the absence of census papers in 
Albanian.
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the Greek side to support its “Megaly idea”120 in Albania which would affect the 
territorial integrity of Albania have been the main characteristics of these relation.
After the elections that Albania held in June 1997, a new socialist government 
came to power. The new Government, made by a coalition among the centre left 
parties, also brought a new platform in the foreign policy of the country.
“In foreign policy, the government’s aim is to integrate Albania into Euro- 
Atlantic structures, while promoting measures toward regional collaboration and 
understanding within the Balkans121”.
In domestic affairs, the policy of the government is indexed to foreign aid. 
Nano122 has tried to play the card of “a friend in need is a friend indeed”. This has 
increased the competition among the parties with interests in Albania, especially with 
Italy and Greece showing closeness to the present government by competing with 
each other in offering aid and assistance in credits and grants. On the other hand, this 
development makes the government dependent on foreign aid and assistance and 
obedient to the interests of the donors.
Looking at international affairs, Albania would like to be considered as an 
agent of stability. This role assumes the creation of an amicable environment in the 
region in the short term and in the long term, the integration into the European and 
North-Atlantic structures as an important tool for the resolution of the Balkan 
problems and for the guaranty of security in the region.123
In order to relieve the tensions in the region, the formula is to create 
integration among the Balkan states by increasing all kind of exchanges: economic, 
political, cultural, juridical, financial.
“The objective of Government consists of its continuous efforts to establish a 
democratic Balkans, with open borders for the free movement of peoples, 
ideas, goods and capital, to create a civilised region to assert national cultures 
and respect for human rights on the basis of self-determination of the 
democratic government institutions, that is to build a region where 
cooperation and civilised coexistence and not disagreement reign, defrost 
relations and activate numerous agreements on aid and cooperation with
120 “Megaly idea” or otherwise the ideas lor a Greater Greece including the ancient territories inhabited by the 
Hellenes, on the idea see: Volkan Vamik D. and Itzkowitz Norman, 1994, “Turks and Greeks Neighbours in 
Conflict”, Huntingdon: The Eothen Press
121 Final Report of Reform and Recovery of Albanian Government prepared for the Meeting of International Aid 
Donors held in Brussels on 22luJ October 1997
122 Nano Fatos, was the Albanian Prime Minister, after the elections of 29 June 1997 that followed the civil 
unrest of 1997.
123 The institutional perspective will be presented in the coming Chapter.
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Greece, normalise relations with Macedonia, reaffirm very good relations with
Turkey and have no problems with Bulgaria and Romania”.124
In fact, it looks as if Albania would like to be positioned in the Balkans as a 
normalising and initiating force for stability. This policy is also an expression of “good 
behaviour” in accordance with the policy demanded by the Europeans and the US on 
the Balkans. The obedience to the West is due mostly to the difficult domestic 
situation, specially the economic one; the state cannot survive without the economic 
and political support of Western Europe and the US. The present Government found 
itself “sandwiched between its utter dependence on the West for financial aid and its 
loyalty to the Kosovo Albanians”125.
In the domestic policies the importance of the IMF agreement, Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) is evident. Since the beginning, the socialist 
Government has started the dialogue with the IMF board. The first accord of 
understanding was signed on 19 August 1997, which constituted the commitment of 
the Albanian Government to accept the IMF regime. The IMF approved ESAF for 
Albania at the end of May 1998, providing a loan of $47.6 million. l26(This agreement 
could not be supported by the IMF while Berisha remained in power). The test 
period was a hard one for the socialist government. It has been followed by a shortage 
in public administration of 33 percent, which in some cases was used for political 
ends. The increase of VAT has passed from 13 percent to 20 percent and there was 
an increase in the level of income taxes. All that has made the life of the Albanians 
harsher especially after the collapse of the pyramid-schemes and the profound crisis of 
1997 with the consequent rapid increase in prices and the inflation rate. Nevertheless, 
there is a positive climate for the socialist government in Washington127. This is for 
two reasons: first the open opposition that the US showed towards Berisha during the 
crisis of 1997 still remains since there is no changes in the leadership of the 
Democratic Party; second the socialist government is not creating trouble in the 
Balkan with its policy towards Kosovo. The deputy secretary of state, Talbot has 
expressed praise on behalf of President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright saying 
that: “Albania is respected for its all-round support, for the efforts it is making in
124 Fatos Nano, Statement in the Albanian Parliament, 9 April 1998, Reuters
125 Michael J Jordan., “Albania Split in two in the Kosova Question”, RFE-RL, Vol 2, Part II, 16 April 1998
126 Robert Lyle, Transition Nations active in IMF loans, RFE-RL, Vol.2, No. 150, Part II, 6 August 1998
127 Fron Nazi, “Washington goes socialist”, War Report, 1998
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unison with the international community and the contact group, in particular, to 
ensure that the criminal policy pursued, against the Kosovo people is condemned and 
denounced in the international arena, averting any act of provocation and re­
establishing the Albanian government, institutions and national security in exemplary 
cooperation with the United States, the EU, NATO and the OSCE”128. The socialist 
government is trying to use the US positive climate to relieve the burden of the IMF 
Agreement for Albania; since late summer 1998 only the first delivery of $9.7million 
of the loan of $47 million was delivered.129
Looking more closely at the Balkans, the new government has started the 
dialogue with all neighbour countries. These dialogues are characterised by the 
highest level of participation.
4.1. Relations with Yugoslavia
Relations with Yugoslavia are closely related to the issue of Kosovo. With 
regard to the Kosovo issue, the dialogue started with the first meeting between Milo, 
the Albanian Foreign Minister, and Milutinovic, the Serbian Prime-Minister during a 
UN meeting on 23 September 1997, continuing with the meeting between Nano- 
Milosevic130 in Crete in November 1997. The idea behind this dialogue was to reduce 
the tensions by promoting the cross border trade through opening the frontiers, and 
by concluding a consular agreement for facilitating the movement of both countries' 
citizens, while increasing the exchanges in the field of education and judiciary affairs. 
This was considered as the first step in the relations between the two countries.
The dialogue was started bilaterally and without the presence of international 
mediation. The idea was to facilitate a solution to the problem of Kosovo under 
Yugoslavia, perhaps for self-determination of Kosovo but undefined in terms of time. 
Self-determination was perceived as coming as the result of the démocratisation of 
Yugoslavia and good relations with Albania, so démocratisation and good 
neighbourship will create the needed amicable environment for this development. In 
fact this was an initiative supported more by the Europeans than the Americans, led 
by the Greeks who pushed this idea at the Summit of Crete at the beginning of 
November 1997. This step marked a new era in the foreign policy of the Albanian
128 BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 April 1998, “Talbot statement on Kosovo”
129 Robert Lyle, op. cit note 126
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Government. It showed that this policy was different from Berisha's favoured policy 
of international mediation for the resolution of the question of Kosovo. Furthermore it 
neglected the legitimate government of Kosovo. This policy led to confrontations with 
the Government of Kosovo, domestic public opinion and the opposition led by 
Berisha. In any case, it can be said that these factors did not greatly affect the position 
of the Nano government towards the Kosovo question at that time. This is due to the 
good will shown to this government in the international arena. As the time passed, 
the dynamic of the events in Kosovo altered the attitude of international diplomacy. 
This was followed by a new dynamism in the position of the Nano Government 
toward this problem.
The precipitation of the situation in Kosovo increased the attention of the 
international community, which came with other proposals for solutions. Supported 
by the Americans, the French and Germans presented an initiative, which became 
public in November 1998. The initiative aimed to bring the two parties in conflict into 
negotiations and supported the idea of substantial autonomy under the authority of 
Yugoslavia, whilst opposing any self-determination that will violate the territorial 
integrity of Yugoslavia. The Albanian Government has supported this initiative and 
further in time it supported every international initiative that will provide a solution to 
this issue. It is evident that the present Government does not have its own policy 
toward the problem of Kosovo. After the proposal made by Turkey and then by 
Bulgaria and Romania at the Balkan Conference on Kosovo on early 1998, which 
assumed that the solution of the crisis had to take into consideration the will of the 
Kosovo people, the Albanian government began to favour the independence of 
Kosovo. Some other factors have influenced this attitude of Albanian Foreign Policy 
on this issue. The opposition was gaining popularity with its consistent and serious 
stance on this problem. The public pressure has gained a new momentum by 
increasing the participation in demonstrations and acts of solidarity. Furthermore, the 
Serb government had undertaken harsh ethnic cleansing policies, thus signalling the 
failure of the idea of integration that nourished the aspirations of Nano’s Government. 
All these recent developments led to the acceptance of the concept of the self- 
determination, the involvement of the Rugova Government and other political forces
1311 Milosevic is the actual president of Yugoslavia
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in Kosovo in the dialogues and the necessity for international mediation, particularly 
US mediation, in the solution of the crisis.
4.2. Relations with Greece
Following the policy of integration and dialogue in the region, the Albanian 
Government has increased the level of understanding and cooperation with Greece. 
There are also some other factors influencing Albanian policy toward Greece. The 
composition of the Nano cabinet originates mostly from the South and has an 
orthodox affiliation. Greece also is the second most important partner of Albania in 
trade and foreign investments. Moreover, Greece represents the European Union to 
some extent in the Balkans and influences its policies towards the region.
The Nano Government has supported the Greek proposal raised at the Summit 
of Crete, for the Europeanisation of the Balkans, as a tool for the resolution of Balkan 
problems and contradictions, giving Greece the leading role.
Greece is influenced in its policies toward Albania by its competition with the 
other interested international players which look for influence in Albania, among 
whom the most interested is Italy. This competition is multi-dimensional; it includes 
not only the struggle for gaining dominance in the military, political and economic 
affairs of Albania, but also in matters of religion. Greece is seeking to establish a line 
of Orthodox influence throughout the Balkans from Serbia in the North, through part 
of Macedonia, to the south of the Balkans occupied by Greece itself.
Competing with Italy, Greece tries to hold the role of the initiator in respect of 
the initiatives toward Albania in the European institutions. Together with Italy, 
Greece proposed and played the role of the promoter and initiator firstly at a 
Conference of Donors held in Rome in July 1993 and then at a further Conference 
held, in Brussels in October 1997. Both meetings were organised by the European 
Union on behalf of Albania. Greece also has an important bilateral programme of 
military, financial and technical assistance. In this framework Greece has promised to 
offer aid of $71.44 million, of which $7 million are grants and $63 million are soft 
credits in different programs of assistance and projects.131
Considerable aid is provided for the logistic equipment of the military port of 
Durres, Sarande and the Airport of Rinas and the training of Albanian military staff in
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Greece. Greece maintains in Albania a military guard of 205 soldiers and officials 
remain from the “Alba”13 32 multinational mission.
The facts show that the Greek aid is conditional, it seeks the increase of the 
Greek influence on Albania thus feeding the Greek “Megali idea” After the promised 
aid, requests follow on. The first request is related to the Albanian citizenship 
requested by the archbishop Janullatus, the head of the actual Orthodox Church in 
Albania. Giving Janullatus Albanian citizenship would prevent an archbishop of 
Albanian origin from rising on the top of the Albanian Autocephaly as it was foreseen 
in the founding statute of the Albanian Orthodox Autocephaly. The issue is of great 
importance, given that it was one of the contentions that brought about the failure of 
the Referendum organised by Berisha on the Constitution in November 1994133. 
Included in the list of requests is an appeal for autonomy for the schools of the 
minority and a demand to open a Greek high school in Tirana. All these requests have 
not been considered with the same good will. The Greek authorities have rejected the 
request of the Albanian authorities for legalising Albanian teachers in Greece for the 
education of the children of emigrants.
4.3. Relations with the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia
Regarding Macedonia, the Albanian Government is continuing the policy of 
integration and dialogue for mutual understanding and cooperation, which will lead to 
the opening of the borders, free communication of people and cultures and to an 
economic integration. The leading philosophy on the Albanian side is the spirit of 
reconciliation that followed the example of France and Germany who left aside the old 
conflicts and were unified in Europe. Accordingly, the first high level meeting was 
held in October 1997 between Mejdani134 and Gligorov135 in Skopje. This meeting 
prepared the climate for the following meetings at the Prime Ministers and Foreign 
Ministers level, and the signing of a series of Agreements. Six Agreements were 
signed by the Foreign Ministers, which refer to the regime and inter-border
131 RFE-RL, Part 11, 13 November 1998
132 “Alba” is a multinational military force mandated by the Resolution 1101 of United Nation Security Council 
to help prevent the escalation of conflict in Albania during the 1997 crisis.
133 See, Mero Base, 1997, “Realitete Shqiptaro- Amerikane”(Albanian-Ainerican relations), Tirana: Koha Press 
- The constitution provision sanctioned the importance of Albanian origin for the archbishop of the Albanian 
Orthodox Autocephaly.
134 Rexhep Mejdani is the Albanian President from July 1998
135 Kiro Gligorov is the President of FYROM
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communications and economic cooperation in different areas of mutual interest. At 
the Prime Minister level eight agreements were signed on the judiciary, frontier 
regimes and economic matters, including the 8th Corridor and the gas pipeline that 
will comes across Bulgaria.
The presence of an Albanian population in Macedonia is considered as an 
element of stability for the mutual relations between the two countries and it is 
therefore argued that the Albanian population there should be allowed to live in the 
country with dignity.
“Righteous requests of the Albanians in Macedonia are supported but these 
rights remain within the legal framework of the state, which they belong to, in 
this case Macedonia, the policy of Albania comply with the international 
documents. Albania does not support and does not request activities that are 
contrary to the final documents of Helsinki and the Paris Declaration or with 
other documents, which it has signed”136.
The policy toward the ethnic Albanians outside the borders is in total 
accordance with the US and European policy in the Balkans which favours the 
inviolability of the present Balkan borders. This was further evidence that the 
Albanian Government does not have a policy on the Balkans.
4.4. Relations with Turkey
One of the most important countries for the political but also economic 
interests of Albania is Turkey. There are traditional links that bond both countries; the 
long coexistence under the Ottoman Empire, the large presence of Albanians and 
Turks of Albanian origin in Turkey which in total exceeds the number of Albanians in 
Albania proper. Turkey is also the third commercial partner of Albania and, being an 
important member of NATO, can play an important role in the integration of Albania 
into NATO programmes.
After a period of close relations with Turkey especially in the military field, 
during the Berisha Government, the new socialist government experienced an 
estrangement of friendship. First this was due to the strong Western orientation of 
Nano’s foreign policy. Second, this estrangement is related with the distant policy 
toward the Muslim world due to the pressure of the West on conditioning the aid and 
the Orthodox affiliation of the present Government. Accordingly, Albania has not
136 Paskal Milo statement, Albanian Press Release, Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 1998
53
participated in the high level meetings of the Islamic Conference. (Albania has been a 
member since the early stage of the Berisha Government). Third, there was a 
perception that Turkey was in favour of the Democratic Government and supported it 
during the 1997 crisis. Furthermore, Turkey was accused of providing shelter to some 
SHIK137 agents who ran away during the crisis. The new Government translated that 
as a hostile attitude toward itself.
Nevertheless, both countries have close common interests. The will for 
improvement that both countries showed after a short period of coolness displays the 
common ground shared by the two states. Recently, many Albanian high-level visits 
have been made, including the visit of President Mejdani, of the speaker of the 
Parliament, Gjinushi, of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Milo, of the Minister of 
Defence, Brokaj, of the chair of the Commission of the Parliament for Foreign Affairs, 
Godo, and others. It is important to see that first the visits are of a high level and 
second are all invitations extended by Turkey to the Albanian authorities. This shows 
the interest on the Turkish side in increasing the level of relations with Albania and 
maintaining its influence in this part of the Balkan as a counterbalance to the Greek 
influence. All this culminated with the visit of Turkish president Demirel to Tirana last 
summer. Moreover, Turkey is extending the range of its involvement in Albania. The 
Exim Turkish Bank will extend a credit of $70 million to Albania, of which, $17 
million is a grant and the rest is soft credit.138 Drawing parallels with Greece, we see 
that Turkey would like to be in the same track. Still the military cooperation is going 
well and is considered at an advanced level. In this framework, Turkey has signed the 
agreement of $7 million for the reconstruction of the Pashaliman naval basis in the 
Southeast of Albania139.
4.5. Relations with Italy
Italy plays an important role in the whole Albanian economic, political and 
military life. Italy represents the first economic and commercial partner of Albania, 
accounting for 70 percent of the trade and representing more then 55 percent of 
foreign investments present in Albania. There are a considerable number of Albanian
137 SHIK is the Albanian National Informative Service
13,1 Interview with the counsellor to the Ambassador in the Turkish Embassy in Tirana, 29 March 1998
139 See, RFE-RL, Part II, 23 January 1998 and RFE-RL, Part II, 27 March 1998
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emigrants who work in Italy, and their remittances are of the primary importance for 
the Albanian economy eager for foreign currency. Italy is also regarded as the 
Albanian representative in Europe. In this matter, Italy is playing an important role in 
increasing the sensitiveness of the European Partners in Europe toward Albania. Italy 
proposed and led the initiative for the Multinational Intervention Force “Alba” during 
the civil unrest in Albania; also it has issued the initiative for the two Donors' 
Conferences on Albania. Italy has initiated a Marshall Plan for Albania of $220 million 
dollars that will be delivered in the period 1998-2000140 and will include different 
fields. It aims at building up the civil society in Albania through programs for youth 
education, integration of woman in society and business, the rehabilitation of the 
marginalised categories. This huge programme of assistance will also concentrate on 
the rehabilitation of road, electric, water systems, on the rehabilitation of the health 
service, customs and financial system, rehabilitation of public administration, 
privatisation, and the promotion of Italian investments in Albania. Italy will push 
forward the construction of the 8th Corridor (Brindisi, port of Durres, Macedonia, 
Bulgaria up to Istanbul) in the European Union structures, especially through PHARE 
and INTEREG programs. Italy also will play an important role in the compilation of 
the Albanian Constitution. Italy will support Albanian membership and integration 
into the EU and NATO. In foreign policy, Italy will support dialogue and integration 
in the region and will support Albania in its efforts for the solution of Kosovo 
question.
In military terms, Italy will participate with Turkey in the reconstruction of the 
Pashaliman naval base. It is providing a considerable logistic aid in support of the 
Albanian Police and it maintains 200 military troops- the remains of “Alba” Mission- 
that patrol the Albanian coast aiming to stop illegal emigration.
There is a justification for this Italian trop de zele . First, there is the problem 
of the flow of the emigrants entering Italy from Albania. These efforts aim to stop this 
flow. Second, Albania represents for Italy the only entrance gate to the Balkans.
In the struggle for increasing its dominance in the political, economic and 
military spheres of Albanian life, Italy is competing with Greece. The competition is 
extended even in the religious domain. Catholicism and Orthodoxy are looking for
140 See, RFE-RL, Vol II, Nr. 183,18 December 1997
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dominance. There is evidence for this views. “Alba” operation in Albania, which was 
led by the Italians, beside the mission of peacemaking was involved in the protection 
and reconstruction of Catholic cathedrals. Moreover, the Vatican under the initiative 
of the Pope has started the construction of a Catholic University in the centre of 
Tirana and another in Durres. In commemoration of Mother Teresa, who was of 
Albanian origin, the Catholic community is constructing a monastery in the North of 
Albania. Moreover, Italy is increasing the presence of its consulates in its zones of 
influence, by opening two new ones, in Shkodra and Valona, in the near future. The 
system of visas will be liberalised and Italy will create the conditions for the 
integration of the Albanians working in Italy within the Italian society.
4.6. Relations with other Balkan Countries
Looking to the other Balkan countries, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia and 
Croatia, Albania has good relations with them since there are no territorial interests 
and ethnic problems involved. In these circumstances, Albania is pushing dialogue and 
mutual understanding for integration and cooperation. High level delegations were 
exchanged recently. A numerous of agreements have been signed with these countries 
in economic, investment, and customs matters.
5 6
CHAPTER 3 - An Institutional Perspective on Security Issues
1. Security from an institutional perspective
“To analyse world politics in the 1990s is to discuss international institutions: 
the rules that govern elements of world politics and the organisations that help 
implement those rules”. Institutions provide the capability for “states to cooperate in a 
mutually beneficial way”, by laying down rules and guidelines. They “reinforce the 
practices of reciprocity, which provide incentives for governments to keep their own 
commitments to ensure that others do so as well”. As a result “general conformity to 
rules” will make state behaviour more predictable and will reduce uncertainty. This 
climate is also favoured by transparent negotiations, consistent rules applied over 
time, honesty encouraged in return for reputation preservation and continuous 
monitoring of government compliance over their commitments. Furthermore, 
institutions by providing procedures and rules “create informational structures”, and 
by determining acceptable principles and by judging governments for acting 
legitimately or not, shape participants’ expectations and create a powerful form of 
global regulation.141
These patterns of institutions are considered a powerful engine that provides 
for stability and security. Many scholars regard the institutions as the prominent factor 
that has helped in successfully stabilising and managing regional and global changes in 
the world system after the end of the Cold War, and in the future will avoid military 
conflict especially in Europe.142 Today Europe does not have to start from scratch. A 
good experience was gained during the Cold War that can very well serve as a base 
upon which the new adjustment can be shaped in accordance with the new 
challenges.143 Institutions such as NATO, the EU, the OSCE, WEU, can play an 
important role in providing suitable solutions.
141 See, Robert O.Keohane, op. cit note 22, pp.82-94
142 See, ibid., and John G Ruggie., “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” International 
Organisations”, Vol.46, No.3, Summer 1992.
143 Marko Carnovalle, op. cit note 70, p. 13
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Furthermore, at the present time “vital security interests are no longer national 
interests, and national security interests are no longer vital”144. The vital national 
interests are challenged by a wide range of problems that goes beyond the military 
ones that have almost become anachronistic in the face of economic and 
environmental problems, terrorism, migration, civil unrest, resurgent nationalistic 
splits and fear of further escalation across border challenges. Accounting for these 
challenges, we can enumerate a range of problems following them. Globalisation has 
made societies and economies enormously complex and at the same time, vulnerable 
to international financial transactions. The wide spread possibility of proliferation of 
the weapons of mass destruction, especially in the Southeast part of Europe and other 
underdeveloped countries in the Middle East and Asia, is challenging stability and 
peace. Regional conflict that has not disappeared with the end of the Cold War era 
may provide a “domino effect”. In most of the cases, in Europe they result from “lack 
of democracy, human rights and economic opportunities. Yet others are caused by the 
daunting challenges of transition into modern, self-confident states and societies”. The 
free and sure access to natural resources of every kind remains a challenge that will 
have repercussions in the stability and development of world countries.145 These 
challenges require an adequate, complex and instrumental approach. A single state 
cannot provide a sustainable and satisfactory solution. The institutional approach is 
the most appropriate in providing the solution to the new challenges, especially to 
those related with security and defence issues.
The purpose of international institutions and their role “provide an acceptable 
balance between the sovereign equality and independence of states on the one hand 
and the reality of an interdependent world and the international law commitment to 
human dignity on the other”146. In this discussion it is important to mention that the 
realm of the international institutions has a European character described by many 
scholars as ‘ethnocentrism’ or ‘Eurocentsrism’, in the sense that it is based on the 
European conceptualisation of values, law and sovereignty that nowadays has
144 ibid., p. 1
145 Javier Solana, “NATO in the Twenty-First Century”, Perceptions, Volume IV, Number 1, March-May 1999, 
pp. 13-22
144 Rosalyn Higgins, 1986,“Intervention and International Law”, Intervention in World Politics, Hedley Bull ed, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p.30
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transcended the mere fact of sovereignty147. This conceptualisation now has an 
universal impetus rather than adhering to norms contingent and peculiar to Western 
society148. As such the “territory” is no longer the only source of jurisdiction. 
Definitions such as “impact jurisdiction” have gained importance presuming 
intervention in the states’ internal affairs on the name of human values and protection 
of norms, considering the violation of human rights as a common threat that make the 
intervention a collective duty149. In the Balkan context it does not represent any 
controversy150 since all the Balkan countries are part of Europe and they believe in 
European values. The total agreement over NATO operation in Kosovo in the name 
of Western values and the protection of human rights, makes clear the intent of 
sharing and practising such values on the part of the Balkan countries.
In the Balkans, the end of the Cold War has raised two serious problems that 
are related to security issues. The first problem is linked with the economic crisis 
which started with the process of modernisation at the beginning of the 1980s, and 
which provoked the revival of neighbour-blaming and ethnic nationalism. 
Modernisation is related to reforms aiming at the decentralisation of the economy, to 
changes in political culture aiming for the introduction of pluralism in the political life, 
with changes on the society values centred on the individual freedom of choice and to 
changes in the military tradition. The new democratic perspective on human and 
minority rights inspired separatist feelings among different ethnic groups in search of 
better standards of living, thus creating a great threat to the security and stability of 
existing states.
The second problem relates to question of political legitimacy. The legitimacy 
is based mostly on the charismatic personality leader. On the one hand, this legacy 
may lead to authoritarism and on the other hand the correlation between economic
147 Stanley Hoffman, 1986, “The problem of Intervention”, Intervention in World Politics, Hedley Bull eds., 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 25-26
148 Ian Forbes, 1993, “Beyond the State’’, Political Theory and the Ethics of Intervention, Ian Forbes and Mark 
Hoffman eds., Macmillan, p.217
149 Rosalyn Higgins, op. cit note 146, p.3I
150 Some scholars of international relations believe that the institutions mostly represent and project Western 
values The West through these institutions is trying to project itself all-over the world, producing clashes with 
the other world civilisations. These clashes are perceived as a source that generate tensions more then providing 
for stability. In the case of the Balkan countries this is not the case since they are considered as part of Europe. 
See for more details : Samuel P.Huntington, 1998, Barry Buzan, 1991
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and ethnic problems and charismatic leaders can violently affect the legitimacy of the 
regime and the process of démocratisation.151
Under such circumstances international institutions can play an important role 
in managing these transition problems that closely relate to security issues in the 
Balkans. At the first stage, in the short term, institutions can intervene through 
political dialogue and mediation before tensions explode producing a political solution 
suitable for the parties without running the risk of a costly military confrontation that 
carries the risk of regional escalation. In the long term, institutions, especially the 
European ones, can extend the process of political, economical and security 
integration to the Balkan countries. The Western experience is a good example of 
managing and pacifying the old rivalries between states. The habit of cooperation and 
the elaboration of ties among the European states helped to constrain the outbreak of 
the conflict among Western European states. This integration process is in its initial 
stage in the Balkans. Most of the Balkan countries are members of the OSCE which 
provides a forum for discussion and confidence and security building. Most of Balkan 
countries are members of the Partnership for Peace programme that works towards 
making the military capabilities and strategies of these countries compatible with 
NATO's standards; also, NATO with the NACC152, has created the opportunity for a 
further military integration in the future of the Balkan countries. The European Union 
represents the biggest allure of attraction and as such can play an important role in the 
future since it involves in the integration process democratic values and respect for 
human rights, market economy and legal and institutional framework. However, this 
integration is a remote prospect for most of Balkan countries.
On the other hand, the institutions can guarantee the democratic transition by 
providing the right institutional checks and balances over the process and aid and 
assistance in the support of democratic moves until the legitimising process creates 
the democratic culture that is missing in most of the Balkan countries.
2. General Outlook on European Security Institutions
Historically, European politicians have believed in the idea of collective
151 John R. Lampe, 1990, “Southeastern Europe and the Legacy of Insecurity”, Problems of Balkan Security, 
Southeastern Europe in the 1990s, Shoup & Hoffman eds., Washington, DC: The Wilson Centre Press
152 EAPC has superseded NACC
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security as an important tool to maintain peace and security order in Europe. 1989 
marked the start of the post Cold War era, Europe is living in a new era where 
political conjunctures, economic structures or international alignments are changed. 
The events of 1989-1991 marked a major change within the European continent. The 
bipolar system has come to an end and multi-polarity has replaced the previous one. 
The European alignments have changed in central Europe, in the Baltics, in the 
Balkans, and elsewhere. Europe is moving very fast toward a global economy and 
global communications that favour the deepening of integration. States already 
manage their affairs increasingly through collective organisations and regimes. The 
process of détente and the end of the Cold War are accompanied by the development 
of a new security system in Europe, in which the military forces of former blocs, 
NATO and the Treaty of Warsaw began to exchange information and cooperate to a 
remarkable degree. The break up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, however, 
reopened the possibility of armed conflicts in Europe, especially in the new state 
system created in eastern Europe, after the dissolution processes. This raises the issue 
of whether Europe has moved beyond the age of war-fighting towards the “end of the 
history”153, or whether the Cold War was only a break.
With the end of the Cold War, the challenges of formulating European defence 
and security policies have changed considerably. For over five decades, the East-West 
conflict substantially structured the strategies, defence planing priorities and military 
needs of Europe. This contributed to European security, but today the European 
internal context carries instability and changes to the formulation of security policies. 
In this unfamiliar and uncertain new environment, security policies cannot be based 
any more on the outdated assumptions of the past decades. The new environment is 
not sufficiently shaped and the national consensus about the content over security 
concerns in the post Cold War era is not clear cut. This presents the difficulties faced 
in establishing a shaped and appropriate multilateral security system for post-Cold 
War Europe. Nevertheless, the institutional approach is the most appropriate one that 
can address the new challenges. An overview of the most important European 
institutions will help in clarifying their role in building the European security 
architecture. This analysis has a direct implication in the security building for the
153 See on the idea Fransis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History” National Interest, Nr. 16, Summer 1989
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Balkans since such institutions are seen as constituent part of these architecture.
2.1. NATO
After the Second World War in order to ensure peace and security in Europe, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or NATO was created. Its strategic mission 
was directed mainly against the threat coming from the Soviet Union that remained 
powerful for more then 40 years. With the disappearance of this central mission and 
the Soviet Union itself, there is today no military threat to NATO’s countries 
territories, but alliance members still continue to share vital interests with regard to 
security issues. The new vital interests include: the defence against a renewed outside 
hegemony threat to Europe; the preservation of the strategic balance in Europe by 
preventing the return of European rivalry or even military competition and conflict, 
the prevention of the re-nationalisation of European politics and defence policies; the 
halt or at least slowing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and delivering 
missile systems by working on confidence building measures and encouraging 
transparency and arms verification and control; the maintaining of free access to 
Persian Gulf oil and other primary resources at reasonable prices; the promotion of 
democratic values and institutions as an important tool that provides for security and 
an open international system.154 t
The forceful dissolution of Yugoslavia that materialised in two fierce conflicts, 
gave NATO another important out of area role: the protection of democratic values 
and Western economic and security interests in its closest periphery and beyond. The 
redefinition of NATO’s mission and of alliance current practices went together with 
the adjustment over the NATO structures, mechanisms and procedures to make sure 
that such an arrangement works in the same way as it did during the Cold War. 
Accordingly, NATO expanded its mission on the continent, opening the possibility for 
responding to overall threats to European security. In this context, NATO has 
committed itself to peacekeeping and peacemaking action to contain conflict in 
Europe.
154 See, Jan Petersen, “NATO’s Next strategic concept”, NATO Review, No 2, Vol.46, Summer 1998, pp.I8-22, 
and Javier Solana, “NATO in the Twenty-First Century”, Perceptions, Volume IV, Number 1, March-May 
1999, pp 13-22, and “Washington Summit Communique”, NATO Press Release NAC-S (99)64-24 April 1999, 
and Manfred Worner, “NATO Transformed: The Significance of the Rome Summit”, NATO Review, No 6, 
Vol.39, December 1991, pp.3-8
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NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, after the failure of UN intervention 
and European Union negotiations, and the air bombing operations in Kosovo, showed 
that NATO from the military, strategic and operational point of view, is today the 
most effective structure to ensure security and peace in post Cold War Europe. 
Projecting stability for the central and eastern part of Europe, the alliance established 
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
programme and most recently the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) that 
superseded NACC, contributing substantially to strengthening political consultations 
and practical cooperation between the partners and the Alliance on security and 
defence related issues.155 The most important move was to expand membership 
toward the East, which is fulfilling another old inspiration of European politics, 
creating a unified and peaceful Europe.156
2.2. The OSCE
The OSCE is another European organisation projecting security and stability 
in Europe. This role is generated by the fact “of its all-inclusive membership” since all 
the European countries are members in the OSCE, including Russia. Its geographic 
expansion reaches three continents, North America, Europe and Asia. Meanwhile, the 
organisation provides the largest dimension to security issues, including human rights 
and economic dimension. The values to which it is committed, such as human rights, 
free market economy, environmental issues and control and confidence building 
measures, lay the path for a stable and secure Europe, on the grounds that nowadays 
there is a shift toward the reduction in the frequency of inter-state military 
confrontation.
On the practical side, the OSCE has created a cooperative and consensual 
spirit that led to politically binding agreements on core issues, such as arms control, 
confidence and security building measures (CSBM) and human rights. The OSCE 
devoting a great deal to fact finding and monitoring missions aiming at conflict
155 Sergio Balanzino, “A Year After Sintra: Achieving Cooperative Security Through the EAPC and PfP”, NATO 
Review, No.3, Autumn 1998, pp.4-8
156 On the issue of NATO new strategic mission and role see in alphabetic order: Gulnur Aybet, “NATO’s New 
Missions”, Perceptions, Volume IV, Number I, March-May 1999, pp 65-75, Jan Petersen, “NATO’s Next 
strategic concept”, NATO Review, No 2, Vol.46, Summer 1998, pp. 18-22, Javier Solana, “NATO in the Twenty- 
First Century”, Perceptions, Volume IV, Number 1, March-May 1999, pp. 13-22, “Washington Summit 
Communique”, NATO Press Release NAC-S (99)64-24 April 1999, Manfred Worner, “NATO Transformed: 
The Significance o f the Rome Summit”, NATO Review, No 6, Vol.39, December 1991, pp.3-8.
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prevention. Last but not the least, the OSCE provides the grounds for facilitating the 
coordination among different institutions and organisations in Europe on security 
problems and issues.157
In order to facilitate the problems of managing a large and diverse membership 
and fulfil its missions, the OSCE established an executive secretariat in Prague, a 
Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna that will work mostly on CSBMs, and an Office 
for Free Elections in Warsaw to monitor national elections which later became the 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Such bodies have facilitated 
common security policies and in some cases the OSCE have succeed in mitigating 
regional quarrels between member sates. Nevertheless, there is little hope that 
common agreement can be implemented without the threat of military sanctions. The 
major European powers share different interests in the Continent, so using military 
force to enforce collective decision has little chance to be implemented. On the other 
hand, the OSCE does not have the right structures for projecting power in managing 
and coping with concrete cases of instability and crisis. Its main role remains the 
projection, spread, monitoring and defence of the democratic values in the new 
democracies in the post Cold War Europe, in close cooperation with a NATO that 
“offers the instruments to bring these processes together in a coherent way”158.
2.3. The European Union
The European Union represents in itself a body that, through a deeper and 
expanded integration process, will lead to a closer union which logically involves 
common security and defence policies and provides an important attractive security 
envelope to Europe. According to the functionalist approach, the progress made 
toward economic and political union will necessarily imply progress in the domain of 
security, because political union cannot be considered to be complete and successful 
without common security and defence policies.
The end of the Cold War has raised a large range of challenges to Europe. The 
interdependence of member states is growing and this increases the need for 
convergence of interest in other areas. This need is related first, to the fear of a drift in
157 See, Niels Helveg Petersen, “Toward a European Security Model for the 21s’ Century”, NATO Review, No 6, 
Vol.45, November-December 1997, pp 4-7.
l5S Michael Ruhle, ‘Taking Another Look at NATO’s Role in European Security”, NATO Review, No 4, Vol.46, 
Winter 1998, pp. 20-23.
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the United States’ policy toward Europe; second, to the diversity of risks deriving 
mainly from the dissolution of Soviet Union and the fear of the spread of its nuclear 
arsenals in the trouble spots close to Europe; third, to the challenges to European 
economic vital interests related with free access to primary resources, especially oil159; 
fourth, to the threats coming from a turbulent surrounding neighbourhood as it is the 
case of the Balkans. All these challenges point to the urgent necessity to define a 
common defence policy and ability to act and make the necessary changes to the 
European security institutions.
The Maastricht Treaty has tried to respond to these new challenges. In the 
security field the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty on Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), including its extension on common defence policy, remain 
complicated and depend on an efficient division of labour with other organisations. 
NATO views its own enlargement and that of the EU as mutually supportive and 
parallel processes which together will make a significant contribution to strengthening 
of European security structures. While no rigid parallelism is foreseen, each 
organisation needs to consider developments in the other. Accordingly, unlike the 
Cold War period, the European integration process is interrelated with that of 
NATO.160
The decision at the NATO Brussels Summit in January 1994, on developing a 
European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO assigns to NATO an 
important role in deepening European integration and matching the European 
aspirations for Common Foreign and Security Policy in the short run.
In the long term, European security integration aims firstly at “the 
preservation and the expansion of the European security-community”, in the words of 
Karl Deutsch161. The creation of such a community involves a large range of factors 
such as the consolidation of liberal democracies, the development of a large network 
of cooperation and interdependence among the region states and building a solid base 
of trust and confidence in the continent. Secondly, this integration aims at the 
effective and efficient protection and promotion “of the vital national interests of
159 Karl-Heinz Kamp, 1995“European Security outside of Europe”, European Security and International 
Institutions after the Cold War, Marko Carnovale eds., New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 101-102
160 Robert J Art., “Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO”, Political Science Quarterly, 
Spring 1996, Vol 111, pp.I-40
161 In Deutsch Karl W. security community concept involves a region not as a community of states but as an 
area when war is not any more the way of conflict resolution, See, Karl W.Deutsch, op. cit note 13
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European States in international relations”, and “the construction of a federal 
Europe”. A European security integration “will be an essential anchor for the 
continent in the absence of direct superpower hegemony”.162 A further enlargement of 
the EU in Central and Eastern Europe is the most important move that will promote 
the idea of a free, unified and peaceful Europe, since membership of the EU implies 
much more important requirements involving democratic and human values and 
market economy regime and which hopefully will create a Kantian ‘pacific union’ of 
liberal republics.
2.4. WEU
In its dual role as defence component of the EU and the European pillar of the 
Atlantic Alliance, WEU brings an additional dimension to European security. WEU 
has extended a pledge of common defence to all signatory members, based on the 
Article 5 of the modified Brussels Treaty. At the NATO Brussels Summit in January 
1994, NATO’s Heads of State and Governments acknowledged this dual role and 
contributed to its further development by expressing readiness to make collective 
assets available for WEU operations undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of 
their CFSP. When implemented, the concept of “Combined Joint Task Forces” will 
enable asset-sharing between the WEU and NATO to take place and allow the 
maximum possible use of existing forces.
The Petersberg Declaration in June 1992 clarified WEU’s role in conflict 
prevention and crisis management. According to this document, the forces answerable 
to WEU could undertake humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and 
tasks of combat forces in crisis management; WEU units could of course, also be used 
“contributing to the common defence of the Alliance”.163
The role of WEU is conditioned by the integration process. The extension of 
membership to new countries is not moving any further. This is due to the fact that 
the pre-conditions of membership include a large variety of issues, from the economic 
to human rights, from social policies to legal compatibility, from defence patterns to 
foreign policies and interests. Accordingly it seems it will take a long time before the
162 lan Gambles, "European Security integration in the 1990s”, Chaillot Paper 5, November 3, 1990, Paris: 
WEU Institute for Security Studies
163 See Petersberg Declaration, June 1992
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EU will be able to extend its security guarantees to the Central and Eastern European 
Countries. Nevertheless, the process of an integrated Europe under the EU umbrella 
has started, Accession Agreements have been signed with most of the ex-socialist 
countries, which automatically has extended the associated status of these countries in 
WEU, thus providing a role for WEU in the European security architecture.
In the European framework, “interlocking institutions” that mutually reinforce 
their mission on projecting and promoting European security and avoid rivalry in 
between, are very important. These organisations are created at different points in 
time and circumstances, covering the security challenges and problems of the moment. 
Nowadays any cooperation among these organisation which match ideals and 
capabilities is important. NATO has proved to be the most important organisation that 
can provide the operational and military capabilities with well established structures 
able to implement and legitimise common decisions. The EU represents the main 
attractive pole of prosperity and as such provides the model of democracy and the 
market economy regime, a model to be followed. The OSCE is the most integrated 
structure that involves all the European states and pursues a continuous policy on 
monitoring and developing democratic values across Europe. WEU is an intermediate 
organisation that represent an important bridge between NATO and the EU, aiming to 
develop European security and defence identity.
The attempt to stabilise and integrate the Central and Eastern Europe within 
the European security architecture demands inter-complimentary work on the part of 
these organisations, each contributing with its own means and policies. It is hard to 
believe that Europe will be a safe and peaceful place without completing this
164process
3. Albanian institutional perspectives of its own security concerns
In the previous Chapter a general outlook over the Balkans and Albanian 
history was provided justifying the Albanian concerns over its security. Historically, 
the Balkan peninsula is considered the powder keg of Europe and apparently it has 
not changed much over time. Being geographically between Europe and Asia, with a 
dominant position in the Mediterranean Sea, the Balkans has been a point where 164
164 The discussion of European identity, both from geographic and common shared values point of view is 
excluded from the whole discussion.
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interests have clashed. This pattern has influenced state creation in the Balkans by 
drawing the state borders according to the geopolitics of the moment and not ethnic 
considerations. All Balkan countries have territorial claims against their neighbours 
and ethnic minority problems. The Balkan countries are very sensitive toward those 
problems and those issues can very easily be a cause for war as it has been the case of 
the Balkan wars in the past and recently it was the case of the wars in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and in Kosovo.165
Albania is shaped in all dimensions by Balkan historical developments. To 
begin with, the Albanian state is surrounded by Albanians which in number equal the 
internal population and meanwhile the external population is subjected to 
discriminatory policies by the hosting countries, which preserves Albania’s tense 
relations with the neighbours. Meanwhile, Albania, having emerged from the most 
destructive communist dictatorships, remains the poorest country in the Balkans, 
unable to provide for its own security due to its economic backwardness.166 Under 
such circumstance, the Albanian question in the Balkans represents a sensitive issue 
with important implications for Albania proper and the stability of the region.
3.1. Albanian alliance building policy and the security issues
The quest for security and the weak position of Albania in the post Cold War 
Balkans push it toward alliances building/membership policies as a tool toward the 
acquisition of security.
An alliance with NATO looks the most appropriate solution to Albania's 
security dilemmas and for stability in the Balkans. The other possible alliances can be 
either bilateral such as with United States, Germany, Italy or Turkey or other 
multilateral structure such as the EU. The bilateral alliances will not be welcomed by 
the members of NATO in the Balkans and in Europe. An Albanian-Italian alliance 
would create a great reaction and would threaten the relationship with Greece and 
Serbia that historically has tried to avoid an Italian presence in the Balkans. An 
alliance with Turkey would jeopardise the relations with Greece and can raise the 
tensions in the Balkans framework. The events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the
165 See, Paul A. Goble, 1994, “A new age of nationalism", The Access Guide to Ethnic Conflicts in Europe and 
Former Soviet Union, Bruce Seymore eds., Washington, DC and Janusz Bugajski, op. Cit Note 19, and Robert 
J. Art, op. cit note 160, pp. 1-40
166 A general outlook for the Albanian macroeconomic situation will be provided in the coming chapter.
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inability of the international community and other organisations to find a solution to 
the crisis in Yugoslavia and the most recent events in Kosovo, confirmed that NATO 
remains at the foundation of the European security architecture. Following this logic, 
membership of NATO represents a priority for the Albanian government. The EU 
membership and the OSCE role constitute appropriate structures that can provide for 
security only in the long term. The final chapter will deal further with their role in 
projecting the security architecture for the Balkans, with a particular focus on 
Albania.
3.2. NATO expansion and Albanian perspectives
The end of the Cold War has opened the debate about the expansion of 
NATO. The new members coming from ex-Warsaw Pact into the alliance dispersed 
the doubts about the future of NATO and its expansion toward the East. 
Nevertheless, one’s concern should be related to NATO expansion in the Balkans, 
since it remains the most unstable area in Europe.
None of the Balkan countries was foreseen joining in the first wave of NATO 
enlargement. However, a sort of security guarantee should be provided to the new 
democratic Balkan countries. This is for two reasons: first, to avoid a new dividing 
line in Europe after NATO expansion in the Central-Eastern Europe; second, 
insecurity may push the Balkan countries to search for other alliances or other 
security alternatives that may give rise to a new struggle for power and influence in 
the Balkans, which will be highly destabilising even for Europe itself.167
Justifications for the further enlargement of NATO into Southeastern Europe 
are directly related to commonly perceived security problems facing the US and its 
European partners in the Balkans.
The security concerns are related firstly, to the growth of nationalism and 
rebellious tendencies in the Balkans. These tendencies became evident in the violent 
dissolution of Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, followed by the civil 
unrest in Albania, Bulgaria and Serbia during 1997 and recently with the Kosovo 
crisis. A turbulent region just behind Europe’s door does not match either the 
European or the US interest. The only appropriate instrument to deal with these
167 Roland D.Asmis and F. Stephen Larrabee, “NATO and the Have Nots”, Foreign Affairs, November- 
December 1996, pp.1-7
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instabilities is NATO, as proved by the intervention in Bosnia and recently in Kosovo. 
But for a permanent solution only a NATO extended membership in the Balkans can 
cope with the situation, stabilise the region, provide the right framework for the 
continuation of the process of démocratisation and economic reform toward a market 
economy regime and from a larger perspective contribute to “preserving the strategic 
balance within Europe”168.
Secondly, there is a common need to strengthen the Southern wing of NATO, 
which actually appears to be weak either because of the tensions between Turkey and 
Greece, or because of the situation in the Middle East. The extension of the conflict in 
the South of the Balkans will further deepen the division, providing the alliance with 
very delicate dilemmas.
Third, there is a dangerous environment close to the Balkans, that may affect 
it, namely Islamic fundamentalism and the fears of its expansion in the Balkans. In the 
Balkans there is a large Muslim presence, constituted by Turkish, Albanian and 
Bosnian communities. The explosion of a war in the Balkans may favour the 
expansion of fundamentalism and involvement of regressive force in its support. The 
idea of volunteers from fundamentalist organisations coming from the Muslim 
countries of the Middle East in support of Bosnian Muslim community during the 
Bosnian war and the presence of doubtful humanitarian Muslim organisation in the 
Balkans, cause these fears. The explosion of War in the Balkans may be a good 
opportunity for transforming the conflict into a clash between different civilisation 
based on religious differences. This situation can be dangerous not only for the 
Balkans but for Europe also. In such circumstances, NATO, “either takes themfthe 
Balkan countries) in, and tries to deal with their problems, or the latter will grow and 
affect NATO anyway, sooner or later... if you are not perpetually going forward, 
you’ll fall off.”169.
It is also important to see the reverse of the coin, and to envisage a situation 
where NATO interests, dilemmas and factors influence its enlargement into the 
Balkans, and by implication the chances of Albanian membership in the organisation.
After the end of the Cold War three factors negatively affected NATO’s
168 Meeting o f the North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, Copenhagen, 6-7 June 1991
169 Jamie Shea, 1995, “Should NATO Be Enlarged to the East”, European Security and International 
Institutions After the End of the Cold War, Marco Camovale eds., New York: St. Martini Press, p. 87
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enlargement in the Balkans. First, there is a divergence in the perception of national 
interest and political priorities between the United States and its European allies in the 
Balkans. The four years of crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the crisis of 1997 in 
Albania illustrated this. Washington’s reluctance to send ground troops in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and the EU’s and WEU’s involvement in the Albanian crisis can serve as 
examples. Furthermore, the divergence among the Alliance members over the 
bombing campaign in Yugoslavia reinforce this idea.
Second, Russia has opposed and would continue to oppose NATO 
enlargement in the Balkans. In the Balkans, Russia began to act as protectors of the 
Serbs. The motive is not only “Pan Slavism” and the alleged bond of kinship with the 
Serbs; it is also related to other interests such as oil pipelines170. Emerging from the 
shock of defeat after the end of the Cold War, Russia is trying to re-stabilise its zone 
of influence there. In order not to upset Russia171, NATO will at least delay any 
enlargement in the Balkans.
Third, after the three new members, further NATO enlargement in the Balkans 
is going to affect NATO cohesion. In a way this is not a strong argument since the 
alliance has always been based not on numbers but on sharing of common democratic 
values.172 Nevertheless, the new comers from the Central Europe are not able to bear 
all the costs of such membership; the old members have to provide for it. Following 
this logic, NATO enlargement in the Balkans looks very distant from a cold financial 
point of view and one cannot ignore the fact that the Balkan countries are still far 
from representing consolidated democracies.
Focusing on the Albanian case, there is a logic behind the exceptions of 
Albania for an early membership in NATO. The membership of Albania within 
NATO will contribute to the security of the region and avoid the outbreak of the 
interstate conflict in the Balkans. These are the main reasons. First, Albania has a 
compact ethnic population, 98 percent being Albanians, and no territorial claims from 
its neighbours. Therefore, a stable and pro-western Albania would be an important 
asset in the creation of a stable pro-west centre in the Balkans. Second, the Albanian
170 On the idea see Norman Stone, ‘T w o Cheers for Colonel Tony Benn”, The Times, 26. March 1999
171 Richard Murphy, “OSCE Hopes Russia Will Keep Trying in Kosovo”, Reuters, April 06, 1999; Carol 
Giacomo, “Albright Seeks ‘common ground’ with Russia on Kosovo”, Reuters, April 12, 1999; Barry Schweid, 
“Trying to Mend Fences with Russia”, Associated Press, April 13, 1999.
172 Shea Jamie, op. cit note 169, p. 86
71
question in the Balkans has reached boiling point. Kosovo represents a big danger; 
half of the Albanian nation has been living there under a military occupation which 
turned into bloody ethnic cleansing campaign this year. This situation can easily turn 
into a widespread conflict in the Balkans, involving first of all Albania and also 
Macedonia where 25 percent of the population is Albanian. The other Balkan 
countries will find themselves reeling under the pressure of hundred of thousands of 
refugees trying to escape on an even greater scale than at the present conflict. 
Furthermore, Greece and Turkey could even be involved in a conflict.173 In the long 
run, the Albanian national question may cause a major threat to the security and 
stability of the Balkans. Thus anchoring Albania to the West constitute an intelligent 
move from a geo-political and strategic point of view and will help in defusing one of 
the most explosive threats to regional stability.174 In this case NATO enlargement will 
contribute to maintaining the security of the region and will create the environment 
for negotiable solutions in the Balkans.
Third, the threat of a possible aggression against Albania has increased due to 
the fact that Albania has a very weak defensive system which deteriorated with the 
serious damages caused by the civil riots of the 1997 and the conflict in Kosovo, 
which saw a continuous violation of the Albanian borders by the Serb army. 
Accordingly, a modernisation of the Albanian defence system will be of primary 
importance. It is difficult for the Albanian government alone to carry out this process, 
so NATO support in achieving this purpose will be of great importance. That can be 
realised as a first stage through an active PfP program that will lead to future 
membership in NATO.
3.3 NATO’s relations with Albania
Having emerged in a democratic transformation process from an isolated 
period and an alliance vacuum, Albania is eager to promote itself among the other 
European countries and cope with its deficiencies while guaranteeing its sovereignty 
and independence. NATO membership takes top priority in Albanian Government
173 Strobe Talbott, 1995, “US Leadership and the Balkan Challenge”, Remarks at the National Press Club. 
Washington DC, November 9, and Martin Stiefl', “Talbott Warns of Blood Bath if Balkan Peace Fails to Hold", 
Washington Times, November 2, 1995
174 F. Stephen Larrabee, 1997, “US Policy in the Balkans: From Containment to Strategic Reengagement”, 
Crisis in the Balkans, Views from the Participants, Costandine P. Danopoulos and Kostas G. Messas, Boulder 
Co: Westview Press, p.285
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policy as a guarantee of the democratic nature of transition process. Meanwhile it 
provides the much needed security coverage. Based on this logic, the Albanian 
Government was the first among Central-East European countries to ask for NATO 
membership175. Albania was among the first countries to join the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council (NACC)176 in June 1992, and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 
February 1994. These steps are considered an important move toward integration 
into the new architecture of European Security. Furthermore the PIP provides the 
essential assistance that serves to strengthen Albanian security and also contributes to 
the strengthening of the security and stability in the region by enhancing confidence 
security building measures among the Balkan countries by involving them in common 
exercises, exchange of information, meetings of the military staff and personnel of 
every level.
In this framework Albania has been actively supporting and participating in 
NATO operations and initiatives in the search for a peaceful solution to the Balkan 
crisis and a secure future for the region. The Albanian navy has closely cooperated 
with NATO and WEU missions in monitoring the UN resolution on Yugoslavia, 
under the “Sharp Guard” operation. Furthermore Albania offered the Alliance its air 
and naval capabilities in support of the “Safe Haven and Deny Flight” operation over 
Bosnia and recently in support of NATO operation “Allied Force” in Yugoslavia. All 
these aims to show “reliability, the most precious asset of an ally” 177, which will 
improve the chances for a early membership
The PfP programme based on the defence Planning and Review Process 
(PARP) aim: to restructure and harmonise the Albanian military structures and 
capabilities in conformity with NATO standards; to put decision making structures 
and procedures under civilian control and compile the legal framework for it, training 
and exercising military structures on peacekeeping, humanitarian and search and 
rescue missions, thus preparing Albania’s future membership in the Alliance. For this 
purpose, a large number of common exercises have been held between NATO and 
Albanian military forces.178
175 Jane's. Defence Weekly Interview, Volume 24, No. 11, 16 September 1995
176 To day Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)
177 Adem Copani, The new dimensions of Albania’s security posture, NATO review, No 2-March 1996, Vol.44, 
pp. 24-28
178 Ibid.,
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1997 was a momentous year for Albania. A general violent outburst spread all 
over the country due to the frustration caused by the loss of life savings by hundred of 
thousands of Albanians in the “pyramid” investments schemes. The event was 
followed by a total disintegration of the military structures. As a result military units 
were abandoned by the conscripts and their officers and military installations became 
prey to criminal elements and thieves of arms and ammunition. This situation led to 
new political elections and the establishment of a new leftist government. The new 
elections solved the problem politically and the multinational force that was mandated 
by UN Security Council provided the necessary humanitarian assistance and created 
order by its presence, but the problem of the disintegration of military structures was 
not solved. Under such circumstances the PfP programme took the main role in 
developing a programme of assistance. The programme consisted of two pillars. The 
first pillar involved NATO as an organisation in a programme of assistance. The 
assistance was concentrated in three areas :
- the development of the national defence concept and its legal framework, providing 
for a democratic control of forces and civil military relations;
- the structural reorganisation and adjustment of military command and armed forces 
increasing their operational abilities and efficiency by developing an essential 
Command, Control, Communication and Information (C3I) system;
- the resolution of technical issues related to the storage and safety of ammunitions 
and armaments.
Another aim of the first pillar was to keep Albania tied to the PfP main activities in the 
framework of Partnership Work Programme.
The second pillar aimed at channelling bilateral assistance from allies and 
partner countries. The scope was to assess the necessities and priorities, coordinate 
the bilateral actions, avoiding overlaps. For this purpose a special forum of 
coordination named Clearing House on Albania (CHA) was created and a NATO 
office was established in Tirana, the only one in the partner countries.179 *
A new Individual Partnership for Peace programme was signed between 
Albania and NATO for 1999, aiming to strength the Albanian army and the 
cooperation of Albania with NATO as an organisation and its members and partners.
179 On the assistance program after the crisis of 1997 see, George Katsirdakis, “Albania: A Case Study in the
Practical Implementation of Partnership for Peace”, NATO Review, Vol. 46, No.2, Summer 1998, pp.22-26
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3.4. WEU’s relations with Albania
WEU is the only European organisation empowered to carry out military 
operations. WEU is a totally intergovernmental organisation addressing the needs of 
its members and requests coming from the EU. Looking at WEU’s role solely after 
the end of the Cold War, its role is related to “humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
peacekeeping tasks and task of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peacemaking” otherwise known as “Petersberg tasks” . Furthermore, WEU will be 
ready “to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with its own procedures, 
the effective implementation of conflict prevention and crisis management measures, 
including peacemaking activities of the CSCE180 or the United Nations Security 
Council”181.
Dealing with the new challenges in Europe after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the WEU paid attention to the new 
democracies of the Central-East Europe. In this framework, a Forum of Consultations 
was established at Petersberg in June 1992, involving the WEU members and eight 
countries of Central Europe. In May 1994, the Kirchberg Declaration constituted a 
new development in the cooperation with the countries of Central-East Europe. A 
new status-that of association-was established with the countries that possess a 
European Association Agreement, opening the possibilities for a more intensive 
cooperation with them.182
Unfortunately, Albania does not yet have an Association Agreement with the 
EU. As a result Albania does not have a partner status and cooperation with WEU. 
Nevertheless, WEU is present in Albania under the provisions of the Maastricht 
Treaty where it is declared that “the Union requests the Western European 
Union(WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the European Union, to 
elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence 
implications”.183 Although the EU Foreign Ministers, in their meeting in Apeldoorn, 
on 15-16 March 1997, did not decide to send a military force to Albania as a response 
to the request of the Albanian government, they agreed to dispatch a military and 
police “advisory force” to help the newly elected government to restore order after
To day OSCE
1,11 Council of Ministers, Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19 June 1992,
182 Council of Ministers, Kircheberg Declaration, Luxembourg, 19 June 1992
183 Article J.4 (2) o f Maastricht Treaty, 10 December 1991
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the collapse of the pyramid investment schemes. Accordingly a fact-finding mission 
from the WEU Planning Cell was sent to Albania to monitor the situation. Based on 
the results provided by the fact-finding mission, the WEU Council decided on 2 May 
1997 to establish a Multinational Advisory Police Force (MAPE) in Albania, in order 
to provide advise and training to the Albanian police. “The main missions of MAPE 
are to:
- advice the central echelon on law and order, frontier policing and the reconstruction 
of the Police Academy;
- organise training programmes.”184
The mission became operational after the signing of the Memorandum of 
Understanding between WEU and Albanian authorities on 24 June 1997. The 
Mandate of MAPE was extended and strengthened two times by the WEU Council. 
The mandate has been extended until April 1999 and the number of officials has 
increased from 60 to 100. Furthermore, the WEU’s Multinational Advisory Police 
Element in Albania is considered a contribution to stability in the region, so further 
areas of cooperation are foreseen for the future. MAPE’s advisory role will be 
extended including advice on police monitoring and controlling border area. In order 
to improve Albanian ability to monitor and control its borders, further training and 
provisions of equipment are foreseen for Albanian police. Moreover, WEU is 
examining if further contributions can be made in accordance with NATO assistance 
programme in the field of military training and restructuring of the Albanian armed 
forces.185
184 Assembly of the Western European Union, Report, Document 1589, 5 November 1997.
185 WEU Ministerial Council, Rhodes Declaration, 12 May 1998
76
CHAPTER 4 - Social and Economic Issues in a Transition Period
1. Introduction
“The social crisis is a significant security threat, even if it does not result in 
open political conflict among the states of a region. Weak systems tend to be unstable, 
and instability is costly, in terms of both money and political involvement.”186 In the 
Balkan region this concern is more than relevant. Considering the difficult period of 
transition and fragile internal ethnic equilibrium that most of the countries in the 
region face, instabilities can easily create implications for the neighbours with large 
repercussions. Furthermore the social crisis influences directly the development of the 
transition process, economic and political reforms and the democratic process as a 
whole. The social crisis is directly related to the level of development of civil society 
and domestic intermediary structures related with it; and the development of 
economic pluralistic patterns. In considering the importance of these issues on the 
security concerns, this Chapter will deal with these issues and will consist in two 
parts, the first part will deal with the civil society and democratic transition issues, 
problems and the role of institutions and the second part with economic issues. In 
understanding better civil society and economic issues and the patterns of behaviour 
related with them, a broader perspective that involves the regional and international 
context beside the national framework will be also in focus.
l.l.Regional Context, Historic Legacies in the Balkan societies
Balkan countries share a common heritage that is related with the history and 
the way that state-society relations have performed over time. This heritage has a 
direct impact over how power is exercised, and how mediation and conflict resolution 
are settled in time.
After being under the dominance of different empires for a long period, the 
Balkan countries have inherited an military perspective on the way of organising the
1R<1Trond Gilberg, 1990, "Communist Southeastern Europe: Challenges to Stability and Security", Problems of 
Balkan Security .-Southeastern Europe in the 1990’s , Shoup & Hoffman eds., Washington DC: The Wilson 
Center Press, p.58
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State, which gives to the state a centralised controlled nature based on tax rising and 
secondly a corrupt nature that provides for rural disorder as a response to this 
corruption.187 This pattern has shaped the state and elite behaviour during the time in 
the Balkans, providing for a limited meditative and conciliating democratic culture.
Being under the Ottoman domination for almost five centuries, the patterns of 
society are highly influenced by the “sultan heritage”188. “The main characteristics of 
it are the highly personal and arbitrary nature of rule and the absence of the rule of 
law, the unmediated and despotic exercise of power, low institutionalisation, the 
absence of intermediary structures, and hence, the weakness of civil society.”189 In a 
way this heritage has influenced the state building process and society behaviour and 
currently is affecting the transition process toward démocratisation in the Balkans. 
None of the Balkan states have been in shape and power able to control or dominate 
the other ones or furthermore maintain their sovereignty and independence without 
the support of outsiders. These uncertainties and threats to security have pushed the 
Balkan states all the time to look for support from the great powers. In this way, the 
external factors have played an important role in building the legitimacy and shaping 
the size of the state.190
Accordingly, this attitude has affected the way the legitimacy is perceived in 
most of the Balkan countries. The political actor that acquires foreign support 
automatically become legitimate. This attitude gives precedence to the external factor 
and undermines the domestic legitimising procedures, showing in this way the 
weakness of the civil societies in these countries and the danger of basing legitimacy 
on an alien judgement that may be biased and effected by other than national interests. 
In return, the quest for internal legitimacy affects the internal developments by 
generating tensions and confrontations, threatening the social order and internal 
stability.
1,7 John R Lampe, op. cit note 151, p. 12
188 See on the concept Max Weber, “Sullanic Regimes”, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative 
Sociology, Roth and Wittch eds., Berkley: University of California Press, 1978, pp.231-232
189 Nikiforos P. Diamandouros, 1994, “Prospects for Democracy in the Balkans: Comparative and Theoretical 
Perspectives”, The Volatile Powder Keg, Balkan Security after the Cold War, Stephen Larrabee eds., 
Washington:The American University Press
19,1 John R Lampe, op. cit note 151 , p. 16
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1.2. The Influence of Preceding Regimes
The end of the Second World War positioned most of the Balkan countries on 
the side of the communist forces and under the Soviet ideological umbrella. This was 
followed by the establishment of totalitarian ideologies and regimes. According to 
Giddens, this solution is not accidental, it is closely related with the previous legacies 
that have shaped in time the sociological set up. “The possibilities of totalitarian rule 
depend upon the existence of societies in which the state can successfully penetrate 
the day-to-day activities of most of its subject population” and exclude the possibility 
that totalitarianism can be developed in well established traditional societies “because 
their segmented character is incompatible with the necessary mobilisation of 
concentrated resources.”191
The main characteristics of such regimes are related with: the existence of a 
totalitarian ideology followed by the existence of a single party that represents the 
only political power committed to this ideology; the role of one person as dictator; 
the monopoly over the mass communications, operational weapons and all kind of 
organisations including the economic ones, by a well established secret police.192
At the end the totalitarian societies are characterised by the lack of pluralistic 
political life experience, the absence of meaningful pluralism in the economic realm 
and unfamiliarity with the nature and workings of the market economy, a vacuum in 
constitutionalism and the obedience to the rule of law. All these features are present 
in the post-communist Balkan countries, making the development of a democratic 
society difficult.
1.3. International context
According to Diamandouros,193 the transformations in the Balkans are 
influenced also by the changes in the international arena after the end of the Cold War 
era. The influence has to be perceived on three levels: the effect caused by the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union as a regional power, the general trends in the 
international environment and the role of the EU and the United States as influences 
on the democratic transformation.
191 Anthony Giddens, 1996 eds., The Nation State and Violence, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 302
192 See, Carl Friedrich, 1954, Totalitarism, Harvard University Press
193 See, Nikiforos P. Diamandouros, op. cit note 189
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1.3.1. The effects of the dissolution of the Soviet Union on the Balkans 
transition
The dissolution of the Soviet Union opened a new era for the ex-socialist 
countries. First, in the framework of perestroika a peaceful liberalisation of these 
countries was allowed and second, the end of the policy of limited sovereignty 
doctrine permitted these countries to follow their own destiny without interference.
Following such developments, an era of democratic revolutions took place in 
Central and Eastern Europe, reaching also the Balkans countries, which were among 
the last to reach the mainstream, ending up with Albania in the early beginning of 
1992. The revolutions in 1989 were committed to introducing civic societies and 
democratic regimes, modelled according to Western democratic political values. 
Trying to reform from above proved difficult since the arena was hardly affected by 
the post-communist society legacies but also by the older historical and cultural 
traditions which appeared to be still present and powerful.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union was followed by the collapse of the main 
institution such as, Comecon and Warsaw Pact, which had been responsible for 
international and inter-state cohesion among the members. To fill the vacuum all ex- 
communist countries, started looking to join other international institutions and other 
regimes that will provide the necessary arrangements for their needs and gaps in 
security.194 This reality assigned an important role to outside international 
organisations, especially to Euro-Atlantic ones.
1.3.2. The effect of general trends in the international arena on the transition in 
the Balkans
The new trend toward democratic values on the international environment 
after the end of the Cold War era has affected the transition process in the Balkans by 
offering the marketplace for the new democratic ideas and the models for political 
and economic reconstruction. Democracy and the market economy are presented as 
the indispensable choice to follow.
In the framework of the international context, it has become clear that 
security in the long term is based on the creation of a security community. Security
194 George Schopflin, 1991, ‘T he Political Traditions of Eastern Europe”, in Eastern Europe...Central 
Europe...Europe, Stephen R. Graubard eds., Boulder, CO: Westview Press
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can not be developed solely through security policies, but is based in a broader 
consensus of values and spread of institutions as means for managing and settling 
conflict, and increasing the importance of a democratic civil society existence. “The 
strong evidence for the finding that democracies do not fight other democracies 
suggests that extending démocratisation is one element of establishing a security 
community. Measures to mitigate economic insecurity and to assist dialogue between 
communities and cultures are others”.195
Acting on these considerations, institutions such as OSCE have adopted a 
new framework196 for the creation of norms related to international law, human 
rights, democracy, the rule of law and market economy beside the framework for 
arms control, prevention and resolution of conflicts and economic cooperation.197
OSCE standards together with the UN charter principles and provisions of 
international law have reached the stage of “declaring principles of the European 
international order” that states in one way or another have to obey.198
1.3.3. The role of main international actors on democratic transition
The European Union represents an important international player with a 
significant role and influence on the other European countries. It is established as a 
model of democracy, pluralist and market regime. Beside being a model, the EU is 
providing technical assistance and aid in helping the transition process, ‘mitigating in 
a way the economic problems’ of the transition countries. Furthermore it is present as 
mediator actor in regional crisis as was the case in Yugoslavia and now in Kosovo, 
‘assisting dialogue between communities and cultures’.199
The role of the US has been carried mostly through non-governmental 
organisations or private organisations. Organisations such as the Soros Foundation,
195 Hugh Miall, op. cit note 7, p. 80
196 The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 established according to Miall, 1993, the 10 principles and rules for a new 
emancipated international society, affirming respect for the sovereignty rights of states, refrain from use of 
violence, the inviolability of borders and respect for territorial integrity of states, peaceful settlement of 
disputes and un-involvement on the internal state affairs, respect for human rights and the equal rights and self- 
determination right of peoples, cooperation of peoples in different fields followed by the fulfilment of 
obligations and duties under international order. To this core values after the end of the Cold War new 
standards are added limiting in a way the sovereignty right of states, by considering as legal and concern of 
other member states, the observation of human rights and respect of minority rights that previously were 
considered as internal affairs of a state.
197 Hojberg Anne-Else, “The European Security Structure. A Plethora of Organisations?”, NATO Review, No.6, 
Nov. 1995, Vol.43, p. 32
198 Hugh M ia ll,, op. cit note 7, p. 80
199 More in details EU role will be developed in the Second Part.
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The American Bar Association, The Ford Foundation, have invested considerably in 
material and human resources; they have also assisted and advised different transition 
actions, choosing their course of actions and equipping them with needed 
infrastructure. The aim of such actions has been more related with the strengthening 
of a democratic civil society by encouraging the economic and political liberalism, 
democratic principles and anticommunism, and playing the role of emancipator in 
these societies.200
1.4. Prospects for Democracy in the Balkans
The era of démocratisation in the international arena, especially in Europe, 
reached the Balkans in the early 1990s. The démocratisation process has been 
significantly affected by the previous legacies mentioned above that have caused a big 
democratic and capitalistic deficit. As a result the new democratic regimes were 
characterised by the great deficit of civil society and the domestic structures related 
with it.201
In most of the post-communist Balkan countries, the state is very weak. The 
previous historical legacies and communist regimes have affected the ordinary 
citizens’ attitudes toward the state. As a result the ordinary citizen does not expect 
fair and equitable treatment by the “authorities” and favours an attitude that 
disregards the state. Furthermore, the previous regime’s arrogance and disregard for 
the rights and needs of the people has produced widespread cynicism and a virtual 
lack of procedural legitimacy, undermining in this way the role of the institutions.202
These weaknesses justify the difficult and troublesome process toward 
democracy and have shown “that societal mobilisation has been for the most part 
inchoate and inarticulate and as a result unable substantively to contribute to the 
deepening of the transition and to the commensurate enhancement of the 
démocratisation process”203. These indicators have shaped in a way the Balkans’ 
peculiarities in the transition toward democracy.
200 Nikiforos P. Diamandouros, op. cit note 189, pp.10-11
21.1 ibid, pp 12-14
21.2 Ivan Volgyes, 1986, Politics in Eastern Europe Chicago: Dorsey Press, Ch. 8
203 Nikiforos P. Diamandouros, op. cit note 189, p. 19
82
These peculiarities have marked the path of transition in the Balkans. The 
process has gone through four stages: first, the process was carried on by the 
communist regimes that won the first pluralist elections. This was due to the 
organisational experience by which the communist leading class has maintained its 
monopoly and the support received by the rural population that constitute the 
majority in the Balkan countries and who have preserved their fidelity toward the old 
regime. Second, the “reformed” regime was unable to carry out the démocratisation 
reforms and consolidate the victory. At this stage the pressure increased by the 
opposition forces and the new elections were called. Third, a coalition of the 
democratic forces won the elections, ending in this way the power of the old regime. 
Fourth, after the start of the démocratisation process, an problematic transition 
favoured in the new elections the return of left wing forces, containing ex-regime 
elements.
The ups and downs in the process show the fragility of the transition process 
in the Balkans and, on the other hand, increase the importance of the external factor 
in the transition process and the building of a democratic civil society.
Under such circumstances is there any prospect for the development of a 
sustainable democracy in the Balkans? A review of the existing literature will help in 
generating the right perspective and providing the right insights. Samuel P. 
Huntington emphasises the importance of political leadership, institutional 
arrangements and international commitment as an precondition for démocratisation.204 
Most of the Balkan countries have not inherited the indispensable institutions of 
democracy such as independent judiciary, independent civil organisations and free 
media. Nevertheless this reality does not diminish the possibility for a future 
sustainable democratic Balkans. According to Ghia Nodia, the commitment of social 
and political forces/elite to democratic values and experiment is considered as an 
important step toward the sustainable success of the democratic process, whatever the 
“objective” conditions of the country205. There is enough evidence of democratic and 
progressive forces in the Balkans; the wave of democratic revolutions and reforms 
demonstrate the existence of the desire for progress and democracy.
204 Samuel P Huntington., 1991, The Third Wave, Démocratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman,OK: 
University of Oklahoma Press, pp.38-39.
205 Ghia Nodia, “How Different are Postcommunist Transitions?“, Journal of Democracy 7, No.4, October 
1996, p.3
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It is of substantial importance to take into consideration the distinction that 
exists between ‘formal democracy’ and ‘substantial democracy’. Diamond posits, 
formal democracy as a stage in the development of a society where free, fair and 
competitive elections are held, involving “a set of rules by which representatives are 
elected, policies are chosen and laws are made and enforced”. In Diamond’s terms, a 
liberal democracy must at least meet the standards of a minimal civil freedom that will 
allow free and equitable competition and participation. This implies: the submission 
under the accountability of the electorate of all segments of society that have an 
executive and legislative power including the military bodies; “the accountability of 
office-holders to one another” that imposes constraints on the executive power, and 
safeguards constitutionalism, rule of law and assures a deliberative process; “extensive 
provisions for political and civil pluralism, as well as for individual and group 
freedom”.206 From the formal point of view most the Balkan countries meet certain 
procedural democratic criteria. Nevertheless, institutionalising the elections as a 
means of selecting decision makers, it is not sufficient to classify a political system as 
a genuine democracy. A broad and deep legitimised political system relies on a 
consolidated democracy.
Consolidated democracy is a stage when both elite and masses are convinced 
that a democratic regime is the best alternative compared to other realistic alternatives 
and the democratic institutionalisation has become self-enforcing, meaning that 
political forces submit their interests and values to institutions.207 In a way, according 
to Linz & Stepan, consolidation is a three dimensional combination: behavioural, 
attitudinal and constitutional. Accordingly, institutionalised parameters of democratic 
procedures have become an inner way of thinking and behaving for the elite/political 
forces and masses and the violation of such parameters are considered both ineffective 
and costly.208
206 See, Larry Diamond, 1996, “Is the Third Wave Over?”, The Global Resurgence of Democracy, Diamond & 
Plattner, 2nd edition., Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2,17 ibid., p.33; and Adam Prezeworski, 1991, Democraty and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.26
m  Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, 1996, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p.5
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With regard to the access to democracy in the post-totalitarian Balkan 
countries, it has been rapid, non-violent and definitive but the consolidation is likely 
to be “lengthy, conflictual and inconclusive”.209
Beside the difficulties, there are numerous conjectural factors that are in 
favour of the establishment of a consolidated democracy in the Balkans. First, the 
international environment is sensitive to the basic freedom associated with 
democracy. Second, there is not another viable alternative to democracy as a 
legitimate model for political organisations after the failure of fascism and 
communism. Third, there is a strong presence of social and political forces in the 
region willing to engage in the democratic experiment.
FIRST PART
1. Albania toward democratic transition
Albanian’s democratic revolution began later than in the other East and Central 
European Countries. Only in December 1990 the first opposition democratic party, 
the Democratic Party, was founded. In March 1991 the first multi-party elections 
were held, and Albania became a parliamentary democracy. The first elections were 
won by the Socialist Party, previously the Party of Labour of Albania, that had been 
ruling the country since 1945.
The general elections of March 1992 brought to power the anti-communist 
Democratic Party. With the elections of June 1997, held after the civil unrest of 
February-March 1997, the Socialist Party returned to power leading a coalition 
government of left parties.
The civil unrest that developed during the first part of 1997, as a result of the 
collapse of get-rich-quick schemes proved that Albanian’s democratic transition will 
be longer and more difficult than was previously thought. These problems are due to 
a constellation of factors related with the past heritage, the legacies of the previous 
communist regime, and also both the stability and developments in the Balkans and 
the hesitation of Western nations and other institutions to deal seriously with the 
complex problems of transition. In their complexity, these factors have affected in one
209 Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “The Conceptual Travels of Transitologies and Consolidologists: 
How far to the East Should they Attempt to Go?”, Slavic Review 53, no. 1, Spring 1994, p. 185
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way or an other the Albanian transition to democracy, marking its peculiarities and 
affecting its security and stability in the region.
The transition toward democracy has been a multiple process. The political 
transition from dictatorship to democracy went together with other changes such as 
the economic transformation from a centralised, controlled economy to a free market 
economy; the transition from a rural to an urban society accompanied by uncontrolled 
demographic movements; and the societal shift from isolation to openness.
In the first years after the fall of the communism, importance was given to the 
political transition, undermining simultaneous economic and social developments that 
proved to harm or even regress the political transformation.
In the economic field, the reforms and privatisation upon Western models was 
challenged by the growth of an informal market for deposits justified as a promotion 
of democracy. For some time anticommunism served as legitimate ideological cover 
for anti-parliamentary and outright antidemocratic forces of the extreme right, whose 
activities can seriously undermine the democratic process and debase the quality of a 
given democracy. Second, anticommunism can, in combination with other cultural 
forces such as, nationalism and religion, be a flammable ingredient that can effectively 
impede, if not derail, the transition. Albania has espoused an extreme anticommunism 
position where in nationalist as well as religious images play a central role and affect 
the climate of the transition in an adverse way. The overall result is a situation that 
can both significantly threaten the prospects for a successful conclusion of the 
transition and impede eventual democratic consolidation.210
The present picture of the Albanian transition clearly implies the necessity of 
stable democratic institutions and a new political culture. In this framework the 
support of international institutions and Western countries weighs significantly on 
Albanian life, especially in drafting clear and long-term policies for the creation and 
consolidation of democratic institutions and ways of thinking and manners of 
behaving. Furthermore, given Albania’s current role in the solution of the regional 
conflicts and the Great Powers historic role of referee in this region the necessity of 
support from international institutions is clear.
Enlarging this perspective, the whole démocratisation process is conditioned
210 Nikiforos P. Diamandouros, op. cit note 189, p.22
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by regional developments. The scenario of Albanians distributed among neighbouring 
countries makes the Albanian factor a sensitive regional issue and a key component in 
the region’s equilibrium.211 This fact has conditioned the policies of the international 
community regarding Albania and political developments in the region. It has become 
clear that between stability and democracy there is a symbiotic relation, and without 
stability there can be no functional democracy. The recent events in the region 
demonstrated that without a sound democratic progress, stability is short lived. The 
international community’s focus on security issues at the expense of democracy has 
proven fruitless.212
1.1. Civil Society patterns
The meaning of 'civil society' has evolved considerably since its use in the 
context of the 18th century European Enlightenment. Then it signified the 
intermediary realm distinct from the state and in support and favour of private 
interests; in practice the realm of the bourgeoisie interests. The new perspective 
views civil society rather as the emancipatory activity of social forces distinct from 
both state and capital.213 Antonio Gramsci's thought embraced both meanings: civil 
society as a ground that sustained the hegemony of the bourgeoisie and its interests 
but also as an emancipatory process that may lead towards the attainment of an 
alternative social order.
Without entering the debate on civil society meanings and role, we will 
consider its importance from both aspects with focus on Albania. In the transition 
processes from socialism to capitalism, civil society assumes a substantial role for the 
development of a capitalistic society in substance that implies the existence of a 
society of classes and social groups with different interests, and the emancipation of 
the society in the sense of values and practices. In this way, civil society constitutes a
211 3.5 millions Albanians live in Albania, 2 millions live in Kosova, comprising 90% of Kosova’s population, 
500-600 thousands live in Macedonia and according to recent registration it constitutes 23% of that country’s 
population (this figure is strongly contested by the Macedonian Albanians who claim 40%), 40-50 thousand 
Albanians live in Montenegro making up to 6% of this Yugoslav Republic’s population. According to Greek 
and Albanian statistics 350 000 Albanians currently work in Greece.
2.2 In the Dayton Agreement, International Community preserved Milosevic’s undemocratic regime, assuming 
that Milosevic withdrawal from power will undermine the equilibrium of the Balkans. Time proved that this 
assumption was wrong, Milosevic initiated a fourth war, this time in Kosovo. Undemocratic regimes can not be 
source of stability and can not project peace.
2.3 Robert W. Cox, “Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order” 
Review of International Studies, 25, January 1999, p. 3-28
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revolutionary force in the transition process toward the establishment of a 
consolidated democracy.
With the end of the monopoly of the Communist Party in December 1990, the 
democratic process started in Albania but the civil society was basically non-existent. 
The ruling Communist Party had been in control of every aspect of life and had 
suppressed with brutality every form of dissidence. The negative effects inherited 
from the previous totalitarian regime are compounded by the lack of independent 
intermediary structures that did not exist even before the Communists overtake the 
power. This heritage has seriously affected both the development of a free and lively 
civil society in Albania, and the transition process itself. In such conditions the 
citizenship equilibrium is disrupted. There is an imbalance between freedom and 
responsibility. Democracy is perceived to be unlimited freedom; meanwhile the 
responsibilities are still to be assumed by the state. The end of the total«collectivism is 
replaced by a total individualism, thus weakening any community feeling. The past’s 
heritage of the absolute role of the state over the country and civilian life has 
established the priority of politics over the other issues. This attitude remains 
powerful since the political decisions still have a great importance in the lives of 
citizens. In the present stage Albania is more a political society than a civil one. 
Between the individual and the state there lies a large gap that in democratic states is 
normally replaced by a multifaceted civil society.
“Nevertheless, significant political changes and economic transformations- 
particularly privatisation and the gradual emergence of a prosperous middle class 
capable of materially supporting independent political organisations-prompted the 
growth of intermediary, civil-societal organisations and groups”214.
In recent years, the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have made 
progress both in number and importance. Since 1991, when the fust NGO was 
established, the number has increased up to 350 by the end of 1998213, representing 
professional associations, societies, cultural organisations, clubs, women’s and 
youths’ organisations, trade unions, business organisations, cultural organisations, 
environmental associations and other voluntary groups. In 1992, the Albanian Civil
214 Elez Biberaj, 1998, Albania in Transition, The Rocky Road to Democracy”, Boulder Co: Westview Press, p.
214
215 Source Albanian Civil Society Foundation, Tirana, Albania, 1999
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Society Foundation (ACSF) was created with the aim of strengthening civil society in 
Albania and providing support for the full spectrum of NGOs in Albania through 
financial support and technical assistance. The ACSF has established a citizen centre 
that provides services for the individuals on facilitating the communication by e-mail, 
fax, Internet, computer access. It has established also a information centre that 
facilitates links between Albanian NGOs and their potential partners and has had a 
positive impact on the development of civil society in Albania. In January 1993, the 
NGO Forum was created as an umbrella forum which coordinates and assists 
Albanian and foreign NGOs in Albania.
NGOs have grown also in importance, representing and advocating different 
interest groups and serving as an arena for free social dialogue. Their importance has 
been growing. During the 1997 crisis they emerged as intermediary agents and 
survived the challenge. Still important are the foreign aid and assistance which 
provide and further the necessary experience and financial means. This is crucial 
given that Albanian NGOs do not have a theoretical acquaintance or practical 
possibilities to extend their activities.
Today we might say that NGOs in Albania are playing an important role in 
social and productive sectors such as: women’s development, youth, health, under­
represented groups such as the handicapped, orphans, pensioners. Different 
associations have flourished such as those of foreign languages teachers, private 
farmers, and engineers of different fields.
A positive and stimulating tool is the creation of the necessary legal 
framework of NGOs. In the new Civil Code of the Albanian Republic are included 
two fundamental laws in this regard: the Associations' Law and Foundations' Law. 
Based on these new laws, which have been in force since November 1, 1994, the 
procedures for establishing and registering of NGOs are more liberal and more 
flexible. Another law in favour of NGOs is the law of sponsors which aims at 
strengthening the collaboration between business sector and the non-profit sector.216
1.2. Institutional Transition
A successful democratic transition process necessitates the creation of a
216 Source, Forum of the NGO, Tirana, Albania, 1999
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sustainable institutional framework, meaning a strong legislative body, 
democratic system based on the division of power, an active and pluralistic parliament 
and a free press. At the same time this intermediary transition period of passing from 
one condition to another, from one system to another, entails the simultaneous co­
existence of two situations. Old institutions co-habitat with the new, the old 
legislation with the new, the old mentality with the new.
For Albania this period has not proceeded along a smooth path. Within a few 
years, periods of anarchy and chaos have occurred twice, once in 1991 and again in 
1997, both of which saw damage to the state and its institutions, including the 
military, police, informative service, the judicial system and prisons and considerable 
amounts of public and private property. This situation is based on the previous 
legacies. The long period of being under the domination of empires217 has cultivated in 
the Albanians some hostile attitudes toward the state and its laws, as the state was 
foreign both in origin and nature. The foreign states saw Albania as a place to recruit 
soldiers and collect taxes; on the other hand they failed to protect and represent the 
country’s citizens. The later Albanian states, both the authoritarian state of King Zog 
and the totalitarian communist regime of Enver Hoxha, did not change this attitude 
toward the state, which still remains hostile to the citizens’ needs, rights and 
expectations. The state officials never gain the role of civil servants; instead they 
remain loyal state servants.
The fall of communism created an institutional vacuum, economic 
impoverishment and a challenge over the national consciousness. The upheavals in the 
transition process are a reflection of the struggle to overcome the vacuum of history 
and the scarcity of social capital such as religion, culture and a national consciousness 
and furthermore reflect the weakness of all institutions that characterise a modern 
country.
To fill the vacuum Western models were borrowed. Following the Western 
models, three distinct elements were established after the fall of the communism in 
Albania: multiple political parties, freedom of the press, and freedom of religion. 
Albania’s new, fragmented society lacks binding material. Meanwhile, political and
217 Since the ancient times Albania has been under foreign domination, first under the Roman Empire then after 
under the Byzantine Empire, ending up with the Ottoman Empire in 1912 when the first independent Albanian 
state was established.
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social life were still dominated by a party that slowed the development of democratic 
institutions. Opposition parties continued to exist, but the popular conception of 
politics as confrontation instead of consensus, along with the majority ruling, 
minimised the role of these parties. The control over the judiciary, prevented these 
institutions from fulfilling their role of regulating a functioning and lawful state.
In the legislative framework Albania has overcome the problem of co­
existence between the new legislation drafted to the European standards and the old 
Communist era legislation. However, the fundamental law of the state, the 
constitution was approved very late, showing once more the lack of political 
consensus among the Albanian political forces. Furthermore this constitutional deficit 
encouraged the conflict between weakened state institutions. Nevertheless, this 
constitutional vacuum has been overcome and Albania gained a constitution in 
November 1998. The result observed by a variety of international organisations such 
as the European Council, the OSCE, and the Commission of Venice, all of which have 
contributed through their assistance in the compilation of the constitution, and 
cooperating with other domestic NGOs, has encouraged a fruitful public debate. All 
these efforts aimed to make the constitution a politically and publicly consensual 
document that is not a product of any one party’s vote. This was an important step 
both in building a new consensual political culture and public trust toward the rule of 
law and providing the country with basic law, contributing in this way to the 
consolidation of democracy in Albania.
Designing good laws, however, is only the first step. The trick is to make sure 
they are effectively implemented and enforced. To ensure effective enforcement, it is 
important to create beside the good written laws other independent “watchdog” 
institutions such as a well established independent legislative body, free media, and 
NGOs, that will develop a democratic system and will help to limit corruption. 
Corruption can be costly both to the continuation of further reforms and in weakening 
public confidence in government and can help extremist politicians who promise 
order.
In this regard Albania has begun such efforts, but it will take time until the 
legacies of the past are overcome and the confidence of the public is gained. Still the 
most serious contradiction in Albania’s legal system is the discrepancy between the 
written law and its enforcement. The debatable independence of the judicial system,
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the frequent violations of the law, poorly qualified lawyers and corruption have been 
seen as the main causes behind the Albanian crises in 1991 and 1997.
1.3. Political transition
The political culture is considered to be an important element of a 
consolidated democracy. It implies a multi-party system, a well developed political 
class with a democratic vision able to lead the democratic transformations, a 
democratic political debate as a force that implies progress toward democratic 
manners.
The end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992 saw the establishment of a multi­
party system that increased in size over time. In the 1997 elections, 13 parties 
participated in the elections218; the number of democratic participants is bigger 
considering that there are also some very small parties that could not take part in the 
elections219. Numbers are important from the formal democracy point of view but 
they do not provide any substantial information about the level of the political culture.
Nowadays, in Albania there is a very diversified political class representing a 
large spectrum of ideas. On the other hand, the profound political crisis of 1997 
reflected the shortcoming of a political class unable to motivate the country to move 
beyond its political past. The existing political culture is defined by the legacies of the 
past and previous communist regime that tolerated no dissenting voices far more than 
in other ex-communist countries. Its main patterns of behaviour are characterised by 
the logic of the conflict, exclusion of the others, and intolerance. The tense climate 
and continuous conflict among the main political parties at struggle for power has 
been a serious obstacle to the return of the normality in the country, the establishment 
of order and revitalisation of economy.
The lack of democratic heritage on the political culture has not assumed a 
clear contemporary meaning for the Left and the Right. The considerations of the 
Right and the Left are based mostly on their historical roots and relations with the 
Communist Party rather than in the programmes and social composition.
2IR Source: Central Election Committee, July 1997, Tirana, Albania
219 By 1994, in Albania has started their existence 30 political parties, see Lajmi i Dites (Daily News), 3 March 
1994, p.2
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The political life is dominated by two main parties, the Socialist and 
Democratic Parties, both of which have eclipsed the rest of the parties, who play the 
role of mere satellites. Relations between the two parties are highly polarised, making 
the consensus very difficult; even impossible. The long lasting process for drafting 
and approving the constitution highlighted the ill-tempered relations between the two.
1.4. Elections
Elections are considered an important tool that encourages the democratic 
transition, by balancing the needs of economic growth in a pluralistic society with the 
exercise of political power, "... promoting economic growth while monopolising 
political power is an almost impossible balancing act over the long term...As people's 
incomes rise and their horizons broaden, they are likely to demand the right to 
participate in government and to enjoy full protection under the rule of law", 
gravitating toward elections that will establish the balance. If elections are a learning 
process toward the democratic manners, they are promoted from outside democracies 
based on such considerations220.
During seven years of pluralism, Albania has taken part in an election process 
almost each year221. In all cases a two-third tradition was observed. Observing the 
parliamentary elections, the picture is as follows: in 1991, the Communist Party won 
two-third of the seats in the parliament, in 1992, the Democrats won two-thirds 
majority, in 1996, after questionable elections, the Democratic Party again won a 
two-third majority, in 1997, the Socialists won two-thirds majority. This trend 
indicates large oscillations in the elections from one pole to the other. It also testifies 
to a politically unstable society. Whether the organisation and application of free 
democratic elections conform to western standards remains a test for Albanian 
democracy. This situation demonstrates the vital importance of the OSCE and other 
international institutions in observing and assisting the electoral process.
1.5 Free Media
After the collapse of the Communist Party important efforts were undertaken 
in establishing a free media, challenging the long monopoly of communist state
2211 Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interests", Foreign Affairs 75, No.6, 1995, p.45
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control over this powerful means of communication. A variety of types of 
communication started to establish the existence of free media. The printed media has 
increased in number. By early 1998, thirteen daily newspapers of different 
orientations were published in Tirana with a range of 85, 000 copies per day. Still the 
development of printed media carries problems. The publication of newspapers 
remains costly in proportion to the population’s incomes, influencing its circulation, 
especially in the rural areas where the daily newspaper subscription can amount to 
over 20 percent of an individual income.21 22 The daily newspapers are printed only in 
Tirana, few weekly magazines are printed in regional cities. The logistical problems, 
high costs and the unrest of 1997 have heavily influenced the circulation of printed 
media in the rural areas and as a result the effect of the media on the majority of the 
population. Beside the quantitative problems the Albanian press is still dominated by 
political conflict to a much greater degree than by a public opinion. This feature 
diminishes the role of media as a promoter of a consensual and thoughtful political 
and social culture.
Unlike the printed media, the broadcasting media has seen considerable 
development. A new law on public and private broadcasting was issued by the 
parliament on March 1997. The necessary dispositions for the applicability of the law 
have been effected by a long debate that has delayed the licensing procedures. 
Despite the delay, small and unregistered radio and television stations have been 
mushrooming in the second half of 1997. Over time their performance has improved; 
most of them provide a comprehensive news bulletin. Still there are many problems; 
most of them are short in personnel due to the shortages in finances that in one way 
or other affects the professional performance. Moreover they are not well connected 
with other media that will enable them to exchange information. The scarcity of the 
broadcasting systems has prevented them from reaching a full national audience.
The state television, RTSH faces a limited audience since a number of 
transmitter-stations were destroyed during the 1997 unrest but still it remains the 
most powerful news source throughout Albania. Despite the improvements in the 
direction of professional journalism in assessing political and social issues, the news
221 This information include four parliamentary elections, two local government elections and two referendums 
for the constitution.
222 Source, Institute of Media, Tirana, Albania, 1999
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is still dominated by extensive reporting of government activities and efforts to 
preserve a political balance by devoting time to politicians.
With regard to the other media, two Internet satellite links have been 
established with the assistance of UNDP and the Soros Foundation, both offering 
Internet access to limited number of institutions, organisations, universities, and 
parliament. Efforts have been undertaken by Albanian Telecom to provide a 
commercial Internet service that will increase access to this service by different 
subjects.
2. The Institutions Role in Democratic Transition: the role of the OSCE
Launched in 1972, the CSCE223 led to the adaptation of the Helsinki Final Act 
in 1975. The process aimed to settle a range of commitments on principles pertaining 
to the relations between the states, on measures that will build confidence among 
states, on respect for the human rights and fundamental rights as well on cooperation 
in economic, cultural, technical and scientific fields.
At the beginning of 1990s the CSCE emerged as an important asset in 
building the new security architecture in Europe at the end of the Cold War. The 
signature of the CFE Treaty by NATO and Warsaw Pact members at the CSCE 
Summit in Paris, in November 1990, limited the conventional forces in Europe, 
furthered the progress made in Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) 
and, with the Vienna 1990 and Vienna 1992 Documents, established the Conflict 
Prevention Centre (CPC) and potentially the new Forum for Security Cooperation. 
These were considered important steps toward future security building architecture in 
Europe.
In June, 1991, at the meeting of the foreign ministers in Berlin, it was decided 
that CSCE should somehow be able to intervene in potentially explosive disputes in 
member countries. This idea was rejected by Russia and Turkey, and was therefore 
moderated. The unanimity rule was modified at least with respect to emergency 
actions. Parties have agreed that a state concerned about a security matter can call an 
emergency meeting by winning over at least ten other members and the required 
actions can be approved based on the principle “consensus-minus-one”, meaning all
221 CSCE is today the OSCE
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the states minus the state concerned. In this way states can use CSCE 
mechanisms and structures to arrange their collective security and diminish the 
national security dilemma.224
In time the security issues in Europe are no longer assigned to a single
organisation, the inter-linkage between different European and Transatlantic
institutions are the foundation of European security architecture. The OSCE military
operational capabilities are not yet developed, in case of a decided intervention it has
to rely on the other organisations’ military capabilities such as NATO and the WEU.
Nevertheless, the OSCE remains the only regional organisation with legitimising
power due to its extended membership. And its role remains important in
encouraging respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, the rule of
law, crisis monitoring and management, and economic cooperation.
Accordingly, today the OSCE has gained a new impetus in the development
of a civil society and consolidation of democracy, crisis monitoring and management,
in the countries involved in a transition process.
Albania signed the CSCE documents on 15 December 1992. The ratification
and accession into the Organisation happened much later in 10 June 1996, with the
ratification of the Agreement by all member states.225
Responding to the political crisis of February 1997, the OSCE established the 
OSCE Presence office in Albania, in April 1997. The aim was:
“to provide Albania with advice and assistance in démocratisation, the 
establishment of independent media and the protection of human rights as well 
as election preparation and monitoring. Furthermore, the OSCE was to 
function as the coordinator framework for the work of other international 
organisations and for facilitating improvements in the protection of human 
rights and the basic elements of civil society”226.
In its mission of crisis prevention and management, the OSCE was also 
supported by other international organisations. In this case the OSCE assumed the 
role of coordinator for the foreign aid and assistance provided by other international 
donors. The “Friends of Albania” group is seen as a focal point that will move this
224 See, Karl E Brinbaum, 1987, From Stockholm to Vienna Building Confidence and Security in Europe, 
Swedish Institute of International relations, Stockholm; John Freeman, 1991, Security and CSCE Process, The 
Stockholm and Beyond, St. Martin’s Press. New York; John Fry, 1993, The Helsinki Process: Negotiating 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, National Defence University Press, US Government Printing Office
225 See, www.osceprag.cz/indexe-se.html
226 See, “OSCE Presence in Albania”, OSCE Newsletter, Vol. 5, no. 4, April 1998
9 6
process forward, under the chairmanship of the OSCE. The first meeting was held on 
September 1998. The goal of the meeting was to coordinate the international 
assistance and other forms of aid and “convey a message of coherent support” for the 
government commitment to move ahead in the démocratisation process.227
The OSCE has also been present through its other instruments such as the 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), mediator envoys, 
and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM).
The ODIHR has been working in monitoring and preparing the right 
environment for fair and just elections. In this framework the work has been focused 
first on monitoring the preparatory procedures, providing also the necessary 
assistance and help; second, on monitoring the voting proceeding and counting 
process. These efforts have contributed to the enhancement of “the transparency of 
election authorities’ work” and have increased the possibility of a free ballot. The aim 
was to give to the vote the needed importance as an important tool for the 
consolidation of democracy in the country. Furthermore, importance is given to the 
education of voters, the ODIHR consider it an important contribution to the 
significance of the elections. In the case of the two referenda for the constitution, a 
great deal was assigned to make the voter conscious of the substance of the 
constitution draft amid a highly politicised electoral climate and media campaigning 
for the ratification.228
The ODIHR, in close cooperation with the Presence office, has provided 
technical assistance to the judiciary system in pushing forward its independence and 
neutrality and has assisted in the establishment of national human rights institutions 
such as an Ombudsman/People’s Advocate by helping in draft law compilation and by 
making the right recommendations for improvement229. Its other contribution has 
been to help in providing assessments on media freedom and assistance on NGO 
programs of development.
During the crisis of 1997, in order to facilitate delivery of the humanitarian 
assistance and create a safe environment for the missions of international
227 See, “Crisis in Albania”, OSCE Newsletter, Vol. 5, no. 9, September 1998
228 See, “The Republic of Albania, Referendum on the Draft Constitution”, ODH1R Bulletin, Winter 1994/1995, 
Vol 3, Nr. I
229 See, “Round-tables on Draft Ombudsman Law for Albania, OSCE Newsletter, Vol. 5, no. 12, December 
1998
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organisations, a Multinational Protection Force (MPF) was established in Albania, 
authorised by the Resolution 1101 of United Nations Security Council. After the 
deployment of MPF, the OSCE has played a major role in stabilising the situation by 
establishing the Presence office and assigning a OSCE chairman in Office in the 
person of Ex-Austrian chancellor, Dr Franz Vranitzky. In this regard, the mediation 
contribution played an important role in ensuring full participation by the political 
parties and proper conduct in the elections. These efforts contributed to the 
reconciliation of all the sides in conflict, giving way to a political solution that was 
realised by settling the date for early elections that were held under the ODIHR 
auspices, and coordinated the activity of other human rights organisations that 
observed the elections.
Before the establishment of the Presence office in Albania, the OSCE has 
carried other important missions related with, among other things, the national 
minorities' rights monitoring, and the observation of UN sanctions on Yugoslavia.
The tense relations between Albania and Greece concerning the Greek 
minority rights in Albania were closely followed by the OSCE through an assigned 
High Commissioner on National Minorities. Fact-finding missions were sent to 
monitor the situation of the Greek community living in Albania, to analyse the legal 
status and help establish more intense dialogue between the authorities and the 
minority. Recommendations were provided to realise further improvement on 
minority rights and human rights in general. The OSCE missions has helped in lowing 
the tensions across the boarders.
The same approach was offered to the tense situation between Albania and 
FYROM on the issue of the Albanian minority living in Macedonia.230
SECOND PART
1. EU Approach in Projecting Security in the Balkans
The European Community231 created after the end of the Second World War 
with the aim to prevent wars between the Europeans, has succeeded in creating a 
community of security, democratic stability and economic prosperity. Meanwhile, the
230 See, “High Comissioner on National Minorities, Albania”, ODHIR Bulletin, Winter 1994/95, Vol.3, No. 1; 
and CSCE Annual Report, 1994 and 1995
231 Today the European Union
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world is shaken and confused as it is by the end of the Cold War and by different
“internal crisis of identity, rights or power”232. After the end of the Cold War the
European Union remains the most important regional power in Europe representing a
fortress of prosperity and security and as such an allure for the other countries of
Europe. In this context, as a community of common democratic values, the EU has
the duty to extend its order to other European countries. More specifically,
“the EU attaches great importance to cooperation both with and among the 
countries in the Balkan region. European stability and prosperity cannot be 
dissociated from developments in the countries in South East Europe. Their 
political stability and economic well-being will be assured. The EU will 
continue to stand firmly beside them, both politically and in terms of economic 
and financial assistance.”233
There are no direct economic interests of the EU in the Balkans, first, because 
the Balkans do not represent a large and competitive market, secondly, the presence 
of the EU there is very limited, since the level of the EU exports-imports and direct 
investments with the region countries are at insignificant levels234.
Nevertheless, considering the political and security interests, the EU cannot 
neglect the Balkans. First, the EU has a moral obligation to address the Balkan issues. 
Second, due to the geographic proximity, the Balkans’ security is an important issue 
for the security of the EU as a whole and for particular states especially. Nowadays 
there is no fear of invasion coming from the south, the main concern is of an other 
nature, being related with the invasion of economic refugees. Also the Balkans crisis 
and tensions “has brought the Balkan’s back on the mental map of most west 
Europeans”, because the Balkans constitute an immediate EU neighbour and 
historically the EU members have perceived differently their interests in the region 
and nowadays this historical background is shaping in many cases their behaviour 
toward the Balkan states.235
Meanwhile an abandonment of the Balkans will create a division line in 
Europe between prosperous and poor countries that may break the existing alignment
232 Jacques Santer, "The European Union’s security and defence policy, How to avoid missing the 1996 Rendez­
vous, Nato Review, Vol. 43, Nr, 6, November 1995, pp. 3-9
233 Statement by the EU Presidency, Luxembourg, 8 April 1999
234 See, the Table 1, 2, 3 ,4  o f the EU export-imports with the Balkan countries
235 See, Loukas Tsoukalis, 1994, ‘The European Union and the Balkans”, The Volatile Powder Keg, Balkan 
security after the Cold War, F. Stephen Larabee eds., Washington: The Amerikan University Press, pp.220-223
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balance and will increase the animosities in Europe and risk a return to Europe’s 
history of conflicts.
Accordingly an integrating policy toward the Balkans is the most appropriate 
policy that will tie up the Balkan countries to Western values. Integration will offer a 
stable framework for new democracies to develop and prosper. The European 
approach toward insecurity in the Balkans is a regional policy considering the region 
as a whole, aiming at the modernisation and development of respective economies, 
societies, and political cultures, bringing them up to contemporary European 
standards.236
Influenced by the Wilsonian consideration that democracies do not fight each 
other, the EU approach in building security in Europe beyond its own borders is 
mostly oriented toward the promotion and encouragement of democracy based on a 
sustainable market economy and well developed democratic society and civil society 
as part of it.
In fulfilling this goal, the PHARE237 was established as an important 
instrument of assistance, aiming “to promote socio-economic development and 
support the reform process in Central European Countries (CECs); to increase the 
effectiveness of cooperation process; and to promote EU- CEC partnership”.238 
Meanwhile the PHARE provides and supports a range of different instruments to aid 
the reform process in the non-candidate countries as it is the case of Albania. They 
consist mainly of know-how, investment support, and investment in infrastructure.
In support of civil society, the PHARE has developed the PHARE Partnership 
Programme (PPP). The idea behind this Programme was the development of civil 
society in ex-communist countries as an important part of consolidated democracy. In 
this framework the empowerment of citizens influences the political life of the 
country and decision-making process and generally the conditions they live in are 
considered an important step toward a consolidated democratic political culture. In
Patric More, “Planning for the Future of the Balkans”, RFE/RL, Vol 3, No. 90, Part II, 10 May 1999
237 PHARE, was originally stood for Poland and Hungary Aid for the Reconstruction of the Economy, later it 
was extended to other Central-Eastern European countries, Actually, 14 is the number of the countries included 
under this Program: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia and 
Croatia.
238 “The report on the evaluation of PHARE Partnership Programme”, European Commission, DG IA, 
December 1998
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this regard, the NGO development is regarded as an essential indicator that can make 
a significant contribution to the creation of a democratic political culture.
The PPP was established in 1993 to support the role of Non-Profit 
Organisations/Non-Governmental Organisations(NPOs/NGOs). The PPP help in 
building up the EU- Balkans countries partnership and networks between 
decentralised NGO’s as important mechanism for the transfer of know-how and 
experience from the EU that helps both the reform and integration process. The 
philosophy behind this effort is that the financial assistance has to build moral support 
and legitimacy and learning process, the Western experiences helps on this matter.
In their dealing with the Balkan countries that lack Association Agreement as 
is the case in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FRY, FYROM, the EU has 
established a strategy based on conditionality. On this basis, the EU has agreed to 
establish, in the framework of the regional approach, political and economic 
conditions as the basis for a coherent and transparent policy towards the development 
of bilateral relations in the field of trade, of financial assistance and economic 
cooperation as well as of contractual relations allowing for the necessary degree of 
flexibility. This EU strategy is supposed to serve as an incentive, and not an obstacle, 
to the countries affected by these conditions. While the exact level of relations with 
each of the countries varies, certain general conditions apply to all of them as part of 
a pre-settled regional policy.239 “Accordingly the interest of EU in the (Balkan) region 
will be pursued through two channels, first in the framework of EU as a whole actor 
and secondly, bilaterally through bilateral agreements on economical, trade, transport, 
and political issues and technical assistance and aid.”240
2. The EU in Albania
The EU role in Albania supports the transformation of a centralised economic 
and political system to a decentralised market economy and pluralistic society that 
offers equal opportunities to every one and a liberal democracy based on individual 
rights, constitutionalism and the rule of law aiming at the least to achieve compliance 
with the EU requirements for a future integration in the EU. The EU assesses its
239 See, “Council Conclusions on the Application of Conditionality in with a view to developing a coherent EU- 
strategy for the relations with countries in the South-East Region’’, 2003rd Council Meeting, Luxembourg 29/30 
April 1997
240 See, Loukas Tsoukalis, op. cit note 235, p .221
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support in the light of Albania’s commitment to the above principles and their 
implementation in line with the EU regional approach.241
Since 1992, Albania has adopted a clear pro-Western foreign policy and aims 
to upgrade its links with the EU. This policy remains constantly the main concern of 
all political spectrums in Albania and all governments in power since 1992.
The first act laying the path for cooperation between the EU and Albania has 
been the “Agreement on Trade and Economic Co-operation”, in force since 
December 1992, with a perspective of association between the EU and Albania 
foreseen in its preamble. This agreement does not have a preferential character. The 
signature of the Agreement was followed by a join Declaration on Political Dialogue.
In 1993 a sectorial “Agreement on Trade in Textile Products” between the 
EC and Albania entered into force. The agreements creates space in the European 
market for Albanian textile exports, aiming at the development of textile industry and 
related investments. Since early 1992, Albania became a PHARE partner country. 
Between 1991 and 1997, Albania received ECU 450.6 million in the PHARE support, 
including ECU 130.3 million for infrastructure development and ECU 74.5 million in 
critical aid. At present, PHARE resources are concentrated in four main areas of 
interest: public administration and institutional reform, local community development, 
large-scale infrastructure development, and agriculture. Only in 1997, did the 
PHARE commit ECU 34 million in national and ECU 20 million in cross-border 
cooperation programmes. In addition, special assistance worth ECU 14.9 million is 
foreseen for budgetary support to public administration reform. Support was also 
given to the OSCE in organising the June-July 1997 elections, amounting to ECU 1.5 
million.242
During the 1997 crisis in Albania, caused by the collapse of pyramid 
investment schemes, PHARE support was interrupted. Nevertheless, humanitarian aid 
through ECHO continued in order to cover the most urgent needs of the poorest 
sections of the population. This aid amounted to ECU 17 million and consisted of 
food and medical supplies. The European Commission also continued to finance some 
activities promoting democracy, security and economic stability, including support to 
the OSCE for organising elections.
241 See, “Council conclusions on Albania”, Bulletin EU, 7/8, 1997
242 Source, Department o f Economic Development and Aid Coordination, Tirana, Albania, 1998
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The new developments in Kosovo and the issue about the Albanian questions 
in the Balkans has opened a new approach toward Albania and its integration into the 
Euro-Atlantic structures. The integration of Albania into the Euro-Atlantic structures 
is considered an important element in the context of the proposed Stability Pact for 
South-Eastern Europe. “In order to draw Albania closer to this goal, every effort will 
be made to implement and actively use all existing assistance and cooperation 
instruments and to examine all possibilities of further enhancement.”243
In the context of the regional approach, a formal proposal for granting to 
Albania trade preferences is foreseen in the nearest EU agenda, the first stage of 
which will favour closer economic cooperation between the two parties, and the 
second stage of which will allow an upgrading of contractual relations in the form of 
an Association Agreements that will contribute to a future Stability Pact for the 
Balkans244.
With regard to the time terms, the Council regulation on trade preferences to 
Albania will permit duty-free access to the entire EU market for Albanian industrial 
and textile products. This regulation is to be ready for implementation by August 
1999.245
The Association Agreement presents more difficulties since Albania is still not 
ready for such an association with the Union. On the other hand, the EU is concerned 
with the 10 candidates for membership246. The EU does not want to upset this process 
by hasty preferential treatments for the newcomers as it was the cases of Albania and 
Macedonia that were not taken in consideration in the first round. Nevertheless, a 
formula is under discussion as a response to the emergence of the security issues in 
the Balkans. Perhaps a technical association will be provided instead of a full 
association agreement that will mean the prospect of free trade and the reduction of 
custom duties.247
243 See, “Joint Statement following the Political Dialogue meeting at Ministerial level between the European 
Union Troika and Albania”, Press/99/121, Luxemburg, 27 April 1999
244 Ibid.
245 Breffni O’Rourke, “EU to develop ties with Albania, Macedonia”, RFE/RL, Vol II, 23 April 1999
246 On 12-13 December 1997, in Luxembourg, the European Council endorsed the Accession Partnership as a 
new instrument which would be the key feature of the enhanced pre-accession strategy. 10 countries were 
selected for the first round of accession: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
247 See, Breffni O’Rourke, op.cit note 245
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3. The Albanian Economic Reform
Albania is the last country in Central and Eastern Europe to move toward 
liberalisation and market economy. In the 1970s and 1980s while the other Central 
and Eastern Europe countries were beginning to adopt liberal policies, Albania was 
intensifying its isolation and its repressive, centrally controlled economy and social 
policies.
In 1978, Albania implemented a policy of “autarchy” and so called “self- 
sufficiency”. The economic system was totally isolated with fixed domestic prices and 
salaries, and a very low standard of living. In the 1990s, total trade has remained a 
fairly small percentage of GDP, with exports and imports equalling 14 percent and 22 
percent of GDP, respectively248. Albania could be considered both as a relatively 
closed economy and as an exporter of primary commodities.
In recent years, Albania’s external position has deteriorated markedly, as its 
terms of trade weakened sharply in 1990-91.249 The economic mismanagement of the 
country was accompanied by a severe drought. There were many other negative 
factors, as production related problems in domestic supply reduced exports and 
increased imports. Access to export markets in Eastern Europe was disrupted. This 
was reflected in the large trade deficit in non-convertible currencies that developed in 
1990-91. During 1988-90, lack of control over the management of external reserves 
resulted in losses from foreign exchange speculation amounting to 10 percent of GDP. 
The overall balance of payments deficit was financed by the near exhaustion of foreign 
reserves, external borrowing, arrears on external trade payments, inter-bank 
borrowing, and defaults on foreign exchange transactions. Total external debt, 
including debt associated with the financing of the current account deficit in non- 
convertible currencies, had increased to about $ 395 million or 37.7 percent of GDP 
by June 1991.250 This is equal to Albania’s gross export revenues for one and one- 
half years during the peak export period of the 1980s.
No economic reforms were introduced in Albania before 1990 in the trade and 
external sector. This situation aggravated the economic performance of the country 
and the living standard of people.251 It was not until the middle of 1990, in response to
248 Source, Ministry of Trade and Foreign Economic Relations, Tirana, Albania.
249 For more detailed information see the Table 5, on Albania’s Payments and Foreign Debt
250 See, Table 5, on Albania’s Payments and Foreign Debt
251 See Table 6, about Annual Rate o f Growth of Main Macroeconomic Indices
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popular unrest, that Albanian authorities acknowledged that the system of central 
planning had led to the accumulation of serious imbalances. The pressure on the 
government increased, and new elections were called. The first multi-party elections 
were held in March 1991, leading to a “coalition government” that took office in 
March 1991. A number of reform initiatives were prepared. In some areas the pace of 
reform remained relatively slow, notably the privatisation of trade activities and 
farming, the integration of state enterprises with the market economy, and price 
determination. An uncoordinated, piecemeal approach prevailed in the design of the 
reform measures. Such measures were also inadequately publicised and slowly 
implemented due to the weak economic administration and political tensions.
A complete, coherent economic programme with defined policies began in the 
second half of 1992 until the end of 1993. The program was established for stabilising 
the macroeconomic crisis inherited from the previous political system. From 1993 
until 1996, a mid term economic program was pursued which had a stabilising and 
structural adjustment effect.252 As a result Albania’s growth in GDP, declining 
inflation, and control of the budget deficit were progressing positively until 1996.253 
“Albania has made one of the most rapid transitions to the market economy over the 
last three years. The Government has transformed an economy of inefficient industrial 
plants and collectivised agriculture, into one of small farmers, traders and 
businessmen.” - thus observed a report from PlanEcon, the Washington economic 
analysts254.
The growth rates achieved have been the highest among the transition 
economies in East and Central Europe, GDP increased at an average of 9 percent a 
year, the inflation running at 226 percent a year at the end of the 1992, fell to 7.8 
percent in 1995. The internal deficit was also reduced to 7 percent compared to 44 
percent of the GDP in 1991. Albania’s national currency, the lek, has been very stable 
and it is internally convertible and has been floating freely since 1992. The role of the 
government was reduced dramatically in almost all the fields of the economy. As a 
result, the private sector accounted for about 75 percent of the GDP, 56 percent of 
exports and 82 percent of the imports on 1996. Also approximately 76 percent of
252 The short and mid-term programs were prepared under the auspice of the International Monetary Fund and
253 See, Table 7 on Annual GDP growth and Inflation
254 See, Financial Time, 2 October 1995
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Albania’s workforce was engaged in private business. Price controls have been almost 
completely eliminated, they remain only in some public services such as electricity, 
water and pharmaceuticals.255
Compared with the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in the 
period 1985-1995, the feature of Albanian transformation was that, the country had 
made the biggest transformation toward liberalisation and privatisation in the shortest 
period. Looking to the comparative tables on liberalisation and privatisation in the 
“World Development Report 1996”, Albania is among the most advanced countries in 
these processes in time terms.256 Albania has been favoured also by foreign 
investments thanks to the liberal terms offered to investors.257
Nevertheless, everything was not rosy. Unresolved problems such as 
privatisation and reform in financial and institution building, followed by publicly- 
acknowledged corruption in public services and the inability to fight it, and generally 
inadequate legal system to fight illicit activities, increased the public discontent that 
reached the highest point toward the end of 1996 and the beginning of 1997. Other 
problems influenced in the aggravation of the crisis the inherited, weak economic 
foundations, a backward banking system, a total absence of capital market and 
underdeveloped institutions brought it nearer.
The crisis reached its peak in 1997 but it had started in mid 1996, signalled by 
a rapid decline of economic indicators. During the year inflation jumped up to 12.70 
percent, while the budget deficit had grown to 12 percent of the GDP from 7 percent 
in 1994.258 The trade deficit increased sharply. In 1996 the current account had a 
deficit 1.5 time larger than in 1995 or $215 million. Meanwhile, in 1997, the deficit 
increased further; it reached approximately $270 million.259 This demonstrated the 
fragility of the macroeconomic equilibrium achieved during the previous years and 
made clear that the macroeconomic foundation of the reform was problematic. At the 
same time the economic reform was not followed by a sustainable institutional reform 
in support of it. The expected institutional reform included a new constitution for the 
country, new institutions and the establishment of basic rules for conducting a
255 See for the data the “Memorandum of Foreign Regime of Albania, 1997, prepared for the accession of 
Albania in WTO, Source Ministry of Industry and Economic Cooperation
256 See Table 9 and 10 on Economic liberalisation and Private sector output as a share of GDP, by country
257 See Table 11 on Cumulative foreign direct investments flows by country
258 See Albania Human Development Report 1998, p. 18
259 See, Table 7 and 11 on Annual GDP and Inflation rates and Annual trade current balance
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democratic society. The lack of a traditional developed democracy, and institutional 
reform were at the base of the crisis. The crisis became violent due to the deepening 
of the financial crisis which was brought about when the pyramid investment firms or 
informal credits with unjustified high interests rate, interrupted their activities. The 
reason for the existence of such pyramid schemes can be found in the lack of financial 
experience and developed institutions and the state’s tolerance of illegal activities.
In fact these phenomena are not surprising for countries in transition. Many 
scholars have described such upheavals. The economic transition is related with the 
transition in politics and society. The transition from dictatorship to democracy opens 
the opportunities for all kind of ideas, but when the democratic tradition is missing, as 
is in the case of Albania, it leaves an ideological void.260 The abolition of the 
communist values does not automatically bring the new civil values. Consequently, 
the political decision making suffers from uncertainties and hesitations and some times 
it is short-sighted. This attitude affects the depth and the speed of the reforms, 
creating serious difficulties after the first wave of the reforms and restraining the new­
born capitalism.261 Albania proved to be part of this transitional picture with many 
commonalties with the transition in the other Central and Eastern European countries.
260 See, Alan Smith, 1991, “The Implications of Change in East Central Europe for the Balkan Socialist 
Economies”, Economic Changes in the Balkan States, Sjoberg&Wyzan eds., London, Pinter Press
261 See, J. Sachs., “Building a Market Economy in Poland”, Scientific American, 266, 3 March 1992, pp.20-26, 
and Kornai J., 1990, The Road to a Free Economy, New York, Norton
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CONCLUSIONS
The present study makes clear that security is a concept that requires a wide- 
ranging understanding. In understanding the complexity of the concept of security, my 
review of traditional and contemporary literature on the different schools of thought 
on international relations has made evident the development of the concept, 
underlined by some authors262 that the security concept is considered a derivative of 
other concepts such as peace and war.
National security at first glance suggests a state level understanding. Such a 
superficial view is not sufficient, since national security has to imply the regional and 
the international level, both of which have implications for the concept. Meanwhile 
national security becomes affected by considerations other than political and military. 
The economic and social spheres have also an impact on the security issues. The 
concept of security binds together both levels and spheres, requiring an integrative 
approach in the understanding and development of the concept.263
In this context, the conceptualisation of the main core of this thesis, security in 
the Balkans with a focus on Albania, is based on three pillars. The first pillar deals 
with the implications for security at the regional level, stressing the initiatives and 
organisations of the region. The second pillar provides consideration of the 
implications coming from the international level with a focus on the role of institutions 
especially the Euro-Atlantic ones. The third pillar has considered the implications of 
economic and social spheres and their effect on security.
The regional approach has introduced the Balkans from a historical and 
contemporary perspective. The Balkan countries have almost a common historical and 
sociological background which have shaped size, problems and insecurities in the 
Balkans. Lack of trust and reconciliation, along with poor economic development, an 
underdeveloped civil society and low inter-cooperative level, have made the Balkans 
the “powder keg” of the Europe. It is as though time has not passed for the Balkans 
and it is still too early to think of an end of history in Fukuyama’s terms. Balkan
262 See, Barry Buzan, op. cit note 1
263 See ibid., p.363
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countries have emerged from the Cold War era with a constellation of problems such 
as internal social-economic instabilities, heightened ethnic problems, movements for 
self-determination and struggles for revised international borders.
Being a peninsula, the Balkans represent a closely knit land, so internal 
insecurities carry a great potential for transporting insecurity at a regional level, 
favoured also by the small size of the states and their fragile internal ethnic 
equilibrium. Furthermore, the problems in a country are disturbing and harming the 
economic and financial life of the neighbour countries by discouraging foreign and 
internal investments, trade flows of goods and services as well as undermining the use 
of the capacity of airports, road, energy and gas networks. This ongoing disorder 
causes delays in economic reform and occasions social disorders thus causing internal 
instability which can spread to the neighbour countries.
Balkan states are small and in most of the cases unviable as units which make 
indispensable the necessity of a regional perspective on resolving security issues. As a 
result it is very difficult to treat country security dilemmas separately from a regional 
and institutional perspective. The end of the Cold War has been followed not only by 
an environment of conflict in the Balkans but also by a growing consciousness of the 
need for cooperation conceived as a tool that will contribute both to prosperity and 
security. Many initiatives are under way, each aiming to enhance cooperation in 
different fields. The Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), The Black 
Sea Economic Co-operation Zone and recently the Stability Pact for the Balkans all 
aim to encourage a free market, economic cooperation and facilitate cross-border 
communications among the Balkan countries. Meanwhile such developments may 
resolve the problems from a regional perspective by harmonising the expectations and 
interests of the countries of the region. The Multinational Peace Force South-East 
Europe (MPFSEE) is an initiative in the military field. It constitutes an effort to 
reduce tensions and prepare the countries’ armies for membership within NATO. 
Moreover, it represents a forum for talks, information exchange, all of which are 
important in building confidence and trust between the military staff of each country 
and beyond. Another form of cooperation has been the forum of head of states. In this 
context one might mention the Summit of Crete which launched the idea of the 
Europeanisation of the region, considering the integration of the Balkan states an 
important step in resolving peacefully conflictual situations and creating the
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framework for the states’ integration into the European Union. The initiatives are 
numerous but they have yet to produce important results in resolving the security 
problems of the region. They may be appreciated as efforts that aspire to peace and 
cooperation and furthermore they contribute to trust and dialogue in the region.
Albania has tried to make a place for itself in the troublesome Balkan region. 
Historically, besides suffering from inherited Balkan problems and legacies, Albania 
has always represented a piece that must be shared among neighbours. Partially this 
has been the case since half of the Albanian territories inhabited by a majority of 
ethnic Albanians, have been assigned to the neighbour countries. During the Cold 
War, ethnic and border problems were frozen and a kind of stability reigned in the 
Balkans. Nevertheless it divided the Balkans in two alignments: the Western Euro- 
Atlantic Alliance and the Communist camp block. Meanwhile Albania ably played the 
alliance building, first with Tito’s Yugoslavia, later with the Soviet Union and lastly 
with China, to guarantee its security and border integrity against the designs of 
neighbours much larger in size and potential strength.
The end of the Cold War has opened a new era for Albania. She is eager to 
integrate herself into the international arena, build alliances that will help her to 
recover from the backwardness inherited from the isolationism of the previous regime, 
and solve her security dilemmas. Meanwhile, Albania is not undermining the good 
relationship and cooperation with neighbour countries. In her foreign policy toward 
her neighbours, Albania aims to establish good relations and maintain an equilibrated 
position toward the ethnic Albanians living in the neighbour countries and act mostly 
in accordance with the international community policy. This attitude aims to elicit the 
praise of the Western states and organisations for its policy and conduct in the belief 
that in return it will be compensated with aid and assistance which are very important 
to the economic and political survival of the country.
My analysis of security from an international perspective has considered the 
role of institutions to be indispensable. In the Balkans, the Eurocentrist nature of the 
institutions does not generate tensions based on culture differentiations since the 
Balkans are regarded as part of Europe. Moreover the Balkans have yet to develop 
any important tendency that would reject the role of international institutions.
By managing relations and settling disputes on common rules and guidelines, 
institutions avoid conflict and provide opportunities for mutual benefit. The
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institutions, especially the Euro-Atlantic ones, showed their ability in dealing 
successfully with the post Cold War problems. Institutions such as NATO, the EU, 
the OSCE, the WEU have gained a vital importance, especially after the end of the 
Cold War, in building European security architecture, each complementing the others 
in an interlocking approach.
NATO has emerged after the Cold War period as the most competent 
organisation from the military, strategic and operational point of view, able to respond 
to the overall threats to European security, and willing to offer a coverage of security 
for the rest of European countries. What is more, NATO has adopted a new role in 
the protection of Western values and interests in the immediate neighbourhood and 
beyond. Projecting stability for Central-East Europe, NATO has established organs 
such as the NACC, recently superseded by the EAPC, and a programme such as PfP 
that will create the needed framework for future membership in the organisation of a 
larger cluster of European states.
The OSCE is also another organisation projecting peace and stability in 
Europe by encouraging cooperation and a consensual framework among the member 
states. It represents also a forum for consultation and coordination of other 
international organisations tasks. It participates as mediator for crisis prevention and 
monitoring. The most important role assigned to the OSCE is related to the 
projection, spread, monitoring and defence of democratic values in the new 
democracies in the post Cold War era.
The EU is the most integrated structure in Europe, a model of prosperity and 
peaceful conflict resolution. The integration within the Union aims at the extension to 
the other non-European member countries of this security community, based on 
shared values and interest. The membership as such implies the consolidation of liberal 
democracies based on political freedom, market economy, constitutionalism and rule 
of law. The spread of such values through Europe will lay the way for a unified and 
peaceful Europe, including the Balkans as an integrative part of it.
The WEU is a complimentary structure of the EU that seeks to provide a 
continental identity to European defence and security. The WEU is mostly involved in 
military issues and programmes in line with the European Union.
In the Balkans the role of institutions is of great importance. This role consists 
of mediating and assisting both the consolidation of fragile internal ethnic equilibrium,
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as is the case of Macedonia, and the settlement of tense inter-state relations, as may 
be the case in Bosnia and Kosovo. More then that, they provide the security 
guarantees necessary for the economic development and cooperation as one of the 
pre-conditions that will provide stability and security in the region. Meanwhile, the 
institutions support the development of democratic values and civil society as an 
important part of the whole security building architecture for the Balkan countries.
Looking to the priorities of Albanian foreign policy, inclusion into the Euro- 
Atlantic structures has a particular importance. NATO in the Balkan framework and 
for Albania in particular constitutes the most important approach toward security 
building. On both sides, there is a reciprocal interest in cooperation. Balkan countries, 
Albania included, will receive the needed security guarantees that create the necessary 
pre-conditions for development in other fields, contain the old rivalries and tie these 
countries to democratic values. From a NATO perspective the extension of 
membership in the Balkans will contribute to European security, it will avoid a 
dividing line within Europe that may encourage the revival of old rivalries in Europe 
based on a quest for zones of interest in the Balkans, thus undermining the strategic 
balance in Europe. Meanwhile the enlargement of NATO in the Balkan region will 
contribute to the strengthening of the southern flank. A conflict in the Balkans may 
involve Greece and Turkey on different sides, thus challenging the internal cohesion 
of NATO. Moreover, the enlargement will serve as a prevention against the overall 
threats to security such as the potential expansion of fundamentalism in the Balkans.
Albania has particular interest in NATO membership. The Albanian question in 
the Balkans after the Kosovo crisis has made clear that linking Albania to Euro- 
Atlantic structures will provide an important stabilising factor for the Balkans. This 
can be only through NATO. Meanwhile Albania has inherited weak defence structures 
which are unable to respond to any kind of threat. In this context only NATO can 
offer the security guarantees and assistance that will cope with these deficiencies.
In conceptualising security from a sphere of activity perspective the focus was 
placed on social and economic factors. These factors are considered important 
elements of the démocratisation process and of security itself, since there is the belief 
that democracies do not wage war against each other. As a start it was considered 
important to look at the Balkans’ mind set from a historical perspective. This 
perspective has been important in understanding the Balkan people’s perception and
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behaviour toward the state and institutions, and how these are considered to have 
implications for the economic and social developments which can then develop into 
security issues. In the Balkans, over time, the state mostly has been centrally 
controlled and based on corruption. The characteristics of the state have been: the 
highly autocratic rule, absence of rule of law, low level of institutionalisation and 
intermediary structures, interference of foreign factors in the legitimisation process. 
The preceding communist regimes have entrenched these tendencies by building 
totalitarian states based on authoritarism and lack of pluralism in all fields. All these 
past developments have an important impact on civil society, the démocratisation 
process and the market economy. The past has effected the transition to democracy in 
terms of the ups and downs endured by the countries and the peculiarities of the 
process. The most visible peculiarity is that the transition to democracy was initiated 
by the communist leadership which even won the first democratic elections.
Looking from an international perspective, the end of the Cold War era and 
the wave of the démocratisation in Central-East Europe had a positive impact in the 
Balkan countries, opening the way toward démocratisation. This development was 
also due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of its sphere of influence, 
which gave the communist countries the opportunity to exit the umbrella of its 
domination. Furthermore, this process was also effected by the international 
institutions, the EU and the US as the most important actors with influence on the 
region, which provided the models and assistance for encouraging the new 
developments.
Analysing the pre-conditions of establishing democracy from the perspective 
of formal and consolidated democracy has been important in understanding the 
prospect for démocratisation in the Balkans. Such analysis results in the observations 
that Balkan countries must be considered as having adopted the pre-conditions for a 
formal democracy such as, free and fair elections, competition and participation. 
Elsewhere, the consolidation of democracy requires the acceptance of democracy as 
the best solution, meanwhile its principles, rules and norms have become self- 
enforcing and customised. This is still not the case in the Balkans.
In the Balkans’ framework, Albania is part of this heritage. At the same time, 
it possesses, particularities related to a wide range of factors such as the isolationist 
policies of the previous communist regime, lack of heritage in civil society and
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democratic culture, a deficiency in the multiplicity of the democratic process that 
involves all spheres of the life, a crisis of values due to the rejection of the communist 
values which led to a vacuum of values, and the uncontrolled movement of the 
population. At the same time there was a lack of civil society and intermediary and 
pluralist structures. Nevertheless, since the start of the democratic process, progress 
has been made. The development of the NGOs and related legal framework have 
contributed to the development of civil society and the democratic process. The 
NGOs have emerged as intermediary structures that have alleviated the burden of the 
social crisis by intervening in the sphere of women, marginalised categories of the 
populations, and professionals, helping them cope with the new challenges.
In approaching the democratic transition in Albania, elements such as political 
pluralism, institution building, elections, and media are taken into consideration, while 
recognising their deficiencies and tendencies. The deficiencies bespeak of a weak 
conceptualisation of basic principles and rules of democracy, oscillations in public 
reaction that lead to an unstable political culture, and the politicisation of all issues. 
At the same time there is a positive move underlined by the development of different 
democratic institutions, democratic constitutional law, private independent media, free 
elections, and multi-party system-all of which encourage the progress toward 
démocratisation.
The complexity of the problems and the difficulty on the part of the Balkan 
countries to deal with them make indispensable the role of international institutions in 
the democratic transition. Here it is important to mention the role of the OSCE. Its 
role is related to confidence and building measures in security issues, conflict 
prevention and dispute settlement, enhancement of economic cooperation and 
protection of human rights, all important issues for the Balkan countries. Mostly, the 
OSCE is focused on the protection of the human rights, crisis mediation, organisation 
and observation of free elections, development of civil society and protection of 
minority rights. Carrying all these tasks, the OSCE is represent in Albania by a 
Presence Office.
A further important actor in the region is the EU. It represents a model that 
must be followed by the Balkan countries as a solution to the instability in the region. 
The EU is seen as an actor that has to play a role in the Balkans. This is due to three 
considerations. First, the EU as a democratic body has the duty to spread democratic
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values and principles. Second, any isolationism on the part of the EU will lead to a 
division of Europe into rich and poor regions that in one way or another subject the 
EU to the pressure of refugees coming from the poor regions. Third, the instabilities 
in the Balkans that are mostly due to the lack of democracy and economic unstable 
structures can easily be transformed into political instabilities with serious implication 
for security issues that may even destabilise Europe.
In fact the EU is present in the Balkans and Albania also. All the Balkan 
countries aspire to join the EU. This membership is foreseen as an important asset in 
building a long-term security for the Balkans, since the membership involves more 
than economical structural changes; it considers values, norms that will build liberal 
democracies. In support of this membership agreements and programmes of 
development are established. The established programmes such as PHARE, PPP, aim 
at the consolidation of civil society and intermediary structures, both considered as 
emancipatory forces that will lead to démocratisation. Meanwhile assistance is 
provided in the economic sphere for the creation of consolidated economic structures 
that will support the democratic changes. Albania is part of this picture. But still the 
level of institutionalisation of the relations with the EU is low. The relations are 
managed by an agreement on trade and economic cooperation which does not 
presume any status as most favoured partner. Nevertheless, a great deal of assistance 
and aid is provided, which is considered as important for the continuation of the 
reform given the inability of Albania to sustain its growth independently.
Looking more closely at the economic reform in Albania, it reflects the deficit 
of pluralistic and consolidated economic structures and it is influenced by the political 
and social development in the country. Until 1997, the Albanian reform in the 
economic field was considered successful and was praised by the international 
institutions. The 1997 crisis marked a deep deterioration of macroeconomic 
indicators. The deep economic crisis was due to the fragility of economic structures 
and other related factors such as, corruption, lack of rule of law, and deficiencies in 
privatisation. Mostly it was attributed to the lack of a consolidated democratic 
environment. This consideration was based on the fact that the society and the state 
were unable to control the crisis caused by the failure of the pyramid schemes in the 
country. The crises involved the other spheres, including the politics and military 
structures. Obviously the events .showed the interlinkage that exists between different
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spheres. The instability in one field involves in one way or an other the others’ fields. 
The risk is higher when the democratic structures are not consolidated and they do 
not meet the challenges.
Finally, looking for practical implications, some options as possible scenarios 
can be summarised for the Balkans’ and Albania’s future. In this Balkan framework 
there may exist three options for the future:
-Total war, all against all. As a result an unstable region will threaten all the Balkan 
countries but the continent also. This option does not have any realistic future. The 
Balkans are part of Europe, according to a number of different perspectives. The 
Balkans are within the European geographical “natural borderline” they share with the 
continent common historical cultural heritage and memories, and they have been 
historically part of European political life. The EU represents the allure of democratic 
values, economic performance and rule of law and the Balkan countries as part of 
Europe cannot remain rejected. Also it is in Europe’s interest to have a stable 
neighbourhood. Furthermore, two of the Balkan countries are members of NATO and 
one of the EU, so the instability can easily be transferred to Europe.
-Division into different alignments will put the Balkan countries on the side of 
different major powers. This results in turning the Balkan land into a theatre of clashes 
between Europe and the US, both testing their supremacy and dividing the zones of 
influence. It is probable but still, the EU and the US share more interests in common 
than divisions, so there is little possibility that this option will gain ground.
-Integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. The integration will resolve many inherited 
problems, rivalries and ethnic problems by making insignificant the meaning of border 
and creating the environment for cooperation and development. This is the most 
discussed version and a Stabilising Plan along these lines is foreseen for the Balkans 
after the recent events in Kosovo.
The last version looks the most suitable and probable. It involves besides 
security, the concept of the new dimension of security in the post Cold War Era: free 
economic and civil society developments, since integration into these organisations 
presumes the compliance with a set of democratic values and practices and economic 
standard.
Assessing options for the future of Albania, two likely policies emerge.
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-To leave Albania alone in its efforts. This will lead the country to anarchy and social 
confrontations. In the present time it is difficult to think that the same isolation will be 
equally repeated without affecting the neighbourhood. A destabilised Albania will 
threaten the region and the EU neighbour members, such as Italy and Greece. The 
threat has firstly an economic character related to the flow of refugees in the 
neighbour countries but at the same time it assumes a political dimension by 
threatening the internal political equilibrium of neighbour countries by breaking the 
fragile ethnic equilibrium.
The other option is to integrate Albania into the international structures. This 
option involves two approaches - multilateral and bilateral. According to the 
multilateral approach the Balkan countries has to find a common language of trust, 
cooperation and political dialogue, that will lead toward a regional integration as a 
first step and a further integration into the European family as a second step. Albania 
will be part of this regional integration trend. According to the bilateral approach, 
Albania may join individually the Euro-Atlantic structures that will assign to it the role 
of stabiliser in the region.
Both last options are suitable for settling Albanian security dilemmas and 
contributing to Balkan stability and peace. Priority will be accorded to the version that 
best suits institutions’ interests for the stability in the region. The integration will be a 
political process rather than one based on standardised indicators for membership of 
these institutions, because Albania like many of the Balkan countries, is still far from 
compliance with the settled pre-conditions for membership. Nevertheless the regional 
two step approach has gained ground recently in the belief that an integrated and 
peaceful Balkans as a whole, will be the best solution for the security of the regional 
states. This follows in the footsteps of the European experience after the Second 
World War.
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TABLES
Table 1 - EU exports to Balkan countries
1995 1994 1995 95/94
% share ECU bn % variant
Albania 1.0 0.43 0.5 18.4
Bosnia-Hercegovina 0.3 0.1 0.14 47.6
Bulgaria 3.8 1.6 1.87 17.2
Croatia 6.2 2.86 3.07 7.0
Fyrom 1.6 0.74 .08 7.8
Romania 7.2 2.65 3.55 7.8
Slovenia 8.9 3.67 4.38 19.1
Source: Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, External Trade
Table 2 - EU im ports from  the Balkan countries
1995 1994 1995 95/94
% share ECU bn % variât
Albania 0.5 0.12 0.21 74.5
Bosnia-Hercegovina 0.1 0.01 0.02 84.5
Bulgaria 4.2 134 1.76 31.4
Croatia 4.2 1.81 1.75 -3.3
Fyrom 1.5 0.66 0.64 -2.8
Romania 7.8 2.51 3.26 30.1
Slovenia 9.1 3.42 3.78 20.6
Source: Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, External Trade
Table 3 - EU T rade B¡alance with the Balkan countries
1995 1994 1995 95/94
ECU bn % total trade
Albania 0.30 0.29 55.2 40.4
Bosnia-Hercegovina 0.08 0.12 77.5 72.7
Bulgaria 0.25 0.11 8.6 2.9
Croatia 1.06 1.32 22.6 27.4
Fyrom 0.08 0.15 5.5 10.7
Romania 0.14 0.29 2.7 4.2
Slovenia 0.25 0.59 3.6 7.2
Source: Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, External Trade
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Table 4 - EU exports to Balkan countries in 1996 in percentage
1996
%
Albania 1.1
Bosnia-Hercegovina 0.8
Bulgaria 2.4
Croatia 5.6
Fyrom 1.2
Romania 6.4
Slovenia 7.7
Source: Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, External Trade
Table 5 - Albania’s Balance of Payments and Foreign Debt_______  $ Million
1990 1991 1992
Commercial banks arrears 181.1 395.0 0.0
Exports 227.0 72.0 65.0
Imports 380.0 281.0 517.0
Balance of Payments -152 -250 -529
Trade deficit ratio of GDP (%) -11.0 -19.2 -72.5
Dept service ratio to exports (%) 26.7 37.7 89.5
Source: Estimates from National Bank of Albania, December 1992
Table 6 - Annual Rate of Growth of Main Macroeconomic indices %)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
GDP 3.1 -0.8 -1.4 9.8 -10.0 -21.1
GDP per capita 1.1 -2.7 6.0 7.7 -11.5 -14.4
Total wage fund 5.5 3.4 1.3 3.7 4.6 18.3
Number of workers 4.0 3.8 2.7 3.4 3.1 n.a
Gross fixed capital formation -2.3 0.7 -1.5 8.0 -0.5 n.a
Exports 18.5 0.0 2.4 18.8 -25.0 -45.8
Sources: Yearbook of A bania 1991 and Directory of Statistics N1lay 1992
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Table 7 - Annual GDP and Inflation rates in %
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
GDP -28 -7.20 9.60 8.30 13.30 9.10 -7.00
Inflation 35.50 226 85 22.50 7.80 12.70 180.20
Source: Institute of Statistics of Albania, 1998
Table 8 - The Foreign Trade Current Balance 1990-1996
1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Total volume 608 260 686 743 905 1130
Export 228 80 112 141 202 207
Import 380 180 574 602 703 923
Net Trade balance -152 -100 -463 -461 -501 -716
in $niln
Source: Institute of Statistics of Albania, 1997
120
Table 9 - Economic liberalisation by country
Index
Group 1
Poland 
Slovenia 
Hungary 
Croatia* 
FYR Macedonia* 
Czech Republic 
Slovak Republic 
Group 2 
Estonia 
Lithuania 
Bulgaria 
Latvia 
Albania 
Romania 
Mongolia 
Group 3 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Russia 
Moldova 
Armenia* 
Georgia* 
Kazakstan 
Group 4 
Uzbekistan 
Ukraine 
Belarus 
Azerbaijan* 
Tajikistan* 
Turkmenistan
Vietnam
China
3B Average extent of liberalization, 1989—95 Q ]  Extent of liberalization in 1995
N o te : B a rs  in d ica te  the  e xte n t to w h ich  p o lic ie s  s u p p o rt in g  libe ra lize d  m arkets and e n try  o f new  firm s p re va ile d  in 1 9 9 5  and on  a verage  o ve r 
1 9 8 9 -9 5 . A s te r is k s  in d ica te  e co n o m ie s  s e v e re ly  a ffe c te d  by reg io n a l te n s io n s  b e tw e e n  1 9 8 9  and  1 9 9 5 . T h e  in d ex is  a w e ig h te d  average  o f 
e s t im a te s  o f lib e ra liza tio n  o f d o m e s tic  tra n s a c tio n s  (p rice  libe ra liza tio n  and a bo litio n  o f s ta te  tra d in g  m o n o p o lie s ), e x te rn a l t ra n s a c tio n s  
(e lim in a tio n  o f e x p o r t  c o n tro ls  and  ta x e s , su b s titu tio n  of low  to  m o d era te  im p o rt d u tie s  for im p o rt q u o ta s  and  high  ta r if fs , c u rre n t a cco u n t 
c o n v e rt ib il ity ) , and  e n try  o f new  firm s (p riva tiza tio n  and priva te  s e c to r, or n o n s ta te , d e ve lo p m e n t). T h e  w e ig h ts  on  th e s e  c o m p o n e n ts  are  0 .3 , 0 .3 , 
and 0 .4 . re sp e c tive ly . In itia l e s t im a te s  for the  th ree  co m D o n e n ts  w e re  b a s e d  on  co m p a ra tive  in fo rm a tio n  in W orld  B ank  and o th e r re p o rts . T h e s e  
w e re re v is e d  fo llo w ing  c o n s u lta t io n  w ith  c o u n try  s p e c ia lis ts  ns w ell a s  e x p e rts  w ith  a co m p a ra tive  p e rs p e c tiv e  a c ro s s  a n u m b e r o f c o u n tr ie s . For 
the tw e n ty -five  c o u n tr ie s  in C E E  and  the  N IS  the tra n s itio n  in d ica to rs  and  a cco m p a n y in g  te xt in E B R D  1 9 9 4  and  1 9 9 5  p ro v id e d  a fu rth e r b a s is  for 
ca lib ra tio n . N e v e r th e le s s , any su c h  in d ex is ju d g m e n ta l and n e c e s s a rily  a pp ro x im a te . S ee  a ls o  the  De M e lo , D e n ize r, and  G e lb  back g ro un d  paper.
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T able 10 - Private Sector O utput as a Share o f G D P by C ountry
Percent
Group 1
Poland 
Slovenia 
Hungary 
Croatia* 
FYR Macedonia* 
Czech Republic 
Slovak Republic 
Group 2 
Estonia 
Lithuania 
Bulgaria 
Latvia 
Albania 
Romania 
Mongolia 
Group 3 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Russia 
Moldova 
Armenia* 
Georgia* 
Kazakstan 
Group 4 
Uzbekistan 
Ukraine 
Belarus 
Azerbaijan* 
Tajikistan* 
Turkmenistan
Vietnam nonstate 
China 
China nonstate
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
1 ------------ 1------------- 1------------- 1------------- 1------------- 1------------- 1------------- 1------------
j g  1990 Q ] 1995
N o te : F irm s are  c o n s id e re d  p riva te  if th e y  are le s s  than  50  p e rce n t s ta te  o w n e d . For .V ie tn a m , th e  n o n s ta te  s e c to r e x c lu d e s  p u b lic -p riva te  jo in t  
v e n tu re s . For C h in a , the n o n s ta te  s e c to r  in c lu d e s  c o lle c t iv e s  and to w n sh ip  and  v illa g e  e n te rp r is e s  a s  w e ll a s  p riva te  firm s ; a g ricu ltu re  is  
c o n s id e re d  p riva te  in 1 9 9 5 , a lthough  la n d  is  he ld  th ro u g h  lo n g -term  le a s e s . A s te r is k s  in d ica te  e c o n o m ie s  s e v e re ly  a ffe c te d  b y reg io n a l 
te n s io n s  b e tw e e n  1 9 8 9  and 19 9 5 . S o u rce : E B R D , IM F. and W orld  B ank  d a ta ; o ffic ia l d a ta .
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Table 11 - C um ulative Foreign D irect Investm ent F low s by C ountry
Percentage of 1994 GDP
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Group 1
Poland |B M P — H  6,459 4 — Millions of dollars
Slovenia 1H U SH  438 ^
Hungary 1
Croatia* [
FYR Macedonia* |1 M  . 36__________________
Czech Republic I 
Slovak Republic [■ ■ ■ 4 8 3
■  3,996
Group 2 1
Estonia 1 —  646
Lithuania 1■ 1  73
Bulgaria 1■ — ■ 3 9 7
Latvia I■ ■ ■ ■  323__________
Albania I 
Romania 1■ H i , 101
| 186
Mongolia 1■ H i  38
Group 3 [
Kyrgyz Republic 1■ 25
Russia ¡1  3,900
Moldova ■  86
Armenia* I 10 CEE, N1S, and
Georgia*
Kazakstan i i l i l H  719
Mongolia
Group 4
Uzbekistan B  250
Ukraine f l  950
Belarus 1 5 2
Azerbaijan* B ■  n o
Tajikistan* i 
Turkmenistan
HI 25
Vietnam ■ B  351 East
China
\ ________1___________ 1___________ L___________1___________ 1___________
N o te : D ata  a re  the  sum  o f in flo w s d u rin g  1 9 8 9 -9 5 ; th o s e  fo r C ro a tia , G e o rg ia , and  T u rk m e n is ta n  are u n a va ila b le . D ata  fo r 1 9 9 5  are 
p re lim in a ry . C o u n tr ie s  are ranked  as in F igure 1. A s te r is k s  in d ica te  e c o n o m ie s  s e v e re ly  a ffe c te d  by reg io n a l te n s io n s  b e tw e e n  1 9 8 9  and  1 9 9 5 . 
S o u rc e : W orld  B a n k  1 9 9 6 b ; IM F  and  W orld  B ank  s ta f f  e s t im a te s .
123
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Albanian Human Development Report 1998, PNUD, Albania
Albanian Government, “Final Report of Reform and Recovery of Albanian 
Government prepared for the Meeting of International Aid Donors held in Brussels on 
22nd October 1997”
Art, Robert J., “Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO”, Political 
Science Quarterly, Spring 1996, Vol 111, pp. 1-40
Asmis, Roland D. & Larrabee, Stephen F, “NATO and the Have Nots”, Foreign 
Affairs, November-December 1996, pp 1-7
Assembly of the Western European Union, Report, Document 1589, 5 November 
1997.
Aybet, Gulnur, 1997, The Dynamics o f European Security Cooperation, 1945-91, 
London, Macmillan Press
Aybet, Gulnur, “NATO’s New Missions”, Perceptions, Volume IV, Number 1, 
March-May 1999, pp 65-75
Base, Mero, 1997, “Realitete Shqiptaro- Amerikane”,(Albanian-American Relations), 
Tirana, Koha Press
Balanzino, Sergio, “A Year after Sintra: Achieving Cooperative Security through the 
EAPC and PfP”, NATO Review, No.3, Autumn 1998, pp 4-8
Betts, Richard K., 1994, Conflict After the Cold War, Boston: Allyn and Bacon
Biberaj, Elez, 1998, Albania in Transition, The Rocky Road to Democracy”, Boulder 
Co, Westview Press
Biberaj, Elez, 1994, “Albania and the Albanians in the Post-Communist Period”, The 
Volatile Powder Keg -Balkan Security after the Cold War, Stephen Larrabee eds., 
Wasington: The American University Press
Booth, Ken and Wheeler, Nicholas, 1992,“Contending philosophies about security in 
Europe” Security &Strategy in the New Europe, Colin Mclnnes eds., London: 
Routledge
Braun, Aurel, 1983, Small-State Security in the Balkans, Totova, New Jersey, 
Barnes&Noble Books
124
Brinbaum, Karl E, 1987, From Stockholm to Vienna Building Confidence and 
Security in Europe, Swedish Institute of International relations, Stockholm
Brown, F. James, 1987,“The East European setting”, Eroding Empire: Western 
relations with Eastern Europe, Gordon Lincoln eds, Washington, D.C, The 
Brookings Institution
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, “Post-Communist Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.68.nr.5, 
Winter 1989/1990, pp 273-298
Bugajsky, Janusz, 1994, Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe: A Guide to Nationality 
Policies, Armonk, N.Y.,O.M.P. Sharpe
Bull, Hedley, 1977, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, New 
York: Columbia University Press
Burton, John, 1987, World Society, Lanham eds., London, University Press of 
America,
Buzan, Barry, 1991, 2nd edition, People, States and Fear, An Agenda for  
International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Harvester Wheatsheaf
Carnovale, Marco, 1995, “ Vital and National Security Interests After the End of the 
Cold War”, European Security and International Institutions After the End o f the 
Cold War, Marco Carnovale eds., New York, St.Martin’s Press
Carr, Edward Hallett, 1994, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939, Boston, Allyn and 
Bacon
Castellan, Georges, 1991, Historic des Balkans (XIV-XX siecle), Paris, Librairie 
Artheme Fayard
Cleveland, Harlan, 1970, NATO, The Transatlantic Bargain New York: Harper and 
Row
Copani, Adem, “The New Dimensions of Albania’s Security Posture”, NATO review, 
Vol.44, No 2, March 1996, pp 24-28
“Council conclusions on Albania”, Bulletin EU, 7/8, 1997
Cox, Robert W., “Civil society at the turn of the millennium: prospects for an 
alternative world order”, Review o f International Studies, Vol 25, No. 28, January 
1999, pp 3-28
Cucchi, Giusepe, “International Security Institutions and National Sovereignty after 
the Cold War”, European Security and International Institutions After the End o f the 
Cold War, Marco Carnovale eds., New York, St.Martin’s Press
125
Danopoulos, Costandine P. and Messas, Kostas G., 1997, “Security and conflict in 
the Balkans”, Crisis in the Balkans, Views from the participants, Costandine P. 
Danopoulos and Kostas G. Messas eds., Boulder Co, Westview Press,
Danopoulos, Costandine P. and Copani, Adem, 1997, “Albanian, Nationalism and 
Prospects for Greater Albania”, Crisis in the Balkans, Views from the participants, 
Costandine P Danopoulos. and Kostas G. Messas eds., Boulder Co, Westview Press,
Deutsch, Karl W, 1957, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: 
International Organisation in the light o f Historical Experience, Pinceton N.J.: 
Pinceton University Press
Diamond, Larry, 1996, 2nd edition, “Is the Third Wave Over?”, The Global 
Resurgence o f Democracy, Larry Diamond and Marc F.Plattner, Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press
Diamandouros, Nikiforos P., 1994, “Prospects for Democracy in the Balkans: 
Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives”, The Volatile Powder Keg, Balkan 
Security after the Cold War, F. Stephen Larrabee eds., Washington: The American 
University Press
Dimitrov, Vladimir, Woog, Robert and Kuhn-White, Lesley, “The Divergence 
Syndrome in Social Systems”, Complexity International, Vol.3, No. 2, April 1996, pp 
15-38
Done, Kevin, “Caution remains the keynote” , Financial Times, October 2, 1995
Doyle, Michael W., 1995, “Liberalism and World Politics Revised”, Controversies in 
International Relations Theory, Charles W. Kegley eds., New York, St.Martin’s 
Press
EU, Press Release, IP/97/1104, December 11,1997
EU, Council of Ministers, Kircheberg Declaration, Luxembourg, 19 June 1992
EU, Council of Ministers, Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19 June 1992
EU, “Council Conclusions on the Application of Conditionality in with a view to 
developing a coherent EU-strategy for the relations with countries in the South-East 
Region”, 2003rd Council Meeting, Luxembourg 29/30 April 1997
European Commission, “The Report on the Evaluation of PHARE Partnership 
Programme”, DG IA, December 1998
European Council , 13 December 1997, ‘The Accession Partnership Document” 
Luxembourg
Friedrich, Carl, 1954, Totalitarism, Harvard University Press
126
Forbes, Ian, 1993, “Beyond die State”, Political Theory and the Ethnics o f 
Intervention, Forbes Ian& Hoffman Mark eds., London, Macmillan Press
Freeman, John, 1991, Security and CSCE process, The Stockholm and beyond, New 
York, St. Martin’s Press
Fry, John, 1993, The Helsinki Process: Negotiating Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, National Defence University Press, Washington D.C., US Government 
Printing Office
Fukuyama, Fransis, “The end of History” National Interests, No. 16, Summer 1989, 
pp 123-164
Gambles, Ian, “European Security integration in the 1990s”, Chaillot Paper 3, 
November 1990, Paris, WEU Institute for Security Studies
Giacomo, Carol, “Albright seeks ‘common ground’ with Russia on Kosovo”, 
REURTES, April 12, 1999
Giddens, Anthony, 1996 2nd edition, The Nation State and Violence, Cambridge, 
Polity Press
Goble, Paul, “After the Bombing Stops”, RFE/RL, Vol 3, No. 81, Part II, 27 April 
1999
Haas, Ernst B., “Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes”, World 
Politics, Vol. XXXII, No. 3, April 1980, pp. 351- 379
Haas, Ernst, 1958, The Uniting of Europe , Stanford: Stanford University Press
Haas, Ernst, 1964, Beyond the Nation State, Stanford: Stanford University Press
Hassner, Pierre, “Beyond Nationalism and Internationalism”, Survival, Vol.35, No.2, 
Summer 1993, pp 270-289
Held, David, et al, 1999, Global Transfortnations : Politics, Economics and Culture, 
Cambridge : Stanford, University Press
Hoffman, Stanley, 1989, ‘The Problem of Intervention”, Intervention in World 
Politics, Bull Hedley eds, Oxford, Clarendon Press
Hojberg, Anne-Else, “The European Security Structure. A Plethora of 
Organisations?”, NATO Rewiev, Vol.43No.6, Nov. 1995, pp 30-39
Holsti, O.R., Hopmann, P.T. and Sullivan, J.D., 1973, Unity and Disintegration in 
International Alliances: Comparative Studies, New York: John Wiley&Sons
Huntington, Samuel P., 1998, The Clash o f Civilisations and the Remarking of the 
World Order, New York: Touchstone Books
127
Huntington, Samuel P., 1991, The Third Wave, Démocratisation in the Late 
Twentieth Century, Norman,OK: University of Oklahoma Press
Jelavich, Barbara, 1983, Balkan History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2 
Volumes
“Joint Statement Following the Political Dialogue meeting at Ministerial Level 
Between the European Union Troika and Albania”, 27 April 1999, Press/99/121, 
Luxembourg
Jordan, Michael J., “Albania Split in Two in the Kosova Question”, RFE-RL, Vol 2, 
Part II, 16 April 1998
Katsirdakis, George, “Albania: A Case Study in the Practical Implementation of 
Partnership for Peace”, NATO Review, Vol. 46, No.2, Summer 1998
Kegley, Charles W., Jr., 1995, “The Neo-Liberal Challenge to Realist Theories of 
World Politics, An Introduction”, Controversies in International Relations Theory’, 
Charles W. Kegley Jr eds., New York, St. Martin’s Press
Keohane, Robert O., "International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?", 
Foreign Policy, Spring 1998, pp 82-96
Keohane, Robert O., 1993, ‘The Diplomacy of Structural Change: Multilateral 
Institutions and State Strategies”, in America and Europe in an Era o f Change, Helga 
Haftendorn and Christian Tuschhoff eds., Boulder, Co, Westview Press,
Keohane, Robert and Nye, Joseph, 1989, Power and Interdependence, London: 
Harper Collins, 2nd eds.
Kornai, J., 1990, The Road to a Free Economy, New York, Norton
Larrabee, F. Stephen, “Long Memories and Short Fuses: Change and Instability in the 
Balkans”, International Security, Vol. 15, no.3, Winter 1990-1991
Larrabee, F. Stephen, 1997, “US Policy in the Balkans: From Containment to 
Strategic Reengagement, Crisis in the Balkans, Views from the Participants, 
Costandine P Danopoulos. and Kostas G. Messas eds., Boulder Co, WesternPress
Linklater, Andrew, 1990, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and 
International Relations, London: Macmillan
Linz, Juan J. and Stepan, Alfred, 1996, Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
Lyle, Robert, “Transition Nations Active in IMF Loans”, RFE-RL, Vol.2, No. 150, 
Part II, 6 August 1998
128
Malcolm, Noel, 1998, Kosovo : A Short History, London, Macmillan Press 
Maastricht Treaty 10 December 1991, Article J.4 (2)
McNeill, William H., 1986, Mythhistory and other Essays, Chicago:University of 
Chicago Press
Mearsheimer John J., “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War”, The Atlantic, Vol. 
266, No.2, August 1990
Memorandum of Foreign Trade Regime of Albania, 1997, document of the accession 
of Albania in WTO, Ministry o f Industry and Economic Cooperation
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, Copenhagen, 6-7 June 
1991
Miall, Hugh, 1993, Shaping the New Europe, London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs
Mitrany, David, 1966, A Working Peace System, Chicago: Quadrangle Books
Mitrany, David, “The Functional Approach to World Organisation”, International 
Affairs, Vol. XXIV, July 1948,
More Patrie, “Planning for the Future of the Balkans”, RFE/RL, Vol 3, No. 90, Part 
II, 10 May 1999
Morgentau, Hans J., 1978, “Introduction”, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for  
Power, New York: Alfred A. Knop
Murphy, Richard, “OSCE hopes Russia will keep trying in Kosovo”, Reuters, April 
06,1999
Nano, Fatos, “Statement in the Albanian Parliament”, Reuters, 9 April 1998
Nazi, Fron, “Washington goes socialist”, War Report, 1998, pp 28-30
Nerlich, Uwe, 1994, “Balkan Security in the European Post-Cold War Environement: 
Challenges and Policy Choices for the West”, The Volatile Powder Keg, Balkan 
Security after the Cold War, F. Larrabee Stephen eds., Washington, The American 
University Press
Nevers, Renee de, “Démocratisation and Ethnic Conflict”, 1995, Ethnic Conflict and 
International Security, Michael Brown eds., Princeton, Princeton University Press
Nodia, Ghia, “How Different are Postcommunist Transitions?”, Journal o f 
Democracy, Vol. 7, No.4, October 1996, pp 1-12
129
Nye Joseph S., 1971, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional 
Organisation, Boston: Little, Brown
ODHIR Bulletin, Winter 1994/1995, Vol 3, N r.l, “The Republic of Albania, 
Referendum on the Draft Constitution”
ODHIR Bulletin, Winter 1994/95, Vol.3, No.l “High Comissioner on National 
Minorities, Albania”
O’Rourke Breffni, “EU to develop ties with Albania, Macedonia”, RFE/RL, Vol II, 
23 April 1999
OSCE Newsletter, Vol. 5, no. 4, April 1998, “OSCE Presence in Albania”
OSCE Newsletter, Vol. 5, no. 12, December 1998, “Round-tables on Draft 
Ombudsman Law for Albania”
OSCE Newsletter, Vol. 5, no. 9, September 1998, “Crisis in Albania”
OSCE Annual Report, 1994 and 1995
Osgood, Robert, 1968, Alliances and American Foreign Policy, Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press
Pavlowitch, Stevan K., 1999, The Balkans, 1804-1945, London: Longman
Pano, Nicholas, 1968, The People’s Republic o f Albania, Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press
Petersburg Declaration, WEU, June 1992
Petersen, Jan, “NATO’s Next Strategic Concept”, NATO Review, No 2, Vol.46, 
Summer 1998, pp 18-22
Petersen, Niels Helveg, “Toward a European Security Model for the 21st Century”, 
NATO Review, No 6, Vol.45, November-December 1997, pp 4-7
Prezeworski, Adam, 1991, Democraty and the Market: Political and Economic 
Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press
Ramet, Pedro, 1989, ‘The Interplay of Religious Policy and Nationalities Policy in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe”, Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East 
European Politics, Pedro Ramet ed., Durham: Duke University Press
Ruggie John G., “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” International 
Organization", Vol.46, No.3, Summer 1992
130
Ruhle, Michael, “Taking Another Look at NATO’s Role in European Security”, 
NATO Review, No 4, Vol.46, Winter 1998, pp 20-23
Sachs, J., “Building a Market Economy in Poland”, Scientific American, Vol. 3, No. 
266, March 1992, pp 57-65
Summit Declaration on Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Istanbul, 25 June 1992
Santer, Jacques, “The European Union’s Security and Defence Policy, How to Avoid 
Missing the 1996 Rendez-Vous”, Nato Review, Vol. 43, No, 6, November 1995, pp 
3-9
Schmitter, Philippe C. and Karl Terry, Lynn, “The Conceptual Travels of 
Transitologies and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to 
Go?”, Slavic Review 53, No. 1, Spring 1994, pp 180-193
Schonfeld, Roland, 1990, “ Economic Challenges to the Communist States of 
Southeastern Europe”, Problems o f Balkan security, Southeastern Europe in the 
1990s, Paul S. Shoup and George W. Hoffman eds, Washington, DC, The Wilson 
Center Press
Schoplin, George, 1991,“The Political Transitions of Eastern Europe”, Eastern 
Europe...Central Europe...Europe, Stephen R. Graubard eds., Boulder, Co: 
Westview Press
Schweid, Barry, “Trying to Mend Fences with Russia”, Associated Press, April 13, 
1999.
Shea, Jamie, 1995, “Should NATO Be Enlarged to the East”, European Security and 
International Institutions after the end o f the Cold War, Marco Carnovale eds., New 
York, St.Martin’s Press
Stieff, Martin, “Talbott Warns of Blood Bath if Balkan Peace Fails to Hold”, 
Washington Times, November 2, 1995
Smith, Alan, 1991, ‘The implications of Change in East Central Europe for the 
Balkan Socialist Economies”, Economic Changes in the Balkan States, 
Sjoberg&Wyzan eds., London, Pinter
Snyder, Jack L., “Averting Anarchy in the New Europe”, International Security, 
Vol. 14, no 4, Spring 1990, pp 81- 97
Solana, Javier, “NATO in the Twenty-First Century”, Perceptions, Volume IV, 
Number 1, March-May 1999, pp 13-22
Starr, Harvey, 1992, “International Law and International Order”, Controversies in 
International Relations Theory, Charles W. Kegley, Jr. eds., New York St. Martin’s 
Press,
131
Stone, Norman, “Two cheers for Colonel Tony Benn”, The Times, 26. March 1999
Strange, Susan, 1996, The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World 
Economy, Cambridge: University Press Cambridge
Talbott, Strobe, "Democracy and the National Interests", Foreign Affairs 75, No.6, 
1995, 39-47
Talbott, Strobe, “US Leadership and the Balkan Challenge”, Remarks at the National 
Press Club, Washington D.C., November 9, 1995
Treadway, Jhon, “Of Shatter Belts and Powder Kegs: A Brief Survey of Yugoslav 
History”, Crisis in the Balkans, Views From the Participants, Costandine P. 
Danopoulos and Kostas G. Messas eds., Boulder Co, Westview Press,
Volkan, Vamik D. and Itzkowitz, Norman, 1994, Turks and Greeks Neighbours in 
Conflict, Huntingdon, The Eothen Press
Volgyes, Ivan, 1986, Politics in Eastern Europe, Chicago: Dorsey Press
Young, Oran R., “International regimes: Problems of Concept Formation”, World 
Politics, Vol. XXXII, No. 3, April 1980
Washington Summit Communique, NATO Press Release, NAC-S (99)64-24 April 
1999
Weber, Max, 1978,“Sultanic Regimes”, Economy and Society: An outline of 
Interpretative Sociology, Roth Guenther and Wittch Claus eds., Berkley: University 
of California Press
WEU Ministerial Council, Rhodes Declaration, 12 May 1998
Worner, Manfred, “NATO Transformed: The Significance of the Rome Summit”, 
NATO Review, No 6, Vol.39, December 1991, pp 3-8
www.osceprag.cz/indexe-se.html
132
